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ABSTRACT 
 
The main aim of this research is to investigate the relationship between corporate 
governance and performance of firms operating in Cyprus and to apply these findings to a 
private university in Cyprus, namely the Frederick University of Cyprus (thereafter 
FUCy).  The main objective of the research is to apply the research findings to the 
improvement of course programmes in accounting and finance and business 
administration. The research focuses on firms operating in Cyprus. However this research 
is supported by overseas research in the area. 
 
In contrast to most previous studies it was found that family firms (thereafter FFs) have a 
negative impact on firm performance however the results of the study provide significant 
evidence that the implementation of corporate governance mechanisms by FFs can lead 
to performance benefits. It was found that FFs that operate in markets where there is full 
compliance with the CGC have a positive impact on firm values. Ensuring more effective 
corporate governance practices and adequate information disclosure are likely to increase 
the confidence of investors in the firm and make the FFs less risky to invest in. This will 
result in lower costs of capital and higher firm values as a result. Furthermore, the results 
of this study generally suggest that the adoption of corporate governance mechanisms has 
some important implications for FFs in the CSE. Corporate governance can greatly assist 
the FF sector via the introduction of better management practices and greater 
opportunities for growth through the utilisation of non-executive directors.  
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Effective corporate governance mechanisms are likely to result in boards exerting much 
needed pressure for improved performance by ensuring that the interests of the firms are 
served.  
 
Empirical evidence also shows differences in the effect of corporate governance 
mechanisms for firms operating in the Alternative Market compared to the Main and 
Parallel Markets. For firms in the Alternative Market, a market with low corporate 
governance standards, the effect of several corporate governance variables was 
significant. For firms operating in AM, it was found that leverage and board size had a 
significant negative impact on Tobin’s Q value, in contrast to the firms operating in the 
MM & PM.  In addition, the number of meetings, insider ownership and the presence of 
audit committees plays a more important positive role in the AM compared to MM&PM. 
Substantial differences between markets are also shown for the relationship of corporate 
governance factors and ROA.  
   
However in contrast to this there is significant evidence from the perception of CSE 
managers that the benefits of corporate governance are not fully understood. Further to 
this there is also evidence of a lack of corporate governance education to students on 
accounting and finance and business administration degree programs in Cyprus. This 
evidence is based on data received from a sample of students and faculty interviews at 
FUCy, one of three private universities operating in the Republic of Cyprus.  
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The main recommendation of the research is that a new module be introduced for both 
the accounting and finance and business administration degrees to meet the increasing 
need for corporate governance education. This will meet the needs of the Cyprus business 
world where the role of corporate governance in business is increasing. This module will 
cover the main aspects concerning corporate governance. It should be mentioned that in 
recent years major professional accounting bodies have increased the coverage of 
corporate governance in their courses and their syllabi. This addition will result in 
benefits to the students and improvements in the relevant degree programmes. 
 
The research is divided into seven chapters. Chapter 1 is an introduction concerning the 
research area. Chapter 2 outlines the research statement, objectives, theoretical 
background and literature review on the subject.  Chapter 3 outlines the methodology of 
the research whereas Chapter 4 outlines the actual project activity and what helped and 
hindered the activity.  Chapter 5 provides an analysis of the findings of the research 
whereas Chapter 6 provides the conclusions, suggestions for future research and 
recommendations. Finally chapter 7 is a reflective account of the researcher’s personal 
and professional learning. It also discussed the impact the project has on the various 
stakeholders. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Chapter summary 
This chapter aims to point out the main themes or problems that are being investigated 
and why there is a need for such research. It also aims to point out the need for the 
research and its importance. It will also illustrate the work context of the research and my 
position in it. Further to this it will justify why the project is appropriate to me to carry 
out. Finally the chapter will highlight the main assumptions and limitations of the 
research.  
 
1.2 Project objectives and goals 
 
The purpose of the project is to apply statistical analysis on Cyprus Stock Exchange 
(thereafter CSE) data and CSE firm’s management interviews, to investigate the impact 
of corporate governance variables on performance of firms. I am a lecturer in Frederick 
University Cyprus (thereafter FUCy) and I am going to apply the corporate governance 
literature and research results in my work environment. Specifically, I will use the results 
of my study, together with the results of student questionnaires and faculty interviews in 
the work environment, to enhance corporate governance education at FUCy.  
 
There are two main reasons for such research.  Firstly, it aims to contribute to the 
literature concerning corporate governance research in Cyprus and secondly, it aims to be 
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used in improving the quality of degree programmes in which I lecture in by examining 
the role of corporate governance education.  
1.3 Importance of research work 
1.3.1 Introduction 
The research investigates the impact of several corporate governance variables on firm 
performance. The research separates into four main categories: board characteristics, 
ownership, control variables and corporate governance code (thereafter CGC) 
compliance. The first category involves variables like CEO duality, board size, board 
composition, frequency of meetings and board expertise. The second category involves 
the investigation of the impact of ownership variables like family and insider ownership. 
The third category involves the effects on performance of control variables such as age, 
size and leverage. Finally, the CGC adoption relates to adoption of the regulatory 
environment on corporate governance that also relates to the adoption of audit and 
remuneration committees.  
 
1.3.2 The researcher’s interest in the subject 
My interest in corporate governance developed from my interest in developments in the 
Cyprus security markets where I wrote a number of research articles. In addition to this I 
was for eight years a financial correspondent for the Cyprus Financial Mirror (a Cypriot 
financial paper) where my job was to carry out financial analysis on the results of public 
companies listed on the CSE. 
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When I was required to pursue a doctorate for my career prospects at FUCy, I decided 
that the most natural choice for a project was an area connected to the CSE. The choice of 
corporate governance as the research area developed due to the fact that it was a new 
development in Cyprus (it was introduced in 2002) and that there was very little 
published research concerning corporate governance in Cyprus. Since I was interested in 
finding out if corporate governance had an impact on the performance of companies in 
the CSE, I decided to pursue a project in this area.  
 
In addition to this I felt that it would also be of benefit if the research were applied to the 
organisation I work through module development with the aim of applying the research 
results to it. 
 
1.3.3 Innovation of research 
The project enhances previous literature results on the following dimensions: 
1. It compiles a new database on corporate governance for firms listed in the CSE. 
2. Unlike earlier research work, the project proposes a unified framework that 
explores the impact of several areas of corporate governance that range from 
board characteristics, ownership characteristics, control variables and corporate 
governance code compliance. 
3. It also examines the effect of family firms (thereafter FFs) versus non-family 
firms (thereafter NFFs) and the effectiveness of corporate governance 
mechanisms in Cyprus that will add to the research literature on corporate 
governance.    
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1.3.4 The application of the research results 
Research concerning corporate governance and performance on the CSE is important to 
the research project since it provides the basis of the conclusions regarding the impact of 
corporate governance mechanisms on performance.  
 
The project outcome could be used as a basis for future publications (such as research 
journal articles) concerning the CSE and corporate governance where there is very little 
or no literature concerning this area. The publication could be geared towards the 
academic community (for its research content), professionals in the financial sector and 
students. 
 
The researcher has taken action in doing this by presenting a research article at the IWBL 
2010 Conference that took place in Larnaca and Limassol on 24-26 June 2010. This 
conference was organised amongst others by Middlesex University and FUCy. The theme 
of the paper is the application of corporate governance research to FUCy and is based on 
work on the researcher’s doctorate project. Further to this it should be mentioned that 
after making the necessary minor revisions my paper will be published in the refereed 
research journal “Higher Education, Skills and Work-based Learning” published by 
Emerald. 
 
1.3.5 Importance of the results for course programs at FUCy  
The results have practical work-related implications regarding the improvement of the 
course programmes and research at Frederick University in the following ways: 
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1. The theoretical background, relevant literature and empirical evidence on 
corporate governance can be incorporated in accounting and finance and business 
administration modules. 
2. The dataset of the study can be used by student for dissertations on the CSE and 
used by faculty staff in further research on corporate governance on the CSE.  
 
Interviews by CSE firm managers intend to clarify whether current management 
perceptions are aligned to the statistical results. They intend to offer possible 
explanations for the empirical results especially where some of the results of the 
empirical data are ambiguous.  The perceptions of the CSE managers will also be used to 
evaluate their knowledge on corporate governance issues and to examine their need for 
corporate governance education. 
 
Student questionnaires show what students perceive concerning the current role of 
corporate governance education and insights concerning its future role. The faculty staff 
interviews provide information the current role of corporate governance education and its 
future role. The views of faculty staff are very important since they are a significant 
component of the organisation and they have the responsibility of making changes to 
course programs.  
 
Hence the student questionnaires and faculty interviews will be used in the study in order 
to obtain information that can help to better structure the course content. Faculty 
interviews, for example, provide information regarding the way modules in this area can 
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be incorporated (e.g., undergraduate or post-graduate courses) while student 
questionnaires help understand the interests of the students. 
 
The School of Economic Sciences and Administration could also use the research (this is 
the school I works in) in developing research ideas that could ultimately lead to funding 
from the European Union (EU) concerning future research. Action has been taken 
towards this direction since a research proposal in the area of corporate governance 
research has already been made to the Research Promotion Foundation (IPE), a 
government organisation that funds research in Cyprus (and has access to EU funding). 
 
Finally, the research could useful to the business community (both in Cyprus and abroad) 
concerning information on the CSE that could be used in making potential investment 
decisions.  
 
1.3.6 Other applications of research results 
The results can be presented to practitioners and in particular firms that are members of 
the CSE. These firms will be able to use the information based on the full sample of all 
firms listed on the CSE used in this study. They can also use the empirical results to gain 
insights on the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and performance 
and invest their resources in the most important aspects. 
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1.4 Work-based Project Context: Frederick  
1.4.1 Introduction 
The work-based project will be based on a literature review and statistical analysis of the 
area of corporate governance and performance in the Cyprus environment (that is the 
CSE) that will be carried out by me the researcher. Using the results from both the 
literature review and the primary data from CSE, the results will be applied to the FUCy 
in the improvement on degree programs in which I lecture. Questionnaires designed to 
capture current students and faculty perceptions about the importance of corporate 
governance for future course program development are also examined.  
 
The work context of the research can be explained by the fact that I am a lecturer at 
FUCy and Frederick Institute of Technology (thereafter FIT) lecturing mainly on the 
Limassol campus. The organisation also has a Nicosia campus where I have lectured in 
the past on professional courses for accountants. I have worked for both these 
organisations for over six years in total where I have taught accounting and finance 
subjects for students predominantly in the School of Economic Sciences and 
Administration. Though I was first employed by FIT in December 2003, I transferred to 
FUCy on 12 September 2007 after the government of the Republic of Cyprus accepted its 
application for university status (Frederick University, 2009). Despite this transfer I still 
teach occasionally for FIT when the need arises.  
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1.4.2 The change from college to university 
FIT, a private college in Cyprus, was the brainchild of its founder Mr. Michael 
Frederickou that operated under a family business culture. Mr. Frederickou has 
significant influence in decision making with a material number of his family and 
relatives having administrative and academic positions in the firm. Another unique 
characteristic of FIT is the bulk of its staff members (that are mainly non-family 
members) have long service to the organisation and there is low staff turnover.     
 
The change from college to university is resulting in a culture change. Though Mr 
Michael Frederickou is Chairman of the University Council of FUCy (Frederick 
University, 2009) and though his family members and relatives have positions in the 
organisation, FUCy is continuing to recruit outsiders to widen the quality of its staff in 
addition to most of the personnel that previously worked for FIT. The change from 
college to university has also resulted in new course programs being offered. One of 
these was the accounting and finance degree that started its operations in the academic 
year 2007-2008 in line with the time when FUCy obtained its university status.  
 
1.4.3 Application of the results to course and research improvement at FUCy 
One of the six schools in the new university was The School of Economics and Sciences. 
This evolved from FIT where it was known as the Department of Business 
Administration. The School of Economics and Sciences operates three degree programs 
in business administration, accounting & finance and maritime studies. The first is taught 
at the Nicosia campus whereas the other two are taught at the Limassol campus. It should 
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be mentioned business administration and maritime studies degree courses operated 
under FIT structure and unlike the accounting and finance degrees have been running for 
some time. Both FIT and FUCy are associated and operate to the current date. Whereas 
FUCy offers undergraduate and postgraduate degree programmes, FIT primarily offers 
diploma programmes. 
 
A problem had arisen in that under FIT the Limassol campus operated a business 
administration degree and under the university rules it was not allowed for this degree to 
be taught simultaneously on two campuses. However under the transitional rules, the 
Limassol campus is allowed to teach to business administration degree students that 
started the course at FIT. Though for the academic year 2009-2010 lessons are taught for 
the three degree programmes, no students can be taught lesson for business 
administration degree for the academic year 2010-2011.  
 
The research results are to be applied predominately to the accounting and finance degree 
program however due to its similarity with the business administration degree it can also 
be applied to this course. Details concerning the outlines of these degree courses may be 
found in Appendix 9, p.40.  
 
One of the strengths of these courses is the fact that they have obtained exemptions from 
the examinations of professional accounting bodies and more specifically the ACCA. The 
accounting and finance degree has achieved nine exemptions from the ACCA 
professional examinations whereas the business administration degree has achieved eight 
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exemptions. It should be mentioned that to pass the ACCA examinations a student must 
pass or get exemptions for 14 modules. Hence the significance is that by successfully 
completing either of the two degree courses mentioned, a student would have gone a 
substantial way to acquiring an ACCA professional qualification. Details of the ACCA 
exemptions are given in Appendix 8, p 239.  
 
Due to the specialist nature of the maritime studies degree, I decided not to apply the 
research findings to this course though this faculty is welcome to apply the research 
findings if it feels it is in its best interest to do so.   
 
One aspect of the research is to consider how the School of Economic Sciences and 
Administration is aiming to improve its degree programs and the doctorate project covers 
three areas that are linked and could make an additional contribution to the program: 
Namely, the CSE, family businesses and corporate governance. 
 
Finally, one of the aims of FUCy is to enhance its status concerning research. (Frederick 
University, 2009). The research from the project could be used as a start to further 
research concerning corporate governance in Cyprus. The FUCy could be used as a host 
research organisation that could lead to European Union (EU) funding for this research. 
This will result in benefits to both FUCy and the researchers involved in this research.  
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1.5 Why the project is appropriate to the researcher  
 
There are a number of reasons why the project is appropriate to me. Firstly, it is in an 
area where I carried out prior research (that is through articles concerning the Cyprus 
securities markets) and has worked in jobs connected to the area (that is as through the 
analysis of the results of public companies in Cyprus). Hence due to this I have prior 
knowledge concerning the research area.  
 
Secondly, my organisation requires me to be involved in research activity as part of the 
requirements of my job and the area of corporate governance is an area with many 
aspects that have not been researched in Cyprus that can provide me with material to 
pursue my research activity. I believe the project could be the start to me establishing a 
specialisation in corporate governance research on the CSE. For example there is little 
research concerning corporate governance announcements and share price performance 
and this could be a research activity avenue I will follow when hopefully I have 
completed my doctorate.  
 
A third reason why the project is appropriate for me is that since I am an investor in the 
CSE, the research findings could be used by me in my future investment strategies. 
 
Finally, the research findings could be used in developing a new module on corporate 
governance on degree courses in which I teach. Currently there is no module on corporate 
governance and the research could be used in determining the content of new modules in 
this area. It should be mentioned that professional accounting bodies such as the ACCA 
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have within the past few years introduced corporate governance to a greater extent in 
their examinations. In addition a number of UK universities do have corporate 
governance modules in their degree courses. 
 
1.6 Assumptions and limitations of research  
1.6.1 Assumptions of research 
The main assumptions of the research are as follows: 
1. Though the type of market was introduced in 2004, the classifications were 
applied retrospectively to 2002-2003. 
2. Concerning the classification between those companies fully complying, partially 
complying and not complying with the corporate governance code (thereafter 
CGC), it was assumed that any firm that does not satisfy all requirements is 
treated as partially complying with the CGC. 
 
1.6.1 Limitations of research 
The main limitations of the research are as follows: 
1. Though the research wished to include variable concerning independent directors, 
it was excluded due to the difficulty of measuring this variable. This is because 
due to the small size of Cyprus it is probable that a director who on paper is 
independent may in practice not be independent due to close ties with other 
directors. 
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2. I had no access to all the financial statements for the research period of a small 
number of firms on the CSE and hence these companies were excluded from the 
statistical testing.  
3. Whist information was obtained concerning directors with a professional or 
university degree, there was no data available concerning directors with financial 
expertise or audit committee members with accounting expertise. This data could 
only be obtained through interviewing senior officials of CSE firms. Due to cost 
and time considerations I did not do this. Hence the research models excluded 
variables for board financial expertise and audit committee members with 
accounting expertise. 
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CHAPTER 2: TERMS OF REFERENCE/THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Chapter summary 
 
This chapter aims to point out the research aims, objectives and research questions. In 
addition it will aim to provide the theoretical background to the research through a 
literature review. The literature review provides evidence of the relationship between 
corporate governance mechanisms and performance. It also looked at the previous 
literature between FFs, corporate governance and performance. The literature is based on 
the corporate governance mechanisms of: board, ownership, CGC compliance and 
control variables.  
 
2.2 Aims, objectives and research questions 
 
Corporate governance is the system by which companies are controlled and directed 
(OECD, 1999). Many countries apply corporate governance practice through the use of a 
corporate governance code (thereafter CGC). Cyprus is no exception with it introducing a 
CGC in 2002. 
 
A main question that needs to be addressed in the research is why there is a need for 
corporate governance in Cyprus. According to Cyprus Securities and Exchange 
Commission (2002) the aims of the CGC in Cyprus include: enhancing investor 
protection; making strong the supervisory role of the board of directors in public listed 
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companies, ensuring there is higher financial disclosure quality and, securing the 
independence of the board of directors when making decisions. According to Ashbaugh 
et al. (2004) corporate governance is needed to reduce agency risk due to the risk that 
managers pursue their own interests at the expense of the shareholders. They add that 
corporate governance mechanisms are needed to monitor managers in order to restrict 
potential opportunistic behaviour. In addition they assert that corporate governance can 
also improve the quality of the information provided by the firm. 
 
Hence corporate governance is about managing firms. In a significant number of 
businesses on the CSE, the firms are owned by one group of persons whilst being 
managed by another group of people. This separation of the ownership from management 
creates an issue of trust. The management must be trusted to run the firm in the interests 
of the owners and other stakeholders.  If the information were available to all 
stakeholders in the same form at the same time, corporate governance would not be an 
issue at all. For example armed with the same information as the managers, the owners 
would not worry about managers investing in useless projects or a customer would not 
worry about a supplier firm not delivering the goods. However in the real world the 
information available is not the same to all stakeholders meaning there is a need for 
corporate governance mechanisms.  
 
The study aims to look at what impact does corporate governance has on performance. 
Though there have been a number of studies that have examined the relationship between 
corporate governance and performance, there is no such published research for the CSE. 
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More specifically the study looks at whether corporate governance mechanisms have an 
effect on performance based on: the type of market, the type of firm and based on the 
perception of CSE managers. According to Maher and Andersson (1999) there are a 
number of potential channels of influence through which governance can affect 
performance. They assert that there is evidence that amongst the corporate governance 
areas that can influence performance are board and ownership factors. The main branch 
concerning ownership factors that would be looked at in the research is to examine the 
performance effects of FFs versus NFFs.    
 
Another aim of project is to examine the current role of corporate governance education 
in FUCy based on data including student questionnaires and faculty staff interviews and 
to make suggestions on its future role in faculty course programs.  
 
Following on from the aims of the project its main objectives are: 
Firstly, to advance the international corporate governance research agenda by describing 
the corporate governance environment for the CSE and to examine the following 
corporate governance areas against performance: board characteristics (including CGC 
compliance variables); ownership characteristics and, control variables. 
 
Secondly, to examine the effect of FFs versus NFFs on the effectiveness of corporate 
governance mechanisms on the CSE based on their market and accounting performance. 
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The final research objective is to apply the theoretical framework on corporate 
governance, previous literature on corporate governance, research evidence from the CSE 
and questionnaires/interviews to students/faculty staff to the development in degree 
programmes in accounting and finance and business administration.  
 
Following on from the objectives of the project, the main research questions are: 
Firstly, what is the effect on firm value of the implementation of board corporate 
governance mechanisms for CSE firms? 
Secondly, is the extent of the relationship between Chief Executive Officer 
(thereafter CEO) duality positively related with market and accounting performance on 
the CSE? 
Thirdly, what is the impact on market performance when CSE firms are listed in 
different markets where the extent of CGC compliance differs?   
Fourthly, what is the effect on market and operating performance of the 
implementation of corporate governance mechanisms for FFs firms listed on the CSE? 
Fifthly, what is the relationship between leverage and performance for both the 
CSE as a whole and for FFs? 
Sixthly, what is the current role of corporate governance education at FUCy? 
Seventhly, what is the extent of the relationship between corporate governance 
theories with the CSE empirical findings? 
Finally, what recommendations can be made to enhancing corporate governance 
education at FUCy based on the research findings?  
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2.3 Statistical models description 
 
The purpose is to test for the above relationship between performance and corporate 
governance mechanisms by testing a linear relationship of the form: 
 
Performance = f (board characteristics, ownership, CGC adoption, control variables) 
 
Where f (x) denotes linear function of x variables.  
 
The following variables have been used for the independent and dependent variables: 
Performance: Return on Assets (thereafter ROA) and Tobin’s Q value. 
Board Characteristics: Board size, board composition, board and management expertise, 
CEO duality and frequency of meetings 
 
Ownership: FFs and insider ownership  
 
CGC adoption: Audit committees and extent of CGC compliance 
 
Control variables: Firm size, age, leverage, sales growth, type of market and type of 
industry. 
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2.4 Literature review  
 
2.4.1 Corporate governance theory 
The OECD (1999) defines corporate governance as “…a system by which business 
corporations are directed and controlled”.  Liandu (2002) defines it “as the way the 
management of a firm is influenced by many stakeholders, including 
owners/shareholders, creditors, managers, employees, suppliers, customers, local 
residents and the government”.   
  
In recent years some very high profile corporate failures that involved fraud and 
questionable business practices (such as Enron and WorldCom) have damaged the 
reputation of business managers. This has led to greater scrutiny of corporate governance 
and for the need for governments to tighten the regulations on corporate governance 
further. In the USA this was done through legislation (the Sarbenes-Oxley Act) whereas 
countries such as Cyprus introduced regulations via a CGC.  
 
Therefore one of the objectives of corporate governance it is a way of mitigating potential 
conflicts between the principal and agent (Ashbaugh et al., 2004). The principal being the 
party that provides the finance (whether it is shareholders or debt holders) whereas the 
agent is represented by the management whose task is to manage in an efficient manner 
so that maximum returns are provided for the principal. According to Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) these agency conflicts may result in agency costs.  
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Agency costs include monitoring expenditures by the principle however may be due to 
losses due to the conflicts in interests between the owners and the managers. The agency 
costs may be reflected in a decrease in share price. Hence to increase firm value, one 
must reduce agency costs. This is how the link between corporate governance and firm 
performance may be viewed.  
 
Disclosure and transparency are also attributes to effective corporate governance practice. 
The OECD (1999) asserts that a corporate government framework should ensure that 
timely and accurate disclosure is made on all material matters regarding the firm 
including the financial situation, performance, ownership and the governance of the firm.  
 
Further to this Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) assert that sound financial disclosure (that 
is an objective of corporate governance) can bridge the information asymmetry gap 
between the managers and shareholders and can minimise agency problems.  They also 
assert that poor financial disclosure that misleads investors will have an adverse effect on 
firm value. They found that effective board and audit committee structures might help the 
quality of disclosure and that will have a positive impact on firm value.  
 
Another objective of corporate governance is investor protection.  OECD (1999) states 
that an element that promotes good corporate governance practice is for the shareholder 
rights to be protected. According to ICAEW (2010) investor protection can be provided 
through an efficient legal and regulatory framework.  
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Corporate governance can be used as a key factor in improving economic efficiency and 
in building investor confidence.  Further to this corporate governance will give incentives 
to the owners and management to adopt objectives that are in the best interests of the firm 
(OECD, 2004). 
 
Economic models that are incentive-based to influence management behaviour may 
motivate some governance features.  
 
One such economic model is an agency model that supports the view that managers have 
different interests to those of the shareholders. It assumes that human behaviour is 
opportunistic and self-serving. This may lead to decisions being made that meet the 
manager’s interest and that are costly to the shareholders. According to Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) agency theory is concerned with aligning the interests of the managers 
and the owners. Those who support the agency model believe that the best option is that 
corporate governance mechanisms should be implemented to protect shareholders from 
management’s conflict of interest (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Otherwise this will generally 
result in negative effects on financial performance.  
 
According to OECD (1999) the agency model recommends that one way corporate 
governance mechanisms could be implemented is for the roles of chairman and CEO to 
be separate (that is non-CEO duality) since it will help the board to be in a better position 
to monitor management opportunism. Evidence on the area tends to be in line with the 
prediction that CEO duality is harmful for firm performance.  
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Yermack (1996) found that if the chairman and managing director are separate persons 
then this could have a positive effect on market performance as measured by Tobin’s Q 
value. Sanda et al. (2003) found a positive relationship between firm performance and 
non-CEO duality. Lam and Lee (2008) found non-CEO duality is good for family 
controlled firms.  Chahine and Tohme (2009) that used data from firms quoted on Middle 
East and North Africa Stock Exchanges found that new issues with firms that applied 
CEO duality under performed issues with non-CEO duality firms over a 6.5-year period.  
 
Agency theory could be used in overcoming conflicts between large shareholders and 
small shareholders. According to Villalonga and Amit (2006) these conflicts could arise 
when a large shareholder who is in a controlling position extracts private benefits at the 
expense of smaller shareholders. The large shareholder who has a controlling stake could 
represent a family interest and would have greater incentives in monitoring the firm and 
expropriating assets at the expense of small shareholders leading to agency problems. 
From this there is an issue as to whether the large versus small shareholder conflicts can 
be detrimental to shareholder value. Claessens et al. (2002) found evidence that the 
excess of shareholder voting rights over cash flow rights has a negative effect on the firm 
value. On the other hand in a Swedish study it was found by Cronqvist and Nilsson 
(2003) that it is cash flow ownership and not excess voting rights that has a negative 
impact on firm value.  
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Another aspect that needs to be considered is whether governance is likely to affect firm 
performance. According to Ashbaugh et al. (2004) governance mechanisms that provide 
more independent monitoring of management will result in the firm having a lower cost 
of equity capital that leads to an increase in firm value. One way firm value may be 
measured (and is used as a performance measure in the research) is Tobin’s Q value. 
According to Daske et al. (2008) higher values of Tobin’s Q could reflect differences in 
cost of capital and/or differences in future cash flows. Tobin’s Q value can capture future 
growth expectations in that it will (all things being equal) show a higher value if future 
cash flows are expected to increase even if the cost of capital stays constant. 
 
Another measure that has been used to measure corporate governance is the return on 
assets (thereafter ROA). According to Yermack (1996, p.201) “If corporate governance 
becomes less effective as board size increases, I expect lower profitability in companies 
with large boards, and I also expect less efficient use of assets. I estimate fixed-effects 
models of board size and three key financial ratios: sales over assets, return on assets, 
and return on sales.” In line with the argument of Yermack (1996) argument for board 
size, a similar argument is used for other corporate governance related variables used in 
this study.  Kiel and Nicholson (2003), Cheng (2008) and Klapper and Love (2002) also 
argue that ROA measures the accounting performance that may be affected by corporate 
governance practice.  
 
The stewardship model supports the view that managers are good stewards of the firm’s 
resources. It asserts that if managers are left alone they will act responsibly and will 
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effectively manage the assets they control (Donaldson 1990; Donaldson and Davis 1991; 
1994). According to Donaldson and Davis (1994) stewardship theorists assert that senior 
management will not purposely put the shareholders in a disadvantage since they fear this 
will jeopardise their reputation. 
 
In contrast to the agency model, the stewardship model implies that there is no need for 
corporate governance mechanisms to be implemented in order to obtain financial 
performance benefits. Supporters of the stewardship theory assert that CEO duality is a 
means to improving performance. According to Donaldson and Davis (1991) this is 
because CEO duality is a positive force leading to effective and efficient decision-
making. 
 
Lam and Lee (2008) using Hong Kong data, found evidence that CEO-duality is good for 
NFFs for this reason. Villalonga and Amit (2006) found that family management adds 
value when the founder serves as the managing director of the firm or as its chairman 
with a non-family managing director. Chen et al. (2005) detect a significant positive 
relationship between duality and market. Hermalin and Weisback (1998) explain that the 
CEO-duality and performance relationship may be endogenous since a CEO may be 
given a chairman’s role as a result of CEO performing well.  Hence they assert that the 
increase in performance may be due to the demonstration of high ability and not of 
duality per se.  
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In addition to the agency and stewardship models, the bonding hypothesis could also be 
examined in the research. According to Karamanou and Nishiotis (2009) under the 
bonding hypothesis, if controlling shareholders increase their disclosure in financial 
statements this will result in a reduced expropriation of the firm’s resources and an 
increase in investor protection. The idea behind bonding theory is that an increase in 
corporate governance mechanisms will result in an increase in firm value.  One way this 
can be applied is for the firms’ to cross list their shares on a stock exchange where there 
is more stringent corporate governance mechanisms (such as US based stock exchanges).   
 
According to Doidge (2004) controlling shareholders can use a US listing to bond 
themselves to reassure minority shareholders that there is less chance that they will be 
exploited.  This can result in benefits to the firms themselves by reducing the cost of 
capital. Reese and Weisbach (2002) found that firms who cross list using the US 
exchange would more easily be able to raise equity finance in their home countries. 
Doidge et al. (2004) found that foreign firms with a US cross listing have a higher 
valuation than those who are not.  They also found that the difference in value is 
negatively correlated to the level of investor protection in the firm’s home country.  
 
Charitou et al. (2007) found that cross-listed firms have more independent boards and 
audit committees after a listing.  They also found that the ownership structures change 
after a listing. In addition they found that there is a positive effect on the firm value of 
cross-listed firms after their listing and agree with the findings of Doidge et al. (2004). 
But Doidge et al. (2009) found that where the private benefits of control are high, 
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controlling shareholders are less likely to cross list on the US exchange and lose these 
benefits.  The bonding hypothesis theory could be applied to the research in that it 
implies that where firms introduce more corporate governance mechanisms this will 
result in a fall in the cost of capital and an increase in the firm value.  This is in line with 
the research that examines the relationship between corporate governance and 
performance. 
 
The research aims to investigate whether the relationship between corporate governance 
and performance in the CSE are in line with the agency model or the stewardship model 
and whether the bonding hypothesis applies. The following subsections I provide a 
background on the CSE, the corporate governance practices around the world and in 
Cyprus, and a detailed literature review on the evidence relating the corporate 
governance, performance and other variables used in this study.  
 
2.4.2 Background to the CSE 
The CSE is relatively new in Cyprus.  According to Georgiou (1997) the capital markets 
existed in an undeveloped form through an over-the-counter market and it was only in 
1996 when the CSE came into being via the Cyprus Securities and Stock Exchange law.  
 
However though the first three years were successful there was a stock exchange bubble 
in 1999 that was the catalyst for a major stock market crash in 2000-2001 where many 
investors lost a lot of money. According to Cyprus Stock Exchange (1996-2007) the 
general index of the CSE fell from a peak of 849.3 points on 29 November 1999 to 
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129.09 points at 31 December 2001. In other words the market lost around 85% of its 
value in a 25-month period. According to Krambia-Kapardis and Psaros (2006) this CSE 
stock market crash triggered the introduction of corporate governance rules to the CSE in 
2002.   
 
An analysis of CSE firms based on industrial classification showed the following at 31 
December 2007: ten firms belonged to the Banking and Insurance sector; eighteen firms 
to the General Financial sector; fifteen firms to the Retail sector, thirty four firms to the 
Industrial and Real Estate Development sector, four firms to the Technology sector and, 
forty one firms to the Other Services sector that includes hotels, travel and leisure firms 
amongst others (Cyprus Stock Exchange, 2008a). 
 
The area of corporate governance is relatively new to Cyprus. According to Krambia-
Kapardis and Psaros (2006) the move to implement corporate governance rules was as a 
result of the CSE collapse in share prices in 2000. According to the Cyprus Stock 
Exchange (2004) the collapse of the CSE in 2000 was partly blamed on insider trading 
and on negligence on the part of officials.  
 
The move towards stricter corporate governance is generally grouped into those that 
concerned the directors, those that concerned the ownership and control and those 
concerning disclosure (see for example, Dennis and McConnell, 2003 and Abor and 
Biekpe, 2007).  
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As a result of the negative effects on the wealth of investors due to the bubble, the Cyprus 
Securities & Exchange Commission introduced the Code of Corporate Governance 
(thereafter CGC) in September 2002 for the CSE (Cyprus Securities & Exchange 
Commission, 2002). The aim of the CGC is to strengthen the monitoring role of the board 
of directors, to protect small shareholders, to adopt greater transparency and to provide 
timely information, as well as to sufficiently safeguard the independence of the Board of 
Directors in its decision - making. According to Krambia-Kapardis and Psaros (2006) the 
code was based on the Anglo-Saxon model that can be explained by the Republic of 
Cyprus’s economic and historical links to the United Kingdom (UK).  
 
Charitou (2005) stated that the CGC in Cyprus was mandatory for firms in the MM. He 
adds that for firms of the Parallel Market (thereafter PM) only Section C (that covers 
areas such as financial reporting, internal controls, the audit and compliance with the 
code) is mandatory. The Code is not mandatory for firm in the Alternative Market 
(thereafter AM). The data supports the view that corporate governance is a large 
determinant of the different markets but there seems to be also other factors. 
 
According to the Cyprus Stock Exchange (2008a) on 31 December 2007, 141 firms were 
listed on the CSE of which 16 companies were listed on the MM, 16 were listed on the 
PM and the rest of companies were listed on the AM and Special Categories Market. This 
includes 19 investment companies. Hence the majority of companies listed on the CSE 
are not required to adopt the CGC since they are listed in the AM or Special Categories 
Market.  
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2.4.3 CGC development around the world and in Cyprus 
Different countries take different approaches to corporate governance.  According to 
Brigham and Ehrhardt (2005) the USA view to corporate governance is that of a set of 
rules and procedures to ensure that managers employ the principles of value based 
management.  According to Fort and Schripani (2000) the United States provides an 
example of a country heavily rooted in a contractarian, shareholder-primacy approach, 
whereas Japan and Germany traditionally have appeared to be more aligned with 
communitarian ideals. Recent events suggest that these traditional distinctions are 
changing, with the resulting entities suggesting a convergence between the two models. 
According to Fort and Schripani (2000) the communitarian theory views the corporation 
as a separate entity, with social responsibilities not only to the shareholders but also to the 
firm's other stakeholders and society at large. On the other hand, the contractarian 
approach considers the firm's shareholders as the primary constituency to whom 
management is accountable. Voluntary contracting and market forces align the interests 
of management and shareholders.  
 
Developments in corporate governance in the UK came into the forefront of UK debate 
with the establishment of the Cadbury committee in 1991 and the publication of the 
Cadbury report in 1992.  The Cadbury committee was set up by the Financial Reporting 
Council, London Stock Exchange and the accounting profession to propose 
improvements to UK corporate governance.  The main aim of the Cadbury report is the 
positive contribution to the promotion of good corporate governance. Its main 
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recommendation is that a CGC should be introduced by recognised stock exchanges to 
assist in achieving high standards of corporate behaviour (Cadbury Committee, 1992). 
 
The Cadbury report concludes that high standards of corporate behaviour will depend on 
the accountability and responsibility of three groups: the board of directors (to the 
shareholders); the shareholders (to the companies they own) and, the management and 
their advisors (to those who rely on their judgment). 
 
The Cadbury report was subsequently improved by further reports by Greenbury (1995) 
and Hampel (1998) as cited by Foulks Lynch (2001) and this led to the publication of the 
Combined Code in 1998 and its revisions in 2003 and 2006.   
 
Due to international developments on corporate governance, it was inevitable at some 
point that the Cyprus authorities would have to introduce regulations on corporate 
governance. Though a little slow by international standards nevertheless corporate 
governance in Cyprus took off in the 21st century. According to Krambia-Kapardis and 
Psaros (2006) this was caused by the collapse of the CSE in 2000-2001 and the fact that 
many investors incurred huge losses. A bubble whereby the market values of firms in 
1999 were way in excess of their fundamental values caused the losses.  
 
Krambia-Kapardis and Psaros (2006) asserted many firms took advantage of the 
weaknesses in the stock exchange computer system and the absence of any regulations on 
corporate governance to manipulate share prices. According to the Cyprus Stock 
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Exchange (2004) the collapse of the CSE in 2000 was partly blamed on insider trading 
and on negligence on the part of officials. 
 
Hence as result the Cyprus Securities & Exchange Commission (2002) introduced the 
CGC in 2002 to improve the situation.  This code is similar to the CGC introduced by the 
UK. For example the Financial Reporting Council (2006) highlights the influential role of 
non-executive directors, states that the role of the Chairman and CEO should be separated 
and requires companies to establish audit committees and remuneration committees. 
Though Cyprus has adopted an Anglo-Saxon model of corporate governance, Rwegasira 
(2000) implies that it is likely to be unsuccessful if not applied to widely dispersed 
owners.   
 
According to Charitou (2005) the Cyprus CGC is mandatory for firms in the Main 
Market (thereafter MM) but not for firms quoted in the other markets such as the Parallel 
Market (thereafter PM) and Alternative Markets and Special Categories Markets 
(thereafter AM). Since at 31 December 2007, 16 firms out of a total of 141 firms were 
listed on the MM (Cyprus Stock Exchange, 2008a) this means that the bulk of firms on 
the CSE do not fully comply with the code.  
 
In 2007 a second edition of the CGC was issued. The revised code proposes the 
establishment of three committees of the board of directors, namely the nomination 
committee, the remuneration committee and the audit committee (Cyprus Securities & 
Exchange Commission, 2007).  In 2009 the CGC was amended to comply within the 
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framework of EU harmonisation. The main amendments concern a clarification of the 
role of independent non-executive directors (thereafter INED) and states that at least 50% 
of board members must be INED for firms on the MM. The amendments are not to be 
implemented immediately since the CSE has given a period of transition until April 2011 
for MM firms to comply with the new amendments (Cse.com.cy, 2009). 
 
Another unique characteristic of the CSE is that the majority of firms are family 
controlled and that there is concentrated ownership (Krambia-Kapardis and Psaros, 
2006).  Hence the CSE is in a situation whereby most companies did not apply the rules 
to combat problems with the principal agent situation. However this does not 
automatically lead to poor performance since Ehikioya (2009) using data from the 
Nigerian Stock Exchange, found that higher concentrated ownership actually leads to 
better performance since this will motivate shareholders to better monitor and control the 
firm that will result in a greater market valuation.  
 
Family businesses are a major aspect of firms listed on the CSE. There is no one 
definition of a family business. According to Handler (1989) the definition can range 
from small informal shops to large public companies. She asserts that the definition 
should be specific to account for these various forms. The definition that is applied to this 
research is from Dyer (1986) who defines a family business as “an organisation in which 
decisions regarding its ownership or management are influenced by a relationship to a 
family.”  Villalonga and Amit (2006) a number of conditions could be used to define a 
family including: the family or families are the largest shareholders; a family or families 
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control at least 20% of the votes of the firm; there is at least one family officer or at least 
one family director and, the family members may be founding members (that is they were 
shareholders when the firm was established) or 2nd or later generations to the original 
founding members. 
  
In this way the definitions given by Dyer (1986) and Villalonga and Amit (2006) will be 
combined to cover firms quoted on the CSE that fall into this category.   
 
In the following sections of the chapter the previous research concerning corporate 
governance mechanisms and performance is reviewed. The literature review is separated 
into sections concerning corporate governance mechanisms and performance such as 
board, ownership, CGC compliance and control factors.  
 
2.4.4 Board factors and corporate governance 
There are various corporate governance board mechanisms that may be related to 
performance. These include amongst others board size, board composition, board and 
management expertise, frequency of board meetings and CEO duality. A summary of the 
previous literature concerning board factors and performance is explained below: 
 
Board size 
There has been a lot of research asserting that the board of directors is one of the most 
important corporate governance mechanisms in controlling and supervising managers 
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(see e.g., Perry and Shivdasani, 2005). Relating to the effectiveness of the board, there is 
long debate of whether the size of the board can affect performance.  
 
Lipton and Lorsch (1992) and Jensen (1993) support the view that large boards are 
ineffective while small boards are more effective and easier for the managing director to 
control. Jensen (1993) argues that when the board size is more than 7-8 individuals this 
creates an ineffective management of the board. He points out that the reasons for the 
ineffective management may be due to board culture (that is the inability of the board to 
confront-disagree with other members) and the lack of board member’s equity ownership.  
 
Yermack (1996) found that smaller boards are correlated with higher firm value. He 
provides empirical evidence using US data that firms with larger boards tend to correlate 
with lower Tobin Q values. Vafeas (1999) also reports a negative relation between board 
size and firm value as measured by market to book ratio.  
 
Other researchers have different views on the matter. Cowen and Osborne (1993) found 
that performance of small businesses would improve when board size is increased and 
this increase is due to the introduction of non-executive directors.  Their study focuses on 
family businesses alone. Coles et al. (2008) found that very small or very large boards are 
optimal and dispute the findings of Yermack (1996) since they found that complex firms 
need large boards with external directors. Cheng (2008) found that firms with larger 
boards have lower variability of financial performance due to the fact that large boards 
tend to make less extreme decisions through consensus and this leads to less variation in 
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performance. Larmou and Vafeas (2010) using US data found that increases in board 
sizes for smaller firms with a history of poor operating performance will be associated 
with better market performance. 
 
Hence it would appear from the above that the board size may show evidence of complex 
behaviour and its effect on performance should probably be seen in connection with other 
variables like the skills of the board, the percentage of non-executives in the firm and 
firm size and board meetings.   
 
Board composition 
Another corporate governance mechanism that is anticipated to affect corporate 
governance is board composition. The board may be composed of executive and non-
executive directors. Executive directors are full time employees of the firm and have 
managerial duties whereas non-executive directors primary employment is outside the 
firm and are expected to provide advice on the firm’s future strategy. Non-executive 
directors can be either independent of the firm and other management members or they 
may have some dependence either through connected business activities, or other 
relationships.  
 
Non-executive directors that are independent are meant to monitor the management. Non-
executive members that are dependent are meant to provide specialised knowledge, long 
experience and useful business links that can facilitate business activities.  
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Previous research has given mixed results concerning the relationship between board 
composition and performance. Baysinger and Butler (1985) found that there was a 
positive effect on stock returns if non-executive directors are appointed. Yoo (2005) 
found that there is a positive effect on financial performance where there are non-
executive directors. He asserts that this is under the condition that executive directors 
have adequate firm-specific knowledge that is combined by the professional skills of non-
executive directors.  
 
Yoo (2005) also concludes that the link between financial performance and non-
executive directors can only be supported if the non-executive directors are independent 
from the executive directors. This shows that the positive relationship between non-
executives and good performance would appear to depend on the factors of the level of 
independence and expertise of non-executives. However, Bhagat and Black (1999) and 
Bhagat and Black (2002) found no significant relationship between board composition 
and performance using Tobin’s Q value as a measure of performance.  
 
Bhagat and Black (1999) gave a number of explanations as to why independent non-
executive directors do not have a positive effect on performance. One of the reasons is 
that the monetary rewards from the firms to non-executive directors are minimal giving 
them little motivation to be seriously involved in a firm’s strategy. Another reason is that 
they believe that the extent of the knowledge of the business by the non-executive 
director is of higher importance to the success of the business than whether they are 
independent from the executive directors.  
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The previous literature suggests an ambiguous effect of the percentage of non-executives 
and performance. Some authors argue that independence may be important but the 
majority of evidence suggests that more important is their level of skills. The analysis 
thus will include the percentage of non-executives while controlling for other factors and 
especially the board skill levels. In the project, it was very difficult to establish whether a 
non-executive member was independent from the board. It was anticipated in the research 
that non-executive board members in Cypriot firms are appointed either because of 
specialised knowledge or because of good business links that can facilitate business 
transactions.  
 
Management turnover 
Another link that could be considered is that between top management turnover and 
corporate performance and whether the recruitment and dismissal of top-level 
management will have an effect on performance.  
 
Dahya et al. (2002) found that there was a negative relationship between corporate 
performance and top management turnover both before and after the implementation of 
the UK CGC. They assert that the increase in outside board members after the 
implementation of the CGC explained this phenomenon. This is in contrast to the 
argument that an increase in outside directors will have a positive effect on corporate 
performance. 
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The variable of management turnover and performance has not been considered due to 
the small size of the population of management turnovers. The population of CSE firms 
at 31 December 2007 is 141 and the bulk of firms have not changed their management 
during the period 2002-2007. Hence it was found that any analysis of this variable might 
lead to misleading results due to insufficiency of the data.  
 
Board and management expertise 
Other corporate governance mechanisms concerning the board are board and 
management skills. Although skills may have a broader meaning, in this study we 
measure skills by the educational background of the manager or board, a definition that 
was applied by Abor and Biekpe (2007) and Ehikioya (2008). Both these studies 
examined the relationship between corporate governance and performance in developing 
stock exchanges like the CSE.  
 
However the Security and Exchange Commission in the USA defined expertise with 
respect to relative financial experience. This definition was not applied to the CSE due to 
the unavailability of this data that could be obtained via interviews of senior officials of 
CSE firms. Due to time and cost constraints of the project it was decided not to pursue 
this definition and to apply the definition by Abor and Biekpe (2007) and Ehikioya 
(2008) that have been used in studies for developing markets such as the CSE.  
 
Concerning the relationship between skills and performance, Lybaert (1998) using data 
from small and medium size enterprises (thereafter SMEs) from Belgium found that there 
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is a positive relationship between higher levels of education and firm performance. These 
results however were conflicted by Lawrie (1998) who found that management expertise 
is not such an important factor affecting performance when specialist staff skills are 
accounted for.  
 
Abor and Biekpe (2007) who used data from Ghanaian SMEs found a positive 
relationship between management skills and performance but found a negative 
relationship between board skills and performance. The reason cited for the difference in 
the results is that a management skill is a more important variable in influencing 
performance than board skills. 
 
Theoretical arguments are in favour of a positive relationship between board or 
management skills and firm performance.  However, some prior studies have produced 
mixed results. Our goal is to investigate the association of board skills with performance 
measures (ROA and Tobin’s Q value) for CSE firms. Due to the strong correlation shown 
between board and management skills, it was decided that in order for the regression 
model to be more robust that the management skills variable would be excluded. 
 
The frequency of board meetings 
There are two schools of thought concerning the frequency of board meetings to 
performance. One view is that a higher meeting frequency can increase performance. 
Conger et al. (1998) found that board meetings can be used to make the firm more 
effective. However, this is under the condition that the board is committed to managing 
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and is not distracted by other issues. This will enable the board to monitor the 
management in an effective manner.  
 
The second school of thought is that meetings are not useful and do not assist in 
enhancing performance. One reason is that the agenda for meetings are not set by the 
non-executive directors hence they may not be in a position to raise issues that they view 
are important in improving the performance of the firm. 
 
Vafeas (1999) looks deeper into the factors affecting the frequency of board meetings. He 
found that there is a negative relationship between the number of board meetings and 
firm value as measured by market to book ratio. He found evidence to suggest that boards 
that have a higher number of board meetings are usually associated with firm poor 
performance and a board effort to improve firm operating performance.  He found that 
share price declines follow higher board meeting frequency but he also finds that board 
frequency can subsequently increase operating performance.  
 
CEO Duality 
Another aspect of corporate governance board mechanisms that can affect performance is 
duality of the role of the chairman and chief executive officer (thereafter CEO). This is 
known as CEO duality. CEO duality is a corporate governance mechanism that can affect 
performance. The previous research into this area looked whether CEO duality will lead 
to better or worse performance.  There are three views concerning CEO duality.    
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The first view supports that of non-CEO duality and the agency theory. Those who 
support non-CEO duality believe the best option is for the roles of chairman and CEO to 
be separated since it will help the board will be in a better position to monitor 
management opportunism. Evidence on this area tends to be in line with the prediction 
that CEO duality is harmful for firm performance. Yermack (1996) found that non-CEO 
duality could have a positive effect on stock returns. Sanda et al. (2003) also found a 
positive relationship between firm performance and non-CEO duality. Further to this 
Lam and Lee (2008) found non-CEO duality is good for family controlled firms.  
 
The second view supported by stewardship theory supports the view that CEO duality 
can be successful since the managers may be good stewards of the firm’s resources. Lam 
and Lee (2008) using Hong Kong data, found evidence that CEO duality is good for 
NFFs for this reason. Chen et al. (2005) detects a significant positive relationship 
between CEO duality and market value.  
 
The third view states that there is no conclusive relationship between CEO duality and 
performance. This supports the view that a firm may be successful despite its board 
leadership. Daily and Dalton (1992) found no relationship between CEO duality and 
performance based on data from the Inc. 100 (the hundred fastest growing US private 
companies). Of course these firms, being in the 100 fastest league imply a well-structured 
management set-up that can perform well irrespective of board leadership composition. 
Brickley et al. (1997) considers the relationship between CEO duality and firm 
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performance and found little evidence that combining or separating the roles of chairman 
and the CEO affects performance. 
  
Based on the previous literature the corporate governance variable of CEO duality will be 
used to assess its impact on performance for firms listed on the CSE including FFs.     
 
2.4.5 Ownership factors and corporate governance 
The relationship between ownership factors and performance originates by research by 
Berle and Means (1932) who found a negative relationship between diffused 
shareholdings and performance. They stressed that when managers hold little equity in 
the firm and the shareholders are too dispersed to maximise firm value, firm assets may 
be used to benefit managers rather than the shareholders.  
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) explained the problems concerning the separation of 
ownership and control and asserted that the agency agreement (between owners and 
managers) may not work due to conflicts between the objectives of the owners and 
management. 
 
Insider ownership 
Hart (1995) and Shliefer and Vishney (1997) presented corporate governance 
mechanisms to deal with these conflicts between managers and the owners. Amongst the 
variables considered by Hart (1995) and Shleifer and Vishney (1997) was the insider 
ownership. There are two schools of thought for insider ownership. 
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The first is that there is a positive relationship between insider ownership and 
performance. Jensen and Meckling (1976) provided evidence that firm value is positively 
correlated with the level of insider ownership. They assert that this is because there will 
be reduced agency costs since there is goal congruence between the management and its 
shareholders. Kiel (2003) found a positive relationship between the board representation 
of insiders and firm value. Cole and Mehran (1998) found that the greater the increase in 
insider ownership is, the greater the improvement in performance will be due to goal 
congruence. Hence the implications of these research findings are that when insiders have 
large stakes they will be motivated to maximise their wealth and hence this will drive 
them to improve their performance.  
 
The second school of though is that the relationship between insider ownership and 
performance is negative. This could be explained by the fact that insiders could make 
decisions that may be in their interests to the detriment of the other minority shareholders 
and the firm as a whole. Morck et al. (1988) found evidence that for this reason certain 
FFs that have high insider ownership had a negative effect on performance.  
 
However in contrast to this Mishra et al. (2001) that used Norwegian data found a 
positive correlation between the founding family being in control and firm value. They 
also concluded that firm value was greater for younger firms with a smaller board of 
directors whereas the opposite was true for older companies. Randoy and Goel (2003) 
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found that a high level of board and insider ownership had a positive effect on 
performance on founder firms and a negative effect if a non-founder leads the firm.  
 
Based on the previous literature the corporate governance variable of insider ownership 
will be assessed against performance. The research aims to add to the literature by 
examining how insider ownership affects the performance on the CSE.    
 
Family ownership 
FFs are the most common form of business organisation in the world. This is no different 
in Cyprus where the majority of quoted companies are FFs. FFs operate differently from 
NFFs since they may set different objectives. Daily and Dollinger (1992) found evidence 
that family owners concentrate on long-term financial objectives whereas NFFs 
concentrate on short-term financial objectives in order to satisfy the objectives of their 
shareholders.  
 
The implications of this are that FFs are more interested in the long-term picture of the 
firm and improving its profitability at the expense of short-term gain. This may not be to 
the liking of investors who tend to prefer short-term gains. However NFFs have a diverse 
range of shareholders who usually more interested in short-term gains (an increase in 
their investment) than the long-term picture of the firm.  
 
Some studies assert that FFs are generally more efficient than NFFs. Fama and Jensen 
(1983) assert that the reason why FFs are efficient compared to NFFs is due to lower 
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monitoring costs (that is lower costs related to corporate governance). Daily and 
Dollinger (1992) found evidence that these performance advantages are due to the 
unification of control and management, McConaughty (2000) supporting this by finding 
evidence that founding family CEO’s have more incentives than NFFs that lead to 
efficiencies in monitoring.  
 
Family ownership is a corporate governance mechanism that can affect performance 
though according to Martinez et al. (2007) there are two schools of thoughts concerning 
the costs and benefits of family businesses. One is that there are costs of family 
ownership in that they can appoint incompetent family members to manage the business 
whereas the other school of thought states that family ownership provides benefits in the 
form of long-term commitment and the ability to monitor managers. If the former 
statement applies then it anticipated that family ownership will have a negative effect on 
performance since incompetent family members are likely to make bad decisions that will 
results in negative effects on profitability and hence performance. On the other hand if 
the later statement is true then family managers will be motivated to perform well and 
this should have a positive effect on performance.     
 
Past studies reflect these two schools of thought. Fama and Jensen (1983) and Mishra et 
al. (2001) found that founding family businesses offer a type of corporate governance that 
offers lower agency costs and better performance. McConaughty et al. (1998) found 
evidence that there is a relationship between family control and higher firm performance. 
They explain this by stating FFs are more motivated to increase firm value. Anderson and 
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Reeb (2003) that used US data of FFs and NFFs, found evidence that the benefits of FFs 
were in excess to their costs. They used ROA and Tobin’s Q value as measures of 
performance. These findings were also supported by tests on the Ghana Stock Exchange 
by Abor and Biekpe (2007). 
 
Martinez et al. (2007) also found that FFs listed on the Chilean Stock Market have 
performance advantages over NFFs and explain this is due to FFs professionalising their 
management and by strengthening their corporate governance mechanisms.  
 
Another issue that needed to be looked at was the relationship between family ownership 
and share price performance. Morck et al. (1988) found that founding family controlled 
firms operate more efficiently (based on market performance) and carry less debt than 
NFFs. However in contrast to this Slovin and Sushka (1988) found that on the death of 
block holders, there is no significant effect on market capitalisation. Kang (2000) found 
evidence of a positive relationship between family ownership and performance. He 
explains this phenomenon as being due to the family taking a leading role on the board. 
He also found that there is a positive association in performance (when measured by 
ROA and Tobin’s Q) when a family member has an ownership stake providing there is 
non-CEO duality.  
 
However Gomez-Mejia et al. (2001) found that founding FFs may lead to management 
practices that may be to the detriment to the firm that will result in weaker performance. 
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Faccio et al. (2001) provided evidence that showed that FFs in East Asian countries 
incurred significant costs due to severe expropriations of assets by the family.  
 
However not all research shows a relationship between family ownership and 
performance. Daily and Dalton (1992) concluded that there was no relationship between 
family ownership and performance.  This was in conflict with Daily and Dollinger (1992) 
who found evidence that family-owned and managed firms have performance advantages 
due to the unification of ownership and control.  
 
There has also been past research concerning the relationship of FFs and corporate 
governance board mechanisms. According to Chen and Jaggi (2000) it was found that the 
independence of directors if the firm is family controlled. They assert that this is due to 
the relationship these directors may have with the family members.  They also found that 
FFs make fewer accounting disclosures than NFFs. Claessens et al. (1999), using Hong 
Kong data, found evidence that family controlled firms may exploit opportunities that are 
in conflict with the interests of minority shareholders with the result being the later are 
exploited. They found that the family control factor would have a negative affect on the 
effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms. 
 
In Cyprus a major research question that is unanswered involves the relationship between 
family ownership and performance. This is especially important since Cyprus has a 
family business culture with the vast majority of both private and public firms being 
family owned. Based on the previous literature the corporate governance variable of 
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family ownership will be assessed against performance. The research aims to add to the 
literature by answering the research question examining the extent of the relationship 
between family ownership and the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms 
using a family interactions model.  
 
Foreign ownership 
There is very little research concerning the relationship between foreign ownership and 
performance. Concerning foreign ownership Yoo (2005) found a relationship between 
foreign investors and the financial performance of a firm. The sample of data used by 
Yoo (2005) was based on the Korean Stock Exchange that is an emerging market (as is 
the CSE). Yoo (2005) explained the reason for this link is that foreign investors are 
actively involved in monitoring these firms that has a positive effect on performance. In 
addition Yoo (2005) asserts that foreign board members have a positive effect on firm 
performance.  
 
Due to the difficulties in measuring foreign ownership (due to fact that such shareholding 
may be under the limit for disclosure on the CSE) it was decided not to include foreign 
ownership in the empirical models.    
 
2.4.6 CGC compliance and firm value 
The research literature concerning committees and performance is not as extensive as 
other corporate governance mechanisms. Although stricter adoption of the corporate 
governance code may help a firm reduce agency costs, this does not necessarily imply 
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that stricter adoption of the code will lead to better performance since the costs of 
adoption (economic and other) may outweigh the benefits. In fact, Chhaochharia and 
Grinstein (2007) found an overall negative relationship between corporate governance 
compliance relating to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and firm value. This may relate to the 
complications and high costs arising in implementing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. They also 
found that large firms that are less compliant with corporate governance rules earn 
positive abnormal returns whereas the opposite is true for small firms, i.e., small firms 
that are less compliant earn negative abnormal returns. 
 
According to Cyprus Securities and Exchange Commission (2007) various committees 
such as the audit and remuneration are required by the Cyprus CGC in order to comply 
with the CGC. This is to ensure that the firm implements effective corporate governance 
practice. However as mentioned earlier, only firms on the MM are required to fully 
comply with the Cyprus CGC hence a large number of firms on the CSE do not operate 
these committees.  
 
Klein (1998), using US data, found that if there were a lower percentage of non-executive 
directors on audit committees then the firm would register significantly greater ROA and 
share price returns than their corresponding firms. However the research on audit 
committees has been geared towards looking at the relationship between the effectiveness 
of audit committees and its impact on firm value. 
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The Blue Ribbon Committee (1999) as cited by Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) provided 
a number of characteristics that an effective audit committee should have. Firstly they 
promote the notion of independent directors should serve on audit committees since they 
are likely to ensure objective financial information is disclosed. Secondly, they 
recommend they should have financial skills and be able to interpret the information 
given to them (including audited accounts) correctly. Thirdly, the recommend that at least 
one member should have accounting or financial management expertise. Fourthly, it is 
recommended that audit committees should have at least three members and finally, they 
recommend that audit committees should meet as frequently as possible to effectively 
carry out their monitoring duties. Further to this DeZoort et al. (2002) state that an 
effective audit committee is a body with qualified members with the authority and 
resources to protect the interests of stakeholders.  
 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Bill (2002). has followed the line of the Blue Ribbon Committee 
(1999). It states that the USA firms should include in their audit committees directors 
with financial expertise. 
 
Karamanou and Vafeas (2005), using US data (Fortunes 500 firms) found that more 
effective audit committee structures are likely to lead to more accurate financial 
information being given to users of accounts and this will have a positive effect on share 
price performance. Further to this they found evidence that the market puts great 
emphasis on the independency of boards and audit committee structure (that is it consists 
of accounting experts) when bad news is announced.  Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) also 
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found evidence that corporate governance matters in firms and is associated with less 
information asymmetry between owners and shareholders.  
 
Further to this Karamanou and Nishiotis (2009) add to the results of Karamanou and 
Vafeas (2005) by stated that that increased disclosure has positive, statistically and 
economically significant effect on firm value. They found that abnormal returns are 
registered when firms voluntarily adopt international accounting standards. They assert 
that increased disclosure is important for corporate governance in general. 
 
Concerning the relationship between audit committees and firm performance, Defond et 
al. (2005) found that there is a positive effect on the share price (abnormal returns) when 
“accounting” financial experts are appointed to the audit committee as opposed to “non-
accounting” experts. Defond et al. (2005) defines accounting experts as being those 
directors who have experience as financial accountants (whether in practice or industry) 
or as auditors.  Chan and Li (2008) also found a positive relationship between Tobin’s Q 
value and the independence of the audit committee. They state that this is the case if the 
majority of the non-executive directors are independent and have expertise in finance 
issues. Hence from the accounting research there is strong evidence to suggest that if 
accounting experts dominate the audit committee then this will have a positive effect on 
firm value.  
 
The rules concerning audit committees concerning the CSE are not as strict as the USA. 
The Cyprus CGC (2002) states that the chairman of the audit committee should be 
 63
experienced in accounting and finance policy though it does not define what this means.  
However it can be implied that the chairman of the audit committee should be a qualified 
accountant. The CGC does not require any other member to be experienced in accounting 
issues and this can be interpreted as being a weakness since non-accounting experts can 
dominate the committee. However the Cyprus CGC (2002) does state that the committee 
should be a made of a majority of independent non-executive directors.   
 
Based on previous research, the regression model should have examined independent 
directors and the effectiveness of directors.  However since the collection of such 
information was not available on the CSE. This is because there is no existing database 
for these variables. To obtain the data would require separate interviews of CSE firms to 
determine independent directors and accounting experts on the board and on the audit 
committees. It was felt that due to time and cost constraints that this information would 
not be pursued.  However I have outlined this area as one for future research when 
hopefully I have completed my D.Prof degree.  
 
If the variables of independent directors and the effectiveness of audit committees were 
introduced to my research then based on previous research they should have a positive 
effect on firm value.  However I believe that concerning the CSE it is questionable that 
the independence of directors or audit committee effectiveness will have an effect on firm 
value. I have partially covered for these variables in the research by including for board 
composition and a dummy variable for the establishment for the audit committee. I 
believe that if both board composition and the audit committee dummies register positive 
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coefficients in the model that are significant then this is a strong indication that the 
independence of directors and audit committee expertise are likely to have a positive 
impact on firm value. The explanation for this is that non-executive directors will include 
a majority of independent directors as laid down by the CGC and that the code also states 
that the chairman of the audit committee must possess accounting skills. I do admit that 
the independence of directors and audit committee effectiveness are areas that can 
contribute to the corporate governance literature on the CSE and intend to pursue this 
area once I have hopefully successfully completed my doctorate.  
 
Though previous research has looked at the effects of committees on financial disclosure 
and on share price effects, little or no research has looked at whether the establishment of 
an audit committees have an effect on the firm’s performance and a audit committee 
dummy variable intends to be used to examine if there is a relationship between the 
establishment of audit committees and firm value.  In addition the regression models 
intend to examine if FFs that establish audit committees will affect firm value.   
 
The research aims to investigate whether firm performance is higher when corporate 
governance mechanisms are adopted in different markets. In Cyprus, firms can 
participate in different markets depending on meeting certain criteria one important being 
a high degree of adoption of CGC.  
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2.4.7 Control variables and corporate governance 
The control variables concerning corporate governance can be divided into various 
categories such as: age, size, capital structure and the market sector.  
 
The research literature on control factors is not as extensive as corporate governance 
mechanisms such as directors and ownership but two studies by Both Anderson and Reeb 
(2003) and Martinez et al. (2007) found evidence that the control factors of age, size and 
capital structure have an effect on performance. They found evidence that there is 
stronger firm performance for FFs as opposed to NFFs when controlling for control 
factors such as size, debt and age. They also both found evidence to disagree with the 
notion that family ownership is less efficient and harmful for minority shareholders. 
 
The capital structure of a firm could be related to ownership structure. According to Kim 
and Sorenson (1986) higher insider ownership was associated with higher leverage (that 
is gearing ratios).  On the other hand Berger et al. (1997) found that leverage is 
significantly lower where a firm has no major shareholders. They assert that this can be 
explained by the fact that the managers in these firms will avoid debt for its governance 
role.  
 
Ghaddar (2003) using Chilean data (where quoted companies are dominated by FFs) 
found evidence that the gearing ratio will be increased upon the arrival of a new major 
shareholder. He asserts that major shareholders play a major role in monitoring and 
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making sure they act in the best interests of shareholders and that this may also be in the 
interests of the debt holders.  
 
Ghaddar (2003) also found that firms that have a high insider ownership concentration 
are expected to have higher gearing than low insider ownership concentration. He asserts 
that this is because high levels of ownership will wish to avoid ownership dilution. He 
also found evidence to suggest that FFs (with a controlling interest) have higher levels of 
gearing than NFFs. He supports that an explanation for this is the avoidance of ownership 
dilution and the maintenance of control in their respective firms. Ghaddar (2003) states 
that another reason for explaining higher gearing in FFs is that higher gearing can 
overcome the wealth constraints of FFs by enabling them to expand their operations 
without reducing their ownership stake.  
 
Anderson et al. (2002) using US data, found evidence that firms that were controlled by 
the founding family have lower cost of financing when compared to other firms. They 
assert that this is due to these firms having incentive schemes that result in fewer agency 
conflicts between ordinary shareholders and debt holders. They assert that debt holders 
perceive founding family ownership as having organisation structures that protect their 
interests. Anderson et al. (2002) also found that institutional shareholders (outside block 
holders) have no effect on the gearing ratios of founder family owned firms. A possible 
reason given for this is that the outside block holders have the confidence to allow the 
founding FFs to manage and monitor the businesses.   
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In Cyprus a major research question that is unanswered involves the relationship between 
control variables and performance. The research aims to add to the literature by 
answering the research question examining the extent of the relationship between control 
variables and performance.  
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY 
 
 
3.1 Chapter summary 
 
This chapter aims to point out the research methodology. It will focus on issues such as: 
philosophical paradigms, research approaches, data collection techniques, the area of 
triangulation, validity and reliability, sampling, data analysis methods, ethical 
considerations, operational definitions and the role of the worker researcher. 
 
3.2 Philosophical paradigms 
 
According to Collis and Hussey (2003) there are two main research paradigms: 
positivistic and phenomenological. A quantitative methodology comes under the 
positivistic paradigm that Collis and Hussey (2003) explain as being one that seeks the 
facts or causes of social phenomena with little regard to the subjective state of an 
individual. According to Bryman (2004) under positivism, hypotheses are generated and 
tested to allow explanations of laws to be assessed. Bryman calls this the law of 
deductivism. 
 
The qualitative methodology comes under the phenomenological paradigm that Collis 
and Hussey (2003) explain as one that is concerned with understanding human behaviour 
from the participant’s own frame of reference. 
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Creswell (1994) asserts that under the epistemological assumption of a positivistic 
paradigm (quantitative) the researcher is independent from that being researched whereas 
under a phenomenological paradigm (qualitative) the researcher interacts with that being 
researched. Hence in the case of the practitioner researcher the later paradigm minimises 
the distance between the researcher and what is researched. 
 
The research philosophy used in the project is mainly based on the positivistic paradigm 
since a major part is the use of empirical findings.  However an element of the project 
uses a phenomenological philosophy since it aims to understand the human behaviour 
from the participant’s own frame of reference through the use of interviews and 
questionnaires. 
 
3.3 Research approach 
 
3.3.1 Research designs  
According to Bryman (2004) a research design provides a framework for data collection 
and data analysis. There are a number of research designs that the practitioner researcher 
(that is a person who carried out research concerning the organisation he works for) can 
adopt. The two research designs can be grouped as qualitative and quantitative. Research 
may solely use one of these designs or it may combine both.  
 
According to Bell (1999) qualitative methodologies are concerned with analysing the 
individuals’ perception of the world whereas quantitative methodologies collect facts and 
 70
study the relationship of one set of facts to another by measuring them with scientific 
techniques. A quantitative methodology comes under the positivistic paradigm that Collis 
and Hussey (2003) explain as being one that seeks the facts or causes of social 
phenomena with little regard to the subjective state of an individual. 
 
The research project aims to use a combination of both quantitative and qualitative 
research designs. 
 
One research design that is used in the research is a quasi-experimental design. 
According to Gill and Johnson (1997) a quasi-experiment is the investigation of an 
environment that existed, or events that have occurred naturally, without the investigators 
direct intervention. The prime aim of the quasi-experiment is to analyse casual 
relationships between independent and dependent variables. 
 
The research aims to include a quasi-experiment design since it aims to analyse the 
relationship between independent variables of corporate governance on the CSE 
(directors, ownership, family ownership CGC compliance and control variables) against 
the dependent variable that is the financial performance measurement of the CSE. The 
relationship is to be analysed using empirical methods. According to Gill and Johnson 
(1997) one of the reasons for choosing the quasi-experiment design is because it allows 
the research to be conducted in actual settings and any research findings can be 
extrapolated.  
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Another of the research approaches that have been proposed for the research is action 
research that is to be applied to both quantitative (e.g. questionnaires) and qualitative 
methodologies (e.g. interviews) though Collis and Hussey (2003) categorise as a 
phenomenological methodology since the practitioner researcher is close to what is 
researched. According to Bryman (2004, p. 537) action research is defined as being “an 
approach in which the action researcher and a client collaborate in the diagnosis of a 
problem and in the development of a solution based on the diagnosis”. Concerning the 
research I am an employee in FUCy, the organisation being researched.   
 
Gill and Johnson (1997) assert that action research is an approach whereby the researcher 
is in the role of a consultant by their intervention into some naturally occurring events. 
Blaxter et al (2001) assert that action research is suited for researchers working in their 
own work place and especially in the area of education. 
 
A further research approach that is used in the research is the case study. According to 
Adelman et al (1977) as cited by Bell (1999) a case study is defined as being “an 
umbrella term for a family of research having in common the decision to focus an inquiry 
around an instance.” Blaxter et al (2001) asserts that the case study uses a mixture of 
methods such as: observations, interviews and the study of documents amongst others. 
The case study aspect of the research is justified by the provision of statistical data for a 
particular period on a particular organisation, namely the CSE. 
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The research approach aims to combine a quasi-experimental design, case study with 
action research. The research is separated into two main sections. 
 
The first section is the quasi-experimental design that involves an empirical analysis of 
the relationship between corporate governance, FFs and firm performance for those firms 
quoted on the CSE. 
 
The results of the empirical analysis will then be applied in a number of ways. These are: 
1. To add to the research work of the Faculty (Department) of Economics, 
Accounting and Finance in which I am a faculty member. 
2. To be used as a basis for extending the faculty research in this area. Two members 
of the faculty have already made a research proposal to the EU for future funding 
for further research concerning corporate governance in Cyprus. 
3. To apply the research findings to the organisation I work for as a lecturer by 
improving the course programs of the faculty based on the research findings. 
 
The second main section is the action research approach that involves a number of 
aspects. Action research is carried out in three ways: The first aspect is the interview of 
managers in CSE firms. The interview findings for the sample will enable the data 
triangulation process to occur (that is they will be compared with the empirical findings).  
The purpose of the CSE interviews was to understand through each manager’s 
perspective the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on performance. The CSE 
managers’ interviews are intended to supplement the empirical results in providing 
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explanations for the empirical findings.  The perceptions of the CSE managers will also 
be used to evaluate their knowledge on corporate governance issues and to examine their 
need for corporate governance education. 
 
The second aspect of action research is the questionnaires given and completed by 
students. Since students are important stakeholders in the courses of the faculty then their 
answers will be seriously considered in possible recommendations concerning 
amendments to faculty courses.  
 
The third aspect of action research is the interviews carried out on the faculty staff of the 
university. These interviews are justified in that the faculty is an important stakeholder in 
the organisation, and their findings will be seriously considered concerning changes in 
the course programs.  
 
A further research approach that is used in the research is the case study. The case study 
approach is used it aims is to provide statistical data on the CSE that is applied in the 
research and via the CSE database created by myself can be used for further research on 
the CSE. 
 
3.3.2 Rational for research approach 
One research approach used in the research is a quasi-experimental approach based on 
market data. Regarding the empirical investigation one approach that will be used is 
regression analysis of the ROA on corporate governance and family/non-family 
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dummies. The performance of firms is to be measured using a panel data regression 
model as stated by Abor and Biekpe (2007) that measures performance against four 
sections of corporate governance mechanisms: board factors; ownership factors, CGC 
compliance and control factors. One of the proposed performance measures is the ROA 
since this measure combines the financial performance with the financial position. The 
rationale behind using panel data is that recent research by Abor and Biekpe (2007), Di 
Pietra et al (2008) and Ehikioya (2009) have found that using panel data regression 
techniques there is a good fit in the model when measuring the relationship between 
corporate governance mechanisms and firm performance using ROA. 
 
The board factors include variables such as board size, composition and skill. The 
ownership factors include variables such as family ownership and insider ownership. 
CGC compliance factors are proposed to include the extent of CGC compliance and the 
establishment of audit committees. Control variables are proposed to include the age, 
size, and leverage of the firm. In addition control variables have been used for the type of 
market and the industry to which firms belong in. It should be mentioned that in the 
regression model a positive coefficient of family firm dummy would indicate that FFs on 
average have higher performance than NFFs. 
 
Another statistical approach that is used is the probability of belonging to a high 
performance group based on firm corporate governance characteristics. Since the 
research tests a large sample of firms quoted on the CSE, the research will use descriptive 
statistics and more specifically significance testing (that is the t distribution technique) to 
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assess if there are significant differences in the corporate governance and performance 
variables of family businesses as opposed to non-family businesses for performance.  
 
It also intends to use the differences in the means and significant testing to explain 
differences in the corporate governance and performance variables between the markets. 
The rationale for using descriptive statistics is to identify significant differences in 
variables based on the type of firm and type of market to enable a better explanation of 
the relationship between corporate governance and performance on the CSE. 
 
Action research is also used in the research that could apply both quantitative (e.g. 
questionnaires) and qualitative methodologies (e.g. interviews) though Collis and Hussey 
(2003) categorise as a phenomenological methodology since the practitioner researcher is 
close to what is researched.  
 
According to Bryman (2004) it is a research design where the researcher and an 
organisation work together in the diagnosing a problem and development solutions based 
on the diagnosis. The rationale behind this approach concerning the research is I am 
carrying out research with the aim of making improvements to course programs in FUCy.  
Cohen and Manion (2000) describe action research as an on-the spot procedure that aims 
to deal with a problem in the current situation. Bell (1999) asserts those once the research 
project ends the practitioner researcher will continue to review, evaluate and improve the 
practice.  
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Blaxter et al (2001) also asserts that the strength of action research is that those involved 
in the research process are also participants in the change process hence there is an on-the 
job focus to the research. In the case of the research, I am a lecturer in the Economic, 
Accounting and Finance department and am involved in the design and modification of 
modules connected to degree programs of the School of Economic Sciences and 
Administration. This research could then be applied to improving the quality of the 
degree programs offered especially with respect to the area of corporate governance. 
 
Another reason for the choice of action research that is relevant in this case is highlighted 
by Saunders et al (2003) who assert that the practitioner researcher had the advantage 
under this approach that he has knowledge of the organisation and its complexity 
something an outside researcher may not possess. This is true concerning myself since I 
have worked for the Frederick organisations for a total exceeding six years. 
 
In addition to this the researcher will have access to syllabi of the degree programs 
something that an outside researcher would not have. Further to this, I have access to the 
Middlesex University and Infotrac research database in which he can access both articles 
from research journals together with business statistics useful to his research. 
 
The case study approach is used since a main aim of the research aims is to examine the 
performance of firms connected to corporate governance on the CSE and this requires the 
analysis of statistical data of quoted companies on the CSE. In addition to this data from 
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interviews/questionnaires from senior officials from these companies could be used to 
provide additional data for this study. 
 
3.4 Data collection techniques  
 
The data collected on the project is a mixture of primary and secondary data. According 
to Blaxter et al. (2001) primary data is original data that is collected at source, such as, 
survey data or experimental data whereas secondary data is existing data set that presents 
interpretations, conclusions or knowledge additional to, or different from that presented 
in the original data source. 
 
The main source of secondary data is through documentary data. This has been used to 
collect data for the empirical analysis. The data used in the empirical analysis is to be 
mainly derived from the annual report and accounts of companies quoted on the CSE. 
This data is known as secondary data since it is derived from existing data. 
 
According to Cresswell (1994) the advantages of documentary data are various. One 
advantage is it enables the researcher to obtain data from participants that they have given 
attention to complying. According to Blaxter et al (2001) another reason for using 
documentary data is that if the data were collected originally (i.e. primary data) then it 
would be time consuming and expensive for the researcher. Cresswell (1994) asserts that 
another advantage with documentary data is that the researcher can access the 
information at a time convenient to them. Further to this Bell (1999) asserts that the 
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analysis of documentary data would be used to supplement information obtained from 
other methods (such as interviews and questionnaires). 
 
On the other hand there are some limitations to documentary data. Cresswell (1994) 
asserts that one disadvantage is that documentary data may be unavailable to the public. 
In addition the documents may provide information that is inaccurate.  
 
The annual reports were used as a source for data concerning corporate governance 
variables and performance data due to its availability to the public and due to the high 
likelihood it is reliable due to the fact that independent auditors audit the financial 
statements in the annual reports.  
 
Another source of secondary data is that through the World Wide Web. The company 
announcements were found from the official CSE web site. However, the official stock 
exchange reports announcements are published from 2005 onwards. For the 2002-2004 
period information from the financial web side xak.com has been used. This website 
stores CSE announcements online from 2000 onwards and is widely used by investors 
and is considered a credible resource. The same can be said for the stockwatch.com.cy 
web site that provided information for corporate governance mechanisms such as the 
profile of the firm and its directors. The web sites were to collect data since this was the 
cheapest source for obtaining corporate governance variables such as the frequency of 
meetings. In addition the web sites are reliable sources for data on firms that can be used 
in corporate governance variables. 
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One source of primary data is interviews. Information on governance issues is to be 
obtained through a sample of managers that work for CSE listed firms. The interviews 
will be semi-structured and will cover major issues concerning corporate governance and 
performance measures.  
 
The method of interviewing that is used is telephone interviewing. The interview was 
first send by email to the contact person in the sample firm to enable the participants to 
be familiar with the terms included in the interview. A list of definition of technical terms 
was provided (See Appendix 5, p. 234).  I telephoned the contact person and asked them 
if they wished to participate. If the answer were positive then the interview would take 
place over the phone.  
 
There are a number of reasons that telephone interviewing was preferred over face-to-
face interviews. The first is its lower cost when compared to face-to-face interviews. 
Secondly, since the groups of people interviewed are far apart (based on distance) I found 
it to be the most effective way for interviewing the participants in this case. Finally, 
telephone interviews are considered to be acceptable to the participants concerned (who 
are normally very busy) and it enables the information to be collected with the least 
inconvenience (Institute for Work Based Learning, 2008). 
 
A number of questions were asked to interviewees concerning corporate governance 
issues. These responses to uniform standard questions will contribute to the final analysis 
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of the research findings. In addition during the course of the interviews I asked follow-up 
questions in response to the answers given by the interviewees. 
 
The recording method used for the interview was via hand written notes. Where possible 
the sample included management officials responsible for compliance of corporate 
governance in the firms concerned. The interview included questions covering the main 
aim of the project and the answers are used to supplement the findings from the statistical 
tests. 
 
Interviews were also carried out to faculty staff.  It was felt that by interviewing faculty 
staff useful data could be obtained concerning the course programmes and its relationship 
to corporate governance, FFs and the CSE.  
 
The rationale behind the faculty staff interviews was that since it is an important 
stakeholder concerning course programmes in their departments, their views should not 
be ignored if the research results are to be valid. In addition they are in a position to 
understand the organisation’s culture and possible changes that may be of benefit to it 
concerning course programmes. 
 
The interviews were carried out via an unstructured approach where lecturers were free to 
discuss what is of significance to them concerning corporate governance, family 
businesses and the CSE and their role to the course programs. The interviews were 
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carried out on a face-to-face basis. I decided not to tape the interviews to preserve the 
interviewee’s anonymity.  
 
Another source of primary data used was questionnaires to students. The aim of the 
questionnaires was to obtain data from students, a major stakeholder in FUCy, 
concerning the current and future role of corporate governance in degree programs 
concerning the faculty in which I work in. The questionnaire mainly consisted of closed 
ended questions that were justified due to the fact that they enabled the analysis of the 
results to be easier for me. In addition I felt that it would make the completion of the 
questionnaire by the students easier to achieve.   
 
3.5 Triangulation – Validity - Reliability 
 
After determining the research approach, I had to decide on which are the best methods 
for collecting data. When carrying out research it is possible that more than one data 
collection method may be used in carrying out the research in order to obtain relevant and 
reliable conclusions. This approach is known as triangulation.  
 
One data collection method that is used in the research is documentary data. The 
documentary evidence used for this research is related to the CSE and includes statistical 
data and company announcements. This data is known as secondary data since it is 
derived from existing data. 
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According to Blaxter et al (2001) one of the reasons for using secondary data is that if the 
data were collected originally (i.e. primary data) then it would be time consuming and 
expensive for the researcher. According to Bell (1999) the analysis of documentary data 
would be used to supplement information obtained from other methods (such as 
interviews and questionnaires). 
 
Concerning the validity and reliability of the documentary data, the main source of the 
statistical data was the various annual reports of the firms. Most of the information used 
in the project was from audited information from authorised audit firms. In addition the 
stock exchange announcements were mainly derived from the web page of the Cyprus 
Stock Exchange that is the original source of these announcements  
 
Another data collection method to be used in the research is interviews.  This is known as 
primary data that is derived from the original source.  Bell (1999) asserts that the 
advantage of this approach is its flexibility since unlike a questionnaire the researcher can 
follow up responses from the participants. The interviews are to be carried out with a 
sample of senior officials in companies quoted on the CSE. The sample will consist of 
both family and non-family quoted companies. 
 
The purpose of the CSE interviews was to understand through each manager’s 
perspective the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on performance. The 
questions concerning the relationship between individual corporate governance 
mechanisms and performance were designed to elicit the managers’ interpretations of 
 83
their impact on performance.  For example a question concerning how the frequency of 
meetings affects performance yielded interpretations of the extent of the relationship and 
its cause.  They enabled me to explore how CSE managers perceived the same situation 
as analysed by the empirical models and helped me to develop a deeper understanding of 
how particular corporate governance mechanisms affected performance. Another purpose 
of the CSE managers’ interviews was to examine their knowledge in corporate 
governance issues and to apply it to FUCy concerning possible course in corporate 
governance. 
 
The CSE managers’ interviews are intended to supplement the empirical results in a 
number of ways.  Firstly, if the interview results are in agreement with the empirical 
results they provided additional evidence to support the validity of the results.  Secondly, 
they will provide information concerning the nature of the relationship between 
individual corporate governance mechanisms and performance. Thirdly, where the results 
of the empirical data are ambiguous, they will aim to provide possible interpretations of 
the relationship between corporate governance and performance.   
 
Concerning the validity and reliability of the interviews I realised that one danger was for 
the answers were purposely misleading or biased.  I attempted to mitigate this possibility 
at the beginning of the telephone interviews by assuring interviewees that the information 
given was to be completely confidential with respect to third parties and to board 
members. I also aimed to reassure the participants that the interview questions were not 
aimed to expose or criticise and that the manager’s experience was to be used in the 
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research. I believe this resulted in a frank and open conversation in which interviewees’ 
revealed valid and reliable information. 
 
After future consideration it was felt that by interviewing faculty staff useful data could 
be obtained concerning the course programmes and its relationship to corporate 
governance, family firms and the CSE.  
 
The rationale behind the faculty staff interviews was to obtain additional evidence 
concerning the current and future role of corporate governance education in course 
programs. This information could be used in making improvements to course programs 
based on corporate governance education. Faculty staff interviews were used since they 
are in a position to understand the organisation’s culture and possible changes that may 
be of benefit to it concerning course programmes. 
 
I found a weakness of the faculty interviews was the small size of the sample that did not 
enable me to reach conclusions that were supported by statistical testing. However I used 
faculty staff interviews since the faculty is a very important stakeholder when designing 
course programmes in their departments and their views should not be ignored if the 
research results are to be valid. 
  
A questionnaire is a data collection method to be used in the research. According to 
Collis and Hussey (2003) a questionnaire usually provides quantitative data and asks 
 85
standardised questions to a sample of people. They also assert that it is an easy way of 
collecting information speedily and with a low cost.  
 
In the research, questionnaires were given to a sample of degree students. The purpose of 
the questionnaires was to understand through each student’s perspective the current role 
of corporate governance on course programs and to map out how they perceive the role 
should change if at all. It should be mentioned that students are important stakeholders 
with respect to the degree program and the questionnaire will provide information as to 
possible improvements that could be proposed in the degree programs to improve their 
quality. 
 
Concerning the validity and reliability of the questionnaires, I realised that if the 
questionnaires were complex then the answers may not be reliable. To overcome this I 
tried to make the questionnaire easy to understand to students in order to get reliable 
answers. I believe that the answers of the questionnaire are generally valid since the 
answers given are in agreement with other evidence (that is syllabuses).  
 
3.6 Sampling 
 
The data used in the empirical analysis was derived from the financial statements of 
companies quoted on the CSE. Included in this are firms from both the industrial and 
service sector. The period covered for the empirical analysis was 2002-2007.  
 86
Information on governance and ownership issues were also obtained from interviews 
from the management of a sample of these firms. 
   
The study sampled 101 firms out of a total of 141 firms quoted on the CSE on 31 
December 2007. Appendix 3, pp. 228-231 lists the firms that were included in the 
sample. Investment companies that totalled 19 were excluded from the analysis since 
they mainly invest in firms that are included in the sample. Three firms were excluded 
from the sample due to lack of data and 18 firms were excluded for comparative purposes 
since they were not listed for the full six years covered in the research. 
 
The sample was taken from three sub-markets of the CSE: the MM; the PM and 
companies that are not in these two markets. The latter sub-market is mainly derived of 
companies in the AM and those who have been placed by the CSE Council (in many 
cases temporarily) in a Special Categories Market. The market classification is given 
below in Table 1: 
 
Table 1: Market classification of sample 
 
 Banks & 
Insurance 
General  
Financial 
Retail Industrial 
& real estate
Technology Other  
Services 
Total 
 
Main (MM) 4 1 2 4 1 3 15
   
Parallel (PM) 1 1 2 5 0 4 13
   
Alternative  
& Special (AM) 5 10 8 20 3 27 73
   
TOTALS 10 12 12 29 4 34 101
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Table 1 shows that the majority of CSE firms are listed on the AM where there is no 
requirement for CGC compliance. The sample can also be classified between family and 
NFFs. The firm classification is given below in Table 2: 
 
Table 2: Firm classification of sample 
 
 Family Non-family Total 
 Firms Firms  
    
Main (MM) 9 6 15
    
Parallel (PM) 10 3 13
    
Alternative & 
Special (AM) 58 15 73
    
TOTALS 77 24 101
 
 
The results in Table 2 are in agreement with Shleifer and Vishny (1986), Anderson and 
Reeb (2003) and Villalonga and Amit (2006) that conclude that FFs are at least as 
common amongst quoted companies than NFFs. This is due to the fact that the majority 
of CSE firms are FFs. The domination of FFs is also evident in the MM, PM and AM. 
 
Information on governance issues was obtained through the interview of a sample of the 
management of quoted firms. The sample was to comprise of 21 interviews with the 
management of FFs and 9 interviews with the management of NFFs. This equates to 
21.3% of the CSE population (141 firms at 31 December 2007). The interviews were 
semi-structured and will cover major issues concerning corporate governance.  
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Information on the relevance of corporate governance and family business issues to a 
degree program was applied through the submission of a questionnaire to a sample of 
students from the School of Economic and Social Sciences. The sample was intended to 
comprise of 40 students. This equates to approximately 30% of the population tested. The 
intended demographic characteristics of the sample were done to reflect the demographic 
characteristics of the population as follows: Concerning sex the proposed sample was to 
comprise of 60% females and 40% males. Concerning the course it was to comprise of 
60% business administration students and 40% accounting and finance students.  In 
finally, concerning the year of study it was to comprise of 40% 2nd year students, 35% 
were 3rd year students and 25% were 4th year students.  
 
The questionnaire consisted of uniform standard questions and students were encouraged 
to make general comments on the questions asked.  
 
3.7 Data analysis methods 
 
3.7.1 Multivariate regression models 
The multivariate tests will use a cross sectional regression models with different 
specifications each that will use different variables that will be used to test the 
relationship between corporate governance and firm performance. The models will 
include control variables that have been shown in the literature to influence financial 
performance. 
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The multiple regression models have been used in previous corporate governance and 
performance studies such as Vafeas (1999), Villalonga and Amit (2006), Martinez et al 
(2007), Abor and Biekpe (2007) and Coles et al (2008) and Ehiyioka (2008). The 
multivariate model aims to measure performance against four groups of variables: board 
factors; ownership factors; CGC compliance and control factors.  
 
The regression model proposed applies panel data as applied by Abor and Biekpe (2007), 
Di Pietra et al (2008) and Ehikioya (2009). This method is used where there is a 
considerable amount of cross sectional data (in the research these are the corporate 
governance mechanism variables) and where the numbers of periods are small (in the 
research six years are covered (i.e. 2002-2007). According to Di Pietra (2008) this model 
is applicable where the differences in the corporate governance variables vary at a greater 
extent across firms rather than across years for a specific firm. Hence since in the 
empirical analysis, financial statement data and corporate governance mechanisms 
variables are used that are firm specific, the statistical model used must be in a position to 
account for firm differences something the panel data approach does. 
 
The traditional ordinary least square approach to regression was rejected since this 
approach considers all firm year observations as separate to each when they could be 
related. For example an observation for Firm A in 2002 would be shown separately from 
an observation in 2007 for Firm A when in fact the corporate governance variables are 
similar. In line with Abor and Biekpe (2007), Di Pietra et al (2008) and Ehikioya (2009) 
the panel data model proposed was that with fixed effects. Under this approach the 
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difference across corporate governance mechanism variables can be captured in 
differences in the constant term. Hausman and Taylor (1981) state that the fixed effects 
approach is useful since it is an unbiased method of controlling for omitted variables 
when panel data is applied. 
 
3.7.2 Data analysis of CSE managers interviews 
The data analysis of interviews was carried out by content analysis. It is to be broken in 
two stages: In stage one for the uniform standard questions the responses of each of the 
participants are analysed into categories and analysed; in stage two the non-uniform 
responses will be separated and the researcher will aim to group them with other similar 
answers and compare to dissimilar answers. 
 
The quantitative aspects of the interviews was analysed by a statistical program since it 
will enable the answers to be analysed via description statistics that will enhance the 
analysis of the data.  
 
The interviews of the CSE firm managers aim to examine: 
Performance = f (board characteristics, ownership, CGC adoption, control variables) 
from the perception of management. 
 
Where f (x) denotes linear function of x variables.  
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3.7.3 Data analysis of questionnaires 
A spreadsheet program carried out the data analysis of questionnaire since most of the 
answers are for uniform standard questions. The responses of each of the participants 
were analysed into categories and analysed. For non-uniform responses, the answers will 
be separated and the researcher will aim to group them with other similar answers and 
compare to dissimilar answers.  
 
A statistical program carries out the data analysis of questionnaire since most of the 
answers are for uniform standard questions. The responses of each of the participants are 
analysed into categories and analysed (for example an answer could be classified into the 
following categories: Agree, Disagree, Strongly Disagree etc.). For non-uniform 
responses, the answers will be separated and the researcher will aim to group them with 
other similar answers and compare to dissimilar answers. 
 
The quantitative aspects of the questionnaires were analysed by a statistical program 
since it will enable the answers to be analysed via description statistics that will enhance 
the analysis of the data. The student questionnaires aim to examine the current and future 
role of the areas of corporate governance, CSE and family businesses to the content of 
course programs. 
 
3.7.4 Faculty interview data analysis 
Discourse analysis was used to analyse the interviews. According to Bryman (2004) it is 
a method that analyses talk.  The Institute of Work Based Learning (2008) states it is a 
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qualitative analysis of interactive speech.  It has been so that the researcher interprets 
what the interviewee has said after considering their motives, interests and power 
differentials.  
 
Though there is no set format for analysing discourse analysis, the approach adopted was 
in line with Potter and Wetherell (1994) that applied three main devices. These are: 
 
Firstly, by examining the interviewee’s intentions by examining issues concerning 
corporate governance, family businesses and the CSE. Hence the answers given for 
certain issues by interviewees will be grouped and contrasted and compared. Secondly, 
by examining the details of speech and looking for motives behind them and finally, by 
examining the language to establish alternative perspectives and at the same time aiming 
to expose the interviews intention. 
 
3.8 Ethical considerations 
 
3.8.1 Ethical considerations: An introduction 
In line with Gibbs (2004) and Gibbs and Costley (2006) an ethic of care has been adopted 
in the research to avoid the possibility of exploitation of the stakeholders in the research. 
With this in mind a number of ethical considerations have been adopted for the empirical, 
interviews and questionnaires data. In order to capture the major ethical considerations in 
the research, it was decided that the process would be assisted with the help of the 
completion of an Ethics Release Form that may be found in Appendix 1, p. 223. The 
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completion of the Ethics Release Form is justified in that it ensures that an ethic of care is 
followed in the project. Further to this its content includes amongst others the following 
issues concerning participants: confidentiality issues; avoiding offensive material; the 
safekeeping of data and, ensuring there is no prejudice in the research process.  
 
3.8.2 Ethical issues: Empirical data 
A number of ethical issues must be considered in the collection of empirical data and 
where relevant must be stressed to participants. Some of these ethical issues that are 
based on a list on ethic principles by Blaxter et al (2001) and Bell (1999) include: Access 
to the annual report database of xak.com is only available through having a user name 
and password. An application had been successfully made and I have assured xak.com 
that the data would be used strictly for research purposes and that there is safekeeping of 
data. This is in line with the answer 8 of the Ethics Release Form in Appendix 1, 223.  
 
Secondly, I have assured the officials of xak.com that they will get a copy of research 
made on corporate governance if they should wish. 
 
Thirdly, I have assured firms that the information given in the annual reports and 
accounts given to him will be used solely for research purposes and not for commercial 
considerations. 
 
Finally I offered the opportunity to firms and financial providers to state whether they 
want a copy of research work carried out on corporate governance and I have assured 
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them that I will provide them with a copy once the research is ready for publication (that 
is a research article).   
 
3.8.3 Ethical issues: Interviews 
A number of ethical issues must be considered in the conduct of interviews and where 
relevant must be stressed to participants. In line with McNiff (2004) as cited by Gibbs 
and Costley (2006) a sensitive approach has been adopted against interview participants. 
This has been done to ensure that there is effective cooperation between the me and the 
interview participants. Some of these ethical issues include:  
 
The results of the interviews are strictly confidential though the results of the total sample 
are published in the course of the research. This means that no reference should be given 
about the name of participants in the research report. This is in line with question 7 of the 
Ethics Release Form in Appendix 1, p. 223. 
 
Secondly, the interviews will not be recorded by audiotape since this could make the 
participants uneasy about whether this information could be published. This is in line 
with the answer of question 8 in Appendix 1, p. 223.   
 
Thirdly, the questions of the interview will be vetted so that they are not offensive or 
inappropriate to the participant. This is in line with the answer of question 6 in Appendix 
1.   
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Finally, participation via the interviews is voluntary and no one will be prejudiced if they 
do not participate on the project. This is in line with the answer of question 3 in Appendix 
1, p. 223.   
  
3.8.4 Ethical issues: Questionnaires 
A number of ethical issues must be considered in the questionnaire process where 
relevant must be communicated to participants. Some of these ethical issues include:  
 
In line with the answer of question 5 in Appendix 1, p. 223, no minors are involved in the 
questionnaire process. The participant will not state their name in the questionnaire and 
procedures in the collection of the results will ensure that the questionnaires are answered 
anonymously. This is in line with question 7 of the Ethics Release Form in Appendix 1, p 
223. 
 
In addition the questions in the questionnaire will be vetted so that they are not offensive 
or inappropriate to the participant. This is in line with the answer of question 6 in 
Appendix 1, p 223. Finally, participation via the questionnaires is voluntary and no 
student will be prejudiced if they do not participate on the project.  This is in line with the 
answer of question 3 in Appendix 1, p 223.   
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3.8.5 Ethical considerations-Faculty interviews 
The researcher took steps to protect the confidentiality of faculty members that 
participated in the interviews. They were informed of the purposes of the study and I also 
give them oral assurances that their anonymity would be maintained when quoting them 
and that information would be omitted that would enable someone to identify them as the 
source. These points are in line with the answers of questions 3, 4 and 7 of the Ethics 
Release Form in Appendix 1, p 223. 
 
3.9 Operational definitions 
 
The research will aim to measure the relationship between corporate governance and firm 
performance. One measure of performance is profitability that is to be measured by ROA. 
ROA is defined as the profit before interest and taxes divided by total assets (Abor and 
Biekpe, 2007 and Ehiyioka, 2009). Another measure used for firm performance is 
Tobin’s Q value that is a market price based performance measure. Tobin’s Q value is 
measured as the book value of assets minus the book value of equity plus the market 
value of equity divided by the book value of assets (Coles et al, 2008). This measure was 
chosen since it is a method that captures the share price performance as opposed to 
financial performance measurement of the ROA. 
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The sales growth variable is defined as the change in sales on a year-to-year basis and has 
been used as a control variable when measuring market performance (Villalonga and 
Amit, 2006).  
 
The definition that is applied to this research of family businesses is that found by Dyer 
(1986) who defines a family business as “an organisation in which decisions regarding 
its ownership or management are influenced by a relationship to a family.” More 
specifically according to Villalonga and Amit (2006) a number of conditions could be 
used to define a family. These include: 
• The family or families are the largest shareholders.  
• They control at least 20% of the votes of the firm. 
• There is at least one family officer or at least one family director. 
• The family members may be founding members (that is they were shareholders 
when the firm was established) or 2nd or later generations to the original founding 
members. In this way the definition will cover firms quoted on the CSE that fall into this 
category. 
 
The definitions for other corporate governance mechanisms concerning board factors, 
CGC compliance, ownership factors can be found in Appendix 2, pp. 224-227. Appendix 
2, pp. 224-227 also states the sources of information for each variable. 
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3.10 Role as worker based (insider) researcher 
 
I am required as part of my employment contract as a university lecturer to pursue 
research. During my time at FIT I have published an article in the research journal. In my 
time at both FIT and FUCy I have been a supervisor for countless research dissertations 
carried out by students. Hence it could be said that FUCy has a culture geared to 
academic research. In addition I have carried out projects as a worker researcher and one 
of these was research towards the development of a degree program for accounting and 
finance in which I was heavily involved since I proposed a number of new accounting 
modules for this course. The accounting and finance degree was introduced into the 
school’s degree program in the 2007/08 academic year. 
 
The research project for Module DPS 5260 will require research to be carried out on 
corporate governance and family businesses that could be applied to degree programs 
concerning the department. However in order for the research to succeed it is important 
that I have the help of other stakeholders such as colleagues in the department, the 
management of the university and students. Otherwise there may be difficulties in 
carrying out the research. To achieve this, the ethics of care has been applied. According 
to Gibbs (2004) this will prevent the possibility of stakeholders being exploited. Hence 
applying the ethics of care will increase the possibility of stakeholders effectively 
cooperating in the research.  
 
Though it is anticipated that this support will be forthcoming, the benefits to the 
organisation of cooperating will be tangible since without any great cost, they will have a 
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report that will make suggestions as to how the degree program may be improved based 
on academic research.  
 
According to Costley and Gibbs (2006) one of the positive features on having work-
based research is that the researcher will have inside knowledge of the problem and/or 
questions to be researched and of individual who work in their organisation.  For example 
if research were carried on as to the effectiveness of the syllabus of accounting and 
finance, I would be in a position to recognise the syllabus well and recognise the different 
approaches to applying the syllabus. Gibbs and Costley (2006) support this approach 
since they assert that the researcher should take research in areas they are comfortable 
with. Further to this Armsby (2008) asserts that the worker researcher must take 
advantage of their privileged insider research position. However if an outside researcher 
were used to carry out the research and since they do not work in the organisation 
concerned, they may not be as familiar with the subject and hence the research may not 
be effectively carried out as would be the case with the worker researcher. 
 
Another positive influence is that the worker researcher is more familiar with the sources 
of information needed to carry out the research than say an outside researcher.  For 
example he is likely to be more knowledgeable regarding the type of information that can 
be obtained from the organisation’s library and its staff. An outside researcher may find it 
difficult to obtain information from an organisation since the organisation’s personnel 
may be less willing to cooperate with him.  
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Despite this the insider researcher must have due care for the stakeholders in the research. 
According to Gibbs (2004) an ethic of care is critical in insider research to prevent the 
possibility of the exploitation of stakeholders in the research. Gibbs and Costley (2006) 
further add that there is a risk that insider research may be unethical unless personal 
moral deliberation is applied to research ethics. 
 
Further to the above I, the worker researcher, will be in a better position to understand the 
culture of the organisation and hence can better evaluate the effect of potential decisions 
on the running of the organisation. This is the case when evaluating changes to be made 
to a degree program. 
 
In addition to the above the worker researcher will be in a better position than the outside 
researcher to understand the key people in the organisation.  Hence this will assist me in 
the collection of data for the research whether it is for primary or secondary data.   
 
Another positive feature of a worker researcher is that they would gain new knowledge 
that could be passed on to their students.  In other words this will help me to improve the 
quality of my teaching and this will benefit students as well. For example a new teaching 
approach may be applied in the class that would make the lesson more interesting. This 
could lead to more input from students that will hopefully raise the standards of the class. 
It could also lead to more input from students via group work which is something they 
will face in the real world.  
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Hence the effect of the above is that the worker researcher is in a better position to 
understand the workings of the organisation and to make improvements that will lead to 
an improved working practice. 
 
However there are also negative influences related to work-based research. The main 
negative influence of worker researchers is that they are too close to the problem.  This 
means that they may be ignorant of the fact that fundamental changes are needed to a 
particular area that they are involved.  For example I may not be willing to use a 
computer technology in my lecture because I may be uneasy about it. Yet it may be the 
case that computer technology could improve the quality of the lecture. This could be 
done for example through the use of PowerPoint presentations that could better convey 
information to students. According to Armsby (2000) the work-based research should be 
objective in their work and should tackle issues concerning potential bias in the research. 
An outside researcher would take a more objective and detached view and would be more 
likely to recommend radical solutions to a problem than a worker researcher. 
 
Another negative influence is that the work-based researchers own expectations and 
values could restrict the scope of their work since they may be unwilling to expend a 
huge effort to their research work. An outside researcher would be more likely to be less 
biased and carry out the research as scheduled instead of being affected by their 
expectations. This is because they may be interested in gaining new knowledge rather 
than considering their professional interests. 
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Others may also negatively influence worker researchers especially in the organisation 
they work for.  In some ways certain people in the organisation may affect the direction 
of the research.  For example the dean of a department could influence the direction of 
the research of his subordinate. It is quite possible that it may not go in the direction the 
latter expects due to a lack of information not being provided by the organisation. 
 
In addition to the above, the worker researcher may find that there is a conflict in interest 
between the findings of their research and his position in the organisation. This may have 
an adverse affect on their research work.  To explain further, I may find that computers 
are a good way of increasing the quality of the lesson. However I may be uneasy in 
introducing them since this may mean a major change in my teaching approach. Hence 
this conflict could have an adverse affect on the findings of my research. 
 
To conclude there are good and bad points in having worker researchers though an 
increase in researchers is a positive feature since it will enable more knowledge to be 
gained for the benefit of the community. 
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CHAPTER 4: PROJECT ACTIVITY 
 
4.1 Chapter summary 
 
This chapter aims to how the project activity was carried out. It aims to explain how the 
regression models, interviews and questionnaires were applied in the project.  
 
4.2 Panel data regression models 
 
Previous research by Yermack (1996), Mishra et al (2001), Villalonga and Amit (2006), 
Abor and Biekpe (2007) Martinez et al (2007), Coles et al (2008), Di Pietra et al (2008), 
Ehikioya (2009) amongst other have used regression models to establish the extent of the 
relationship between corporate governance and performance. Despite this there is an 
issue as to the type of model. That is whether the traditional model or panel data model of 
regression is to be used as proposed by Abor and Biekpe (2007), Di Pietra et al (2008) 
and Ehikioya (2009). The reasons for its adoption and the rejection of the traditional 
regression model have been explained in section 3.7.1. 
 
Di Pietra et al (2008) and Ehikioya (2009) used a panel data model with fixed effects and 
with White (1980) heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. White (1980) standard 
errors have been used to overcome the problem whereby the variances of independent 
variables are different.  
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Under the panel data model with fixed effects approach the difference across units can be 
captured in differences in the constant term. Hausman and Taylor (1981) state that the 
fixed effects approach is useful since it is an unbiased method of controlling for omitted 
variables when panel data is applied.  The research originally used three forms of panel 
data variations. The first variation uses only fixed time effects (in order words without 
the firm dummy variables). The second variation is the use of fixed effects with time 
dummies though with the inclusion of industry dummies that would capture the industry 
effect. The third variation uses fixed effects with firm and time effects. Under this 
approach dummy variables for each firm (101) and each time period (6) is to be used 
though with inclusion of firm variables the industry dummies are excluded. The sign and 
significance of the coefficients in the three versions produce very similar results that are 
shown in the following section. This shows that results are robust to different model 
specifications.  
 
Model 1 investigates the impact of corporate governance characteristics on performance. 
The model is defined as follows: 
 
PERFit = ait + b1 LN_SIZEit + b2 LN_AGEit + b3 %LEVERAGEit + b4 
SALES_GROWTHit + b5 MD 1it + b6 MD 2it + b7 LN_BOARDit + b8 %NON-
EXEit + b9 %LN_MEETINGSit + b10 LN_BOARD SKILLit + b11 AUDIT-COMit 
+ b12 DUALITYit + b16 FAMILYit + b19 INSIDER%it + b20MD1*CGC_P + 
b21MD2*CGC_N + b22MD3*CGC_F + eit 
 
The variable it represents a firm i at time t and eit is an error term whereas ait is a constant 
over time. The two performance measures (PERF) are the ROA, an accounting measure, 
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and Tobin’s Q value (that measures market performance). These two performance 
measures are to be used in all regression models. However it was decided that the returns 
on equity (thereafter ROE) was inappropriate for the research and hence was not applied 
as a dependent variable. The rationale behind this decision was that the smaller firms 
distorted the ROE results in the AM where their equity was small or even negative 
creating misleading results (e.g., a positive figure when profitability was negative). Since 
it was decided that the ROA has similarities to the ROE it was decided that the ROA 
would be used as a dependent variable in the regression analysis. In addition the ROA is 
a method used by various studies in the area such as: Randoy et al (2003); Abor and 
Biekpe (2007); Cheng (2008) and Ehikioya (2009) amongst others.  
 
Klapper and Love (2004) justify the use of Tobin’s Q value and ROA as performance 
measures. They state that Tobin’s Q value is a measure of the market value of assets of a 
firm and ROA a measure of operating performance. They found that effective corporate 
governance is associated with a higher operating performance and a higher Tobin’s Q 
value. 
  
The independent variables have been derived from the literature review and empirical 
studies analysing the board, CGC factors, ownership and control variables (used to 
control performance) as outlined in section 2.4. The market dummy variables were 
included in order to capture the extent at which CGC compliance affects performance.  
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In addition the following corporate governance dummy variables where included testing 
for the presence of audit committees, the duality of board and executive director and 
whether a firm is family owned or not. Due to the strong correlation between audit and 
remuneration committees only the audit committee variable was used in the regressions.  
 
In line with other studies such as Yermack (1996) and Villalonga and Amit (2006) the 
ROA has also been used as an independent variable for the models where Tobin’s Q was 
used as an dependent variable since it is considered it controls for the current firm 
operating performance and profitability that has may have a significant impact on a 
firm’s market value. It is also considered a proxy for cost of capital that influences firm 
value. 
 
The management skills variable was omitted from the model since it was strongly 
correlated with the board skills that mainly capture management skills (who are executive 
directors anyway). Another feature of the model is that the natural logarithm of variables 
of board size, frequency of meetings, size of the firm, age and board skills have been 
used since the natural logarithm provides a better normalisation of variables and reduces 
the outlier effect compared to the case absolute numbers are used. 
 
In addition a number of interaction variables were used in models 1-3 to examine whether 
there is a relationship between the type of market and CGC compliance. Three such 
dummy variables were used. The first MD1*CGC_P measures whether there is a 
reduction in performance for firms in the MM that partially comply with CGC; the 
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second dummy variable MD2*CGC_N measures whether firms in the PM that do not 
comply with CGC have a reduction in performance and finally, MD3*CGC_F measure 
whether firms in the AM that fully comply with the CGC have performance benefits.   
 
Using panel data time effects with industry controls, Model 2 aims to use the same 
variables in Model 1 and to differentiate the results between those markets that have 
some form of compliance with CGC (that is MM and PM) with those markets where no 
compliance with CGC is required (that is AM and Special Categories). 
 
Model 3 aims to study the performance of FFs versus NFFs using interaction effects. The 
study tests the interaction effects of corporate governance variables in model 1 with 
family firm dummies. For example a variable of FF* DUAL is defined as a family firm 
that has CEO duality. This variable intends to capture differences in performance 
between FFs that employ CEO duality versus the CSE firms that do.  In addition, the 
market interaction variables used in model 1 are also employed in this model. 
 
Model 4 that is also based on model 1 uses variable changes in the regression model. It 
aims to measure the relationship between corporate governance board and ownership 
variable changes with changes in performance. The model will also include control 
variables in it. A changes model has previously been used by Karamanou and Vafeas 
(2005) when looking at the change if forecast status against changes in corporate 
governance mechanisms for board factors, ownership factors and audit committee 
variables. They also included control variables without changes. 
 108
4.3 The Management interview data process 
 
It was planned that thirty managers would be interviewed concerning corporate 
governance issues. The sample was to be derived from the 101 CSE firms included in the 
empirical study mentioned before. The sample was to be distributed from managers who 
worked in firms that were in the MM, PM and the other markets such as the AM. The 
sample was also stratified according to the extent of compliance with the CGC in Cyprus 
and between FFs and NFFs.  
 
Out of the thirty managers, five did not participate. This was down to various reasons 
such as: they were too busy to take part; they did not wish to take part or pressures from 
their peers made it difficult to take part. I believe that this is a good response rate since a 
number of managers originally were reluctant to participate due to fears of what their 
peers’ reaction would be. When I reassured them that the interviews were confidential 
and for research purposes only a significant number agreed to participate in the interview 
process.  Appendix 4, p 232 provides a list of firms whose managers participated in the 
interviews.  
 
Once permission was received, the respective managers were contacted. The interviews 
took longer than expected. Though it was expected that they would take around 10 
minutes, the actual time varied around 15-20 minutes. This was because for certain 
participants the questions set stimulated further discussion hence extending the duration 
of the interviews.  The interviews were carried out by telephone between the dates 13 
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February 2009 to 20 March 2009. There were a number of reasons for using this 
approach.  
 
The first was due to convenience.  The geographic distance of participants made face-to-
face interviews unfeasible since the participants were scattered over the island of the 
Republic of Cyprus and my work commitments made it difficult for me to visit them 
personally.   
 
Secondly, was the issue of cost since telephone interviews are more cost effective than 
face-to-face interviews that involve more significant costs (e.g. travelling costs, loss of 
salary etc.). Thirdly, there was reluctance by many participants to be interviewed face-to-
face though they were more willing to be interviewed by telephone since they were more 
comfortable in doing so. Fourthly, I found it was quicker to get the data using telephone 
interviews rather than the face-to-face approach where I would have been restricted in 
carrying out interviews due to the travelling distance. Finally, the telephone interview 
allowed me to ask follow-up questions something that is difficult to do under the email 
interview approach.  
 
Before the interviews were carried out, I obtained the permission of the participants.  This 
was done either by an email or by telephone. 
 
Of the interview sample that did not participate in the interview, two managers did not 
respond and three individuals did not wish to participate in the interview. For those that 
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did not respond a second email was sent out and again there was no response. I tried to 
contact the individuals three times by telephone but they were unavailable for contact. 
 
Due to the high response rate of the interviews (that is 85% of the sample) and since the 
interview sample that responded mirrored closely the empirical sample with respect to 
FFs and NFFs, I decided not to further pursue the non-responses. I did this because I 
understand that these managers were reluctant to participate and felt it ethically wise not 
to pursue the matter further. 
 
I used the shorthand approach in recording the answers from interviews.  I did not tape 
the interviews due to the unavailability of the necessary equipment and due to 
sensitivities on the part of many interviewees concerning this issue. 
 
The semi-structured interview format provided in Appendix 5, pp. 233-234 evolved 
before the data collection process as the researcher determined which questions were 
ineffectual and those that were effective.  This process was done by piloting the interview 
questions with managers who were not in the sample and taking into account their 
feedback. 
 
Concerning the interviews, the questions were not asked in sequence but rather were 
posed to accommodate the natural flow of conversation. The interviews were divided into 
five sections: the first was general information about corporate governance in the firm; 
the second involved question on corporate governance practices in general and the link to 
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performance; the third involves questions on board composition and its effect on 
performance; the fourth concerns questions on ownership and its effect on performance 
and finally, the last section concerns questions on other factors (such as age and size 
amongst others) that affect performance. 
 
A purpose of the interview was to understand how the various corporate governance 
mechanisms affected performance from the perspectives of management and to compare 
these to the empirical results and to show how they are linked together. Many of the 
variables that were included in questions were in line with the variables used in the 
empirical testing. 
 
The first section of the interviews (general information) aimed to find out from the 
managers the extent of compliance with the CGC, the market and industry they belong to, 
whether the firm had significant family ownership and finally, how the firm assessed its 
performance in general together with interpretation(s) as to why the particular 
performance measure was chosen. 
 
The second section (corporate governance and performance) was designed to elicit the 
manager’s interpretations concerning the effects of CGC on measures of performance.  
Here the managers were free to also discuss other factors (apart from CGC) that affect 
performance.  The section also aimed to find out from managers whether corporate 
governance mechanisms had an effect on performance as measured by sales, ROA and 
market performance. These three measurements were chosen since they are supported by 
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various academic researchers as being the most appropriate for adopting financial 
performance measurements against corporate governance mechanisms. The participants 
were asked to measure the effect on corporate governance mechanisms for these three 
measurements on a scale of 1-3. A value of 1 represents a strong effect whereas a value 
of 3 represents a weak effect. 
 
The third section was designed to elicit the managers’ interpretations concerning aspects 
of the relationship between corporate governance board mechanisms and financial 
performance.  More specifically it examined the relationship between financial 
performance against the following independent variables: audit committees; remuneration 
committees; non-executive directors, board size and the number of meetings. Most of 
these variables were used in the empirical testing mentioned previously. The participants 
were free to elaborate on the areas and if necessary to share their experiences concerning 
these areas. 
 
The fourth section (ownership) looked at the effects of ownership on financial 
performance. It covered three main aspects of ownership and its relationship to 
performance. These were: family ownership, foreign ownership and insider ownership.  
Except for foreign ownership, these variables were also used in the empirical testing 
mentioned previously. The participants were free to provide comments on these three 
issues and to share their experiences they may have in these areas. 
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The final section looked at other areas that could affect performance such as age, firm 
size, leverage and the industry it operates in. The participants were encouraged to justify 
their views concerning the link (or non-link) for these variables.   
 
Before and during the interview process I was aware of the fact that managers may be 
highly sensitive to questions about their superiors (the board). When I realised from the 
reaction of managers that was the case I dropped or amended the question.  However this 
situation was not common since the pilot interviews (to managers not in the sample) 
helped to prevent this occurrence.  
 
There was a methodological challenge that should be mentioned. This was the issue of 
whether the interviews were valid and whether the answers were purposely misleading or 
biased.  I attempted to mitigate this possibility at the beginning of the telephone 
interviews by assuring participants that the information given was to be completely 
confidential with respect to third parties and to board members. I also aimed to reassure 
the participants that the interview questions were not aimed to expose or criticise and that 
the manager’s experience was to be used in the research. 
 
I found that these reassurances resulted in a frank and open conversation in which 
participants’ revealed useful information. To this end the interview questions were 
designed to elicit explanations and interpretations of situations and reveal what managers 
believed about the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and 
performance. 
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4.4 Management interview data analysis 
 
Concerning the analysis of interviews, content analysis was adopted as planned. 
According to Robson (2002) it is a process whereby qualitative data (such as that 
obtained from interviews) is obtained and valid inferences are made from their content. 
According to the Institute of Work Based Learning (2008) this data could be analysed 
using statistical testing (that is descriptive statistics).  
 
After designing the interview questions the record unit was designed.  In some questions 
the recording unit was numbers, in others it was words and finally, some questions were 
answered using sentences.  After this the answers were analysed into categories.  Most of 
the questions were analysed using quantitative methods. This was done in various ways. 
 
One approach was to analyse questions using dummy variables.  An example of this is 
Question 1 in the interview (See Appendix 5, pp. 233) that asked the participants whether 
the firm complied with the CGC code. A yes answer was given a dummy variable of 1 
whereas a no answer was given a dummy variable of 0. In this way using statistical 
analysis the relevant percentage of firms using the CGC code could be derived.  
 
Another approach was to analyse questions on a scale of 1 to 3 with each value been 
given a value. For example in question 8 in Appendix 5, p. 233 the participants were 
asked to value the effect of corporate governance mechanisms on three performance 
measurements: Sales growth, ROA and Tobin’s Q value. A value of 1 represented a 
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strong effect whereas a value of 3 represented a weak effect. This approach was less 
evident than the dummy variable approach that was used in most of the questions. 
 
The quantitative data (for example dummy data and value data) of the interviews were 
recorded on a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet.  Descriptive statistics was carried out for the 
whole sample and separately for participants who worked in FFs and NFFs. This 
distinction was done so as to analyse any differences in the relationship between 
corporate governance mechanism and performance from the viewpoint of managers. 
 
Originally it was intended that the SPSS program would be used for the statistical 
analysis. However I used Microsoft Excel over SPSS for two main reasons: Firstly, I 
believe Excel spreadsheet is user-friendlier than SPSS. I believed that the time lost in 
learning the SPSS program did not justify any possible benefits SPSS had over Microsoft 
Excel in this case. Secondly, since the quantitative data from the interview analysis was 
not complex, I believed that Microsoft Excel was in a position to be as effective in its 
data analysis as SPSS.     
 
However the analysis of qualitative data via the interviews (that is the answers given in 
sentence form) was more problematic to me.  The approach used was to record this data 
and to compare with the answers from other participants. I then grouped these answers 
where there were similarities. An example of this was in Question 9 of Appendix 5, p. 
233 where participants were asked to discuss about the other factors that affect 
performance measurements.  
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4.5 The Questionnaire data process 
 
Information on the relevance of corporate governance, CSE and family business issues to 
a degree program was carried out through the submission of a questionnaire to a sample 
of students from the School of Economic and Social Sciences in Limassol. The proposed 
sample was to comprise of 40 students. This equates to approximately 30% of the 
population tested. The sample is to be taken from students in the Limassol campus since 
the changes to the degree courses are primarily for the accounting and finance course that 
is solely taught in Limassol. The sample will consist of students in both the accounting 
and finance and business administration degrees at the Limassol campus so that the 
research findings may be applied to these degrees. 
 
The proposed sample was constructed in a way that it reflected the population 
characteristics of the population concerning sex, course and year of study. Concerning the 
year of study the first year students were not included in the sample due to the fact that 
they did not cover the areas of corporate governance (no business finance modules are 
offered to first year students). However 38 students participated in the questionnaire since 
two students were absent on the date when the questionnaires were given to students. 
Despite this the sample closely reflected the characteristics concerning sex, course and 
year of study.   
 
The questionnaires were given to students and completed between 12 March 2009 and 18 
March 2009. I designed the questionnaire and handed it out to students on these date 
when they had a lesson either with a colleague or myself. I obtained both the permission 
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of the organisation (See Appendix 6, p. 236) and the colleagues concerned before 
carrying out the interviews. The students recorded their answers on the questionnaire 
sheet and handed it back to my colleague or me so that the answers could be analysed. 
Students were asked not to put their names on the questionnaires. 
 
The demographic characteristics of the sample are as follows: The sample comprised of 
23 females and 15 males. This is broken down into 22 business administration students 
and 16 accounting and finance students.  In addition this was broken down into 15 
students in the 2nd year, 13 students in the 3rd year and 10 students in the 4th year.  
 
The questionnaire given to students can be found in Appendix 7, pp. 237-238. Nine 
statements were made which students could grade on a 1-5 scale. The first six statements 
were made on knowledge gained by students on family business, corporate governance 
and the CSE. The next three statements were made concerning the future development of 
modules concerning these three areas. Each of these statements were answered on a 1-5 
scale with an answer of “1” meaning the students strongly disagreed with the statement 
up to an answer of “5” meaning they strongly agreed with the statement (See Appendix 7, 
p. 237).  Finally there was a section for students to make any general comments.  
 
The aim of the questionnaire was that the answers from the questionnaires would be used 
in determining the future role corporate governance in course programs and whether it 
could be lead its upgrade.  
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I found that an attempt was made to ensure the results were reliable, I believe the results 
may not be 100% reliable. This is because what I believe is a small number of students 
who though they did answer the questions set, may not be providing answers of what they 
really felt. A small number felt a duty to me to answer the questionnaire to help me out in 
my research though it’s uncertain whether the results they gave were valid. Though I did 
not wish to pressure them to participate in the questionnaires, they felt a moral duty to do 
so. I believe that this problem is one that is common in the Cyprus culture where people 
are generally reluctant to participate in questionnaires and where the risk of unreliable 
answers is there. I do believe that having only nine questions for them to answer was the 
right decision since a higher number could have given invalid answers. I still believe that 
in the main the conclusions reached from the questionnaires are correct without 
guaranteeing every student provided reliable answers.    
 
4.6 Questionnaire data analysis 
 
Concerning the analysis of the questionnaires, content analysis was adopted as planned 
for the same reasons as for the CSE managers’ interviews.  
 
The nine statements on the questionnaire were to be answered a scale of 1 to 5 values.  
The quantitative data (value data) of the interviews were recorded on a Microsoft Excel 
spreadsheet.  Descriptive statistics was carried out for the whole sample and separately 
for the demographic characteristics of the sample to determine any differences in the 
relationship between sex, course and year of study.  
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Originally it was intended that the SPSS program would be used for the statistical 
analysis. However the choice of Microsoft Excel over SPSS can be justified by the same 
reasons, as was the case for the CSE managers’ interviews.  
 
However the general comments via the interviews (that is the answers given in sentence 
form) is more problematic to me for analysis purposes.  The approach used was to record 
this data and to compare with the answers from other participants. I then grouped these 
answers where there were similarities. 
 
4.7 Faculty interview data process 
 
It was felt that by interviewing faculty staff useful data could be obtained concerning the 
course programmes and its relationship to corporate governance, FFs and the CSE.  
 
The rationale behind the faculty staff interviews was that since the faculty staff is an 
important stakeholder concerning course programmes in their departments, their views 
should not be ignored if the research results are to be valid. In addition they are in a 
position to understand the organisation’s culture and possible changes that may be of 
benefit to it concerning course programmes. 
 
Five members of the faculty were interviewed out of its eight members. Of the three 
members excluded from the interviews, two were involved in the research and it was felt 
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their inclusion in the interviews was unethical whereas the other member is a part-time 
visiting lecturer who has been at the organisation for a short time with little knowledge of 
the organisation. 
 
The interviews were carried out via an unstructured approach where lecturers were free to 
discuss what is of significance to them concerning corporate governance, family 
businesses and the CSE and their role to the course programs. The interviews were 
carried out on a face-to-face basis. It was decided not to tape the interviews to preserve 
the interviewee’s anonymity.  
 
4.8 Faculty interview data analysis 
 
Discourse analysis was used to analyse the interviews. According to Bryman (2004) it is 
a method that analyses talk.  The Institute of Work Based Learning (2008) states it is a 
qualitative analysis of interactive speech.  It has been so that the researcher interprets 
what the interviewee has said after considering their motives, interests and power 
differentials.  
 
Though there is no set format for analysing discourse analysis, the approach adopted was 
in line with Potter and Wetherell (1994) that applied three main devices. These are: 
 
Firstly, by examining the interviewee’s intentions by examining issues concerning 
corporate governance, family businesses and the CSE. Hence the answers given for 
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certain issues by interviewees will be grouped and contrasted and compared. Secondly, 
by examining the details of speech and looking for motives behind them and finally, by 
examining the language to establish alternative perspectives and at the same time aiming 
to expose the interviews intention. 
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CHAPTER 5: PROJECT FINDINGS  
 
5.1 Chapter summary 
 
This chapter aims to analyse the results from the descriptive statistics and the testing of 
the economic (regression) models. It also aims to analyse the questionnaires and 
interviews. It also aims to analyse the relationship between corporate governance and 
course programmes at FUCy.  
 
5.2 Descriptive statistics: empirical data 
 
To assess the differences in corporate governance, performance and other variables for 
the different markets of the CSE, we initially provide descriptive statistics for the MM, 
PM and AM as shown in Table 3. Significant testing between the means of these three 
markets is shown in Appendix 10.5, pp. 252-253 (which shows significance tests using 
equal and unequal variance assumptions). 
 
According to Table 3 (and Appendix 10.5, pp. 252-253), there are statistically significant 
differences at the 1% level of the means between markets for the following variables: 
board size, non-executive directors, frequency of meetings, board skills, CGC 
compliance, firm size and age. The MM firms show to have higher values for these 
variables, followed by the PM and then the AM.  
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There are statistically significant differences at the 5% level between both the MM and 
PM against the AM with respect to the ROA variable. The data indicate that ROA is on 
average the highest in the MM then followed by PM and then the AM. In contrast to the 
ROA, the results of the ROE provide evidence of distortion due to negative equity in the 
AM as mentioned previously that has resulted in its exclusion from the regression 
models. 
 
Tobin’s Q, a variable that measures market performance, shows significant differences 
between the MM and PM under the equal variance assumption and significant differences 
between all markets under the unequal variance assumption (See Appendix 10.5, pp. 252-
253). I will investigate subsequently whether this can be explained by the fact that MM 
firms apply the CGC to a greater extent than firms in the PM and AM and the market 
may reward these firms however we do not find a strong association. The MM shows to 
have the highest Tobin Q value followed by the PM and AM. Sales growth shows to be 
the highest in the AM, however it exhibits high volatility. 
 
There are significant differences at the 1% level between the proportion of firms using 
audit committees (AUDIT-COM) between both the MM and the PM with the AM. This 
may be explained by the fact that firms on the AM are not obliged to establish audit 
committees. 
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Table 3: Comparison of means for different markets of the CSE 
 
 Pooled sample estimates 
 Main (MM)-1 Parallel (PM)-2 Others (AM)-3 
Variable Mean Variance Mean Variance Mean Variance 
ROA 0.0385 0.0039 0.0288 0.0051 -0.0125 0.0220 
TOBIN Q 1.0595 0.1097 0.8470 0.0983 0.9579 0.4090 
ROE 0.0621 0.2107 -0.0264 0.2028 -0.3293 11.3177 
SALES GROWTH 0.1382 0.2125 0.1954 0.8649 0.5504 25.1964 
BOARD  9.7579 12.3769 8.1325 5.4334 6.3551 4.9321 
LN(BOARD) 2.2209 0.1104 2.0525 0.0918 1.7928 0.1115 
EXE 2.8947 1.4143 2.8072 2.3770 2.3201 2.8973 
LN(EXEC) 0.9544 0.2556 0.9635 0.2584 0.6728 0.4151 
NON-EXE 6.8632 10.4811 5.3253 8.8319 4.0187 4.0605 
LN(NON-EXEC) 1.8179 0.2295 1.5066 0.3864 1.2757 0.2849 
%NON-EXE 0.6878 0.0213 0.6161 0.0570 0.6367 0.0597 
MEETINGS 10.3579 49.4237 6.5181 3.5454 5.4252 2.9663 
LN(MEETINGS) 2.1865 0.2541 1.8384 0.0706 1.6491 0.0810 
BOARD SKILL 9.0211 12.3825 7.0361 6.8645 5.2991 5.0438 
LN(BOARD SKILL) 2.1329 0.1289 1.8508 0.2605 1.5717 0.2213 
AUDIT-COM 0.8000 0.1617 0.7590 0.1851 0.1075 0.0962 
DUALITY 0.2842 0.2056 0.5422 0.2512 0.4439 0.2474 
CGC_F 0.5684 0.2479 0.1325 0.1164 0.0350 0.0339 
CGC_P 0.2316 0.1798 0.6627 0.2263 0.0771 0.0713 
CGC_N 0.2000 0.1617 0.2048 0.1649 0.8879 0.0998 
FAMILY 0.6947 0.2143 0.7229 0.2028 0.7874 0.1678 
INSIDER% 0.4049 0.0689 0.4992 0.0613 0.4833 0.0628 
BV-EQUITY 148.4196 97466.8022 17.0713 173.3832 13.1232 393.2081 
LOG FIRM SIZE 3.9881 2.4038 2.1412 0.6081 1.3047 1.5655 
AGE 36.7474 864.7015 28.7108 192.5251 23.2383 252.3693 
LN(AGE) 3.3263 0.5662 3.2339 0.2632 2.9522 0.3764 
DEBT 1455.8247 12828142.7052 11.4130 359.0676 7.2045 180.0250 
LEVERAGE 0.5268 0.0852 0.3894 0.0866 0.3874 0.0750 
ID1 0.2526 0.1908 0.0723 0.0679 0.0701 0.0653 
ID2 0.0632 0.0598 0.0723 0.0679 0.1238 0.1088 
ID3 0.1263 0.1115 0.1446 0.1252 0.1121 0.0998 
ID4 0.2526 0.1908 0.3614 0.2336 0.2827 0.2033 
ID5 0.0632 0.0598 0.0000 0.0000 0.0421 0.0404 
ID6 0.2421 0.1854 0.3494 0.2301 0.3692 0.2334 
MD1 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
MD2 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
MD3 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 
Notes: The table reports means and standard deviation for different variables the MM, PM and 
AM firms based on pooled data for the years 2002-2007 for the CSE.  The table also reports 
comparisons of means between the different markets for all variables reported using two 
alternative approaches: equal variance and unequal variance of the years 2002-2007 (for brevity 
we only report means and variances using the equal variance sample). The markets are separated 
with respect to the level of corporate governance compliance according to the official CSE 
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classification. We have 95 firm-year observations in the MM, 83 firm-year observations in the PM 
and 428 firm-year observations in the AM.  
 
 
A significantly higher proportion of directors have CEO-duality (DUALITY) in the PM 
and AM firms as opposed to the MM firms. The MM shows to have the lowest 
proportion of directors with CEO-duality. This may be explained by the fact that under 
the CGC, non-CEO duality is required for firms in the MM unless specific reasons apply.  
 
Table 3 shows that there are significant differences across markets between ownership 
factors such as family ownership (the ownership stake of the family) and insider 
ownership (the percentage ownership of the board of directors). A higher percentage of 
FF are observed in the AM followed by the PM and then the MM. This immediately 
suggests that there is a negative relationship between FF and CGC compliance. 
 
In addition Appendix 10.6, p 254 provides medians for all variables for each market and 
median comparisons based on Wilcoxon/Mann-Witney tests. Median comparisons reveal 
similar results to that discussed for the means. Due to skewed distributions for many 
variables median comparisons may be more meaningful. The comparisons reveal that 
median value of ROA, Tobin Q, ROE, sales growth, board size, % non executives in 
boards, number of meetings, board and management skilled members of the board are 
higher for the MM. PM values for these variables have the second highest medians 
except for the cases of % of non-executives and manager skilled members of the board 
where the AM has higher medians. In the case of % non-executives the differences 
between PM and AM are however not statistically significant.  We also note that the 
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differences between ROA and sales growth between the MM and PM do not show to be 
statistically significant. 
 
Table 4 below shows the mean and variance for FFs and NFFs on the MM & PM (two 
markets that have some form of CGC compliance). Further descriptive statistics that 
include the median, maximum and minimum values can be found in Appendices 10.1 and 
10.2. FFs represent 70.8% of this sample, 126 family firm years from 21 different firms. 
 
The mean of Tobin’s Q value of NFFs on the MM & PM is 0.06 higher than that of FFs 
though the difference is not statistically significant. The higher Tobin Q value registered 
by NFFs may be linked with the level of CGC compliance. Despite having slightly lower 
valuations (as evidenced by Tobin’s Q), FFs on the MM & PM on average have higher 
ROA that is significant at the 5% level. The better operating performance of FFs is 
consistent with the findings of Villalonga and Amit (2006). 
 
Table 4 also shows that on the MM & PM, FFs on average are smaller than NFFs with 
respect to firm size, assets and debt and these differences are significant at the 1% level. 
FFs are also on average significantly younger than NFFs on the same markets (30 years 
versus 40 years). Though on the MM & PM, FF register on average slower sales growth 
than NFFs this difference is not significant. 
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics of sample: Type of Business on MM & PM 
 
 Pooled sample estimates 
 Family firms Non-family firms  
Variables Mean Variance Mean Variance Significance 
MD1 0.5200 0.5010 0.5600 0.5020  
MD2 0.4800 0.5010 0.4400 0.5020  
MD3 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  
ROE 0.0689 0.3890 -0.0959 0.5750 ** 
ROA 0.0418 0.0569 0.0151 0.0844 ** 
BOARD  8.3300 2.6290 10.6300 3.6140 *** 
LN_BOARD 2.0744 0.2975 2.3069 0.3463 *** 
EXE 2.9100 1.2200 2.7100 1.6610  
LN_EXEC 0.9665 0.4801 0.9395 0.5649  
NONEXE 5.4100 2.7200 7.9200 3.5910 *** 
LN_NONEXEC 1.5603 0.541 1.9449 0.5516 *** 
NONEXE_P 0.6238 0.1907 0.7284 0.1958 *** 
MEETINGS 7.2700 2.4080 11.7100 9.0080 *** 
LN_MEETINGS 1.9362 0.3030 2.2374 0.6298 *** 
BOARD_SKILL 7.1800 2.6420 10.3100 3.6220 *** 
LN_BOARD_SKILL 1.8885 0.4513 2.2749 0.3443 *** 
AUDIT 0.7700 0.4230 0.8100 0.3980  
DUAL 0.4700 0.5010 0.2500 0.4370 *** 
CGC_F 0.3300 0.4700 0.4600 0.5030 * 
CGC_P 0.4700 0.5010 0.3500 0.4800  
CGC_N 0.2100 0.4060 0.1900 0.3980  
FAMILY 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  
INSIDER_P 0.5816 0.1479 0.1272 0.1748 *** 
BV_EQUITY 39.1090 60.3351 203.6360 407.9820 *** 
TOBIN_Q 0.9419 0.3709 1.0053 0.2437  
LN_SIZE 2.7160 1.2276 4.1223 1.8029 *** 
AGE 30.1600 18.9630 39.8800 31.7770 *** 
LN_AGE 3.2375 0.5919 3.3941 0.7732  
DEBT 194.7715 960.0708 2205.9500 4503.1380 *** 
LEV 0.4394 0.2524 0.5200 0.3900  
SALES_G 0.1586 0.7719 0.1801 0.5697  
ID1 0.0600 0.2450 0.4200 0.4990 *** 
ID2 0.0000 0.0000 0.2300 0.4250 *** 
ID3 0.1900 0.3940 0.0000 0.0000 *** 
ID4 0.3700 0.4860 0.1300 0.3450 *** 
ID5 0.0500 0.2140 0.0000 0.0000  
ID6 0.3300 0.4700 0.2100 0.4120  
Notes: The table reports means and standard deviation for different variables for family and  
non-family firms based on pooled data for the years 2002-2007 for the MM and PM 
combined using the equal variances assumption. We have 126 family firm-years 
observations and 52 non-family firm-year observations. Statistically significance: “*” : 10% 
level, “**”: 5% level, “***”: 1% level. 
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Table 4 and Appendix 10.1, pp. 241-243 also show significant differences between FFs 
and NFFs for variables related to board governance and ownership on the MM & PM. 
According to Appendix 10.1, pp. 242, the average family ownership is 54.5% of the 
equity in FFs compared to average insider ownership of 58.2% meaning that non-family 
insiders do not own a significant portion of the equity in FFs. 
 
Further to this FFs have a significantly lower: board size; percentage of non-executive 
directors on the board of directors; frequency of meetings, board skills and non-CEO 
duality. This provides further evidence that may indicate that NFFs have more effective 
corporate governance mechanisms and that the market rewards them with a lower cost of 
capital and higher firm value. The regression models will aim to establish whether this is 
the case. 
 
Concerning the industry dummies, there is significant evidence that NFFs are more 
prevalent in the financial sector where there is a strong requirement for corporate 
governance procedures whereas FFs are concentrated in the retail, real estate and support 
services sectors where the requirement for corporate governance is not as strong. 
 
Table 5 together with Appendices 10.3, pp. 247-249 and Appendix 10.4, pp. 250-251 
provide descriptive statistics for the AM (markets where CGC compliance is not 
required).  The descriptive statistics are broken down by FFs and NFFs. FFs represent 
78.7% of this sample, 337 family firm years from 58 firms. The aim of Table 5 is to 
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investigate differences in corporate governance and performance between FFs and NFFs 
within a market that uses the lowest corporate governance standards.  
 
Concerning the performance measures of Tobin’s Q and ROA, the descriptive statistics 
of the AM are in line with those of the MM & PM. Namely the NFFs have a higher but 
insignificant difference concerning Tobin’s Q value whereas FFs are significantly higher 
than NFFs concerning ROA performance. 
 
However there are a number of differences concerning control variables when comparing 
the MM & PM with the AM. The results of the AM that are in contrast to the MM & PM 
are as follows: FFs have a significantly higher firm size; FFs have an insignificantly 
higher leverage and, FFs have insignificantly higher sales growth.   
 
There are two differences concerning corporate governance board mechanisms when 
comparing the MM & PM with the AM. The results of the AM that are in contrast to the 
MM & PM are as follows: Firstly, FFs have significantly higher board sizes at the 1% 
level and secondly, significantly higher board skills are registered in FFs. This may be in 
line with the fact that FFs in this market are on average larger firms.  
 
In line with the results on the MM & PM, NFFs on the AM have a significantly higher: 
percentage of non-executives on the board of directors, frequency of meetings and non-
CEO duality. These differences are significant at the 1% level. In addition NFFs establish 
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more audit committees than FFs in both types of markets though the difference is 
insignificant. 
 
Concerning family and insider ownership the AM registers a similar pattern to the MM & 
PM in that average family ownership is around 55% of the equity whereas on average 
non-family insiders own less than 5% of the equity of FFs. 
 
In line with Table 4, FFs in the AM are concentrated in the real estate and support 
services sector whereas a significant portion of NFFs are in the finance sector. 
 
The main conclusions that can be drawn from the descriptive statistics analysed is that 
despite higher on average operating performances (ROA) of FFs, investors reward NFFs 
that show (through adoption of corporate governance mechanisms like non-executives, 
higher number of meetings etc) with higher market value presumably through a reduction 
in the cost of capital.  The results from the regression models in the next section will 
provide a greater insight into the relationship between corporate governance and 
performance.    
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Table 5: Descriptive statistics of sample: Type of Business on AM 
 Pooled sample estimates
 Family firms Non-family firms  
Variables Mean Variance Mean Variance Significance 
MD1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  
MD2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  
MD3 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000  
ROE -0.3575 3.7086 -0.2249 1.5284 ** 
ROA -0.0053 0.1240 -0.0371 0.2146 ** 
BOARD  6.5700 2.2920 5.5500 1.7210 *** 
LN_BOARD 1.8271 0.3309 1.6655 0.3149 *** 
EXE 2.7000 1.6790 0.9100 0.8250  
LN_EXEC 0.8077 0.6429 0.1700 0.3250  
NONEXE 3.8500 2.0530 4.6400 1.7420 *** 
LN_NONEXEC 1.2267 0.5526 1.4573 0.4113 *** 
NONEXE_P 0.5840 0.2366 0.8300 0.1618 *** 
MEETINGS 5.2000 1.3020 6.2600 2.6150 *** 
LN_MEETINGS 1.6163 0.2576 1.7704 0.3426 *** 
BOARD_SKILL 5.3600 2.3490 5.0900 1.8110 *** 
LN_BOARD_SKILL 1.5740 0.4940 1.5612 0.3721 *** 
AUDIT 0.0900 0.2850 0.1800 0.3830  
DUAL 0.5300 0.5000 0.1100 0.3140 *** 
CGC_F 0.0300 0.1700 0.0500 0.2290 * 
CGC_P 0.0700 0.2470 0.1200 0.3280  
CGC_N 0.9100 0.2940 0.8200 0.3830  
FAMILY 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  
INSIDER_P 0.5961 0.1332 0.0658 0.0876 *** 
BV_EQUITY 14.5875 21.0459 7.7007 13.1981 *** 
TOBIN_Q 0.9103 0.5406 1.1341 0.8998  
LN_SIZE 1.3908 1.2114 0.9857 1.3484 *** 
AGE 22.9700 13.3350 24.2200 23.0710 *** 
LN_AGE 2.9806 0.5561 2.8469 0.7855  
DEBT 7.8190 12.4095 4.9275 16.5088 *** 
LEV 0.4156 0.2713 0.2831 0.2588  
SALES_G 0.5715 5.4996 0.4719 2.5724  
ID1 0.0600 0.2310 0.1200 0.3280 *** 
ID2 0.0700 0.2620 0.3100 0.4640 *** 
ID3 0.1400 0.3500 0.0000 0.0000 *** 
ID4 0.3000 0.4590 0.2200 0.4160 *** 
ID5 0.0500 0.2130 0.0200 0.1470  
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ID6 0.3800 0.4860 0.3300 0.4730  
Notes: The table reports means and standard deviation for different variables for FFs and 
NFFs based on pooled data for the years 2002-2007 for the MM and PM combined.  There are 
337 family firm-year observations and 91 non-family firm-year observations. Statistically 
significance: “*” : 10% level, “**”: 5% level, “***”: 1% level. 
 
 
  
5.3 Findings for Economic (Regression) Models 
 
Model 1 examines the relationship between corporate governance ownership mechanisms 
and performance using panel regression with three variations: fixed time effects only; 
fixed time and industry effects and fixed time and firm effects. The results are presented 
in Tables 6 using the performance measure of Tobin’s Q value and Table 7 using the 
ROA as a performance measure. The CSE sample used in Model 1 consists of 606 family 
firm years from 101 firms.  
 
In Appendix 10.7, pp. 254-256, correlations for the corporate governance variables and 
performance measures used in Models 1 have been provided. It can be seen that 
correlation between the various variables is generally not strong. This enhances the 
robustness of the model. Positive correlation is strong between board size and board skills 
since most members on CSE firm boards are educated.  In addition positive correlation is 
strong between the family dummy and insider ownership. This is explained by the fact 
that insider ownership is significantly greater in FFs rather than NFFs. Further to this an 
analysis of the regression results concerning Tobin Q and corporate governance 
mechanisms that is stated in Table 6 is given below: 
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The results show that there is a significant negative relationship at the 1% level between 
ROA and Tobin’s Q value. This result is in contrast to the findings of Yermack (1996).  
As will be seen subsequently this result is driven by the negative performance of firms in 
the AM.  
 
There are very little differences between the sign of the coefficients between the three 
variations in Model 1. All three variations of Model 1 show that there is a significant 
positive relationship at the 1% level between firm size and Tobin’s Q value. On the other 
hand there is a significant negative relationship between leverage and firm value and 
between age and firm value. The results concerning leverage would appear to indicate 
that the introduction of debt by CSE firms is either at sub-optimal levels or does not lead 
to decreases in cost of capital and thus has a negative effect on firm value.  
 
The coefficients on the board size is significantly negative and provide evidence to 
support that smaller boards are more efficient and affect the firm value of CSE firms. The 
results also confirm the empirical results of Yermack (1996) that also documents a 
negative association between board size and Tobin’s Q for US firms. Other studies 
including Vafeas (1999), Eisenberg at al. (1998) Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) and Abor 
and Biekpe (2007), Mishra et al (2001) and Coles et al. (2008) report a similar negative 
relationship between board size and firm performance. This result supports the view of 
Lipton and Lorsch (1992) and Jensen (1993) that smaller boards are more effective in 
planning and implementing their activities. 
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The fixed firm effects model provides significant evidence at the 5% level that there is a 
positive relationship between the percentage of non-executive directors on the board of 
directors and market performance on the CSE.  This provides further evidence that 
investors view positively the introduction of corporate governance mechanisms by CSE 
firms and reward them with possible reductions in costs of capital that lead to higher firm 
values. 
 
Further to this there is significant evidence at the 5% level that the frequency of meetings 
has a positive effect on market performance on the CSE. This shows that the market 
evaluates the higher frequency of meetings as a signal that corporate governance has 
improved in the firm and rewards these firms with possible reductions in their cost of 
capital that improves their firm value. Alternatively the positive relationship between the 
frequency of meetings and market performance may capture the fact that these firms have 
higher growth prospects that are reflected in the higher frequency of meetings necessary 
to plan and implement these prospects.  Board skills show to have an insignificant effect 
on firm value. This result may be driven by the inability of the measure used to capture 
true management skills.  
 
There is significant evidence at the 5% level of a positive relationship between CEO 
duality and market performance on the CSE that is in line with the stewardship theory. It 
also in line with the findings of Chen et al. (2005) that detects a significant positive 
relationship between CEO duality and market value. The results would appear to suggest 
that investors perceive CEO duality is not harmful for investor protection.  
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Table 6:Regression results: Tobin Q performance versus Corporate Governance 
Mechanisms: CSE Market (Model 1) 
 
 
Dependent Variable: Tobin Q 
 TIME EFFECTS 
TIME EFFECTS 
WITH INDUSTRY FIRM EFFECTS 
Variable Coefficient
t-
Statistic Coefficient 
t-
Statistic Coefficient 
t-
Statistic
CONSTANT 1.425 6.645 
*** 
1.335 5.922 
*** 
2.559 4.617 
*** 
MD1 0.071 0.739 0.062 0.635 -0.757 -2.227 
** 
MD2 -0.090 -1.030 -0.094 -1.076 -0.642 -1.967 
** 
ID 1 N/A N/A -0.050 -0.568 N/A N/A 
ID 2 N/A N/A 0.088 1.044 N/A N/A 
ID 3 N/A N/A -0.007 -0.089 N/A N/A 
ID 4 N/A N/A -0.010 -0.177 N/A N/A 
ID 5 N/A N/A 0.106 0.895 N/A N/A 
LN SIZE 0.064 3.006 
*** 
0.065 2.969 
*** 
0.253 7.610 
*** 
LN AGE -0.054 -1.381 -0.040 -0.955 -0.251 -3.177 
*** 
LEVERAGE -0.367 -4.382 
*** 
-0.367 -4.230 
*** 
-0.258 -1.914 
* 
SALES_G 0.000 -0.082 -0.000 -0.018 -0.001 -0.282 
LN BOARD -0.381 -3.208 
*** 
-0.337 -2.611 
*** 
-0.328 -1.627 
% NON-EXE 0.143 1.352 0.115 1.060 0.545 2.411 
** 
LN MEETINGS 0.168 2.306 
** 
0.173 2.293 
** 
-0.101 -1.163 
LN BOARD SKILL 0.014 0.178 -0.004 -0.040 -0.017 -0.107 
DUALITY 0.103 2.161 
** 
0.104 2.142 
** 
.018 0.227 
AUDIT-COM 0.077 1.016 0.079 1.029 -0.161 -2.234 
** 
FAMILY -0.145 -1.505 -0.139 -1.425 -0.280 -2.200 
** 
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INSIDER% 0.163 0.939 0.152 0.864 0.379 1.562 
ROA -0.915 -5.085 
*** 
-0.866 -4.704 
*** 
-0.262 -1.606 
MD1*CGC_P -0.198 -1.586 -0.205 -1.625 -0.061 -0.372 
MD2*CGC_N 0.050 0.369 0.069 0.498 -0.011 -0.098 
MD3*CGC_F -0.188 -1.205 -0.172 -1.089 0.215 1.229 
       
R-squared 0.197  0.200  0.646  
F Statistic 6.194  5.156  7.154  
Probability (F-statistic) 0.000  0.000  0.000  
Durbin-Watson stat.   0.770    
       
The method used was panel regression. The first results are: fixed time effects without industry, the second fixed time effects 
with industry and finally, time and firm effects. The sample consists of 101 panels (firms) and 606 firm observations. 
The time period of the sample was the years 2002-2007. 
Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% level (***), 5% level (**) or 10% level (*) 
 
 
Further on in the chapter the relationship between CEO duality and performance is 
examined to see if there are any differences in the result based on the type of market and 
the type of firm. (FFs versus NFFs). The existence of audit committees has an 
insignificant effect on firm value for the two models, and a negative effect for the firm 
fixed effect model. This result is surprising, and given the inconsistency in the sign 
compared to other models, it may not be considered robust. In subsequent analysis 
focusing by market, the industry model is used which is more standard in the literature 
and we establish a positive relationship between the audit committees and firm 
performance for firms operating in the AM.   
 
All models show a negative relationship between family ownership and performance (the 
fixed firm effects model provides significant evidence at the 5% level). This means that 
minority shareholders are worse off than they would have been under NFFs. Model 3 that 
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will be analysed later will aim to establish if family firms that implement corporate 
governance mechanisms will have performance benefits. In contrast to this, the 
relationship between insider ownership and performance is positive however the 
relationship is not statistically significant (subsequently this shows to be significant for 
the AM). The result of family ownership is in contrast to Villalonga and Amit (2006), 
while the result with respect to insider ownership is in line with their results. It is not 
evident why investors seem to punish ownership arising from families versus ownership 
that relates to insiders. 
 
There is no strong relationship between the level of corporate governance adoption and 
market performance. The interaction variables sought to investigate whether the market 
punishes firms with a lower market valuation in the MM or AM that exhibit lower quality 
of governance. However the results in Table 6 did not establish this. Furthermore, firms 
in the AM that fully comply do not seem to be rewarded by higher market valuations by 
market. 
 
The Durbin Watson statistics has been used to detect the presence of autocorrelation in 
the residuals from the regression. This statistic has only been reported for the fixed time 
and industry effects that is to be used in further tests in Models 2 3, and 4. According to 
NLREG.com (2010) a value less than 0.8 usually indicates that autocorrelation is likely.  
The result given for the time and industry effects model using Tobin’s Q value is close to 
this limit.  
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Table 7 examines the relationship between corporate governance ownership mechanisms 
and ROA performance using panel regression with three variations: fixed time effects 
only; fixed time and industry effects and fixed time and firm effects. The CSE sample 
consists of 606 firm observations and 101 firms. The results for Table 7 are analysed 
below: 
 
In line with the Tobin’s Q measure there is a significant positive relationship between 
size and performance when ROA is used as an independent variable. This finding is 
consistent with the findings of Yermack (1996), Martinez et al (2007) and Ehiyioka 
(2009) who provide evidence that larger firm outperform smaller firms based on current 
performance.  
 
Abor and Biekpe (2007) and Ehiyioka (2009) provide evidence concerning the positive 
relationship between age and ROA performance. They found that older firms perform 
better than younger firms based on current performance. In contrast the relationship 
between age and market performance is negative and significant at the 1% level. This is 
may be explained by the fact that older firms are more mature and profitable, however, 
they may exhibit lower growth prospects.  
 
There is a significant negative relationship between leverage and ROA that is line with 
market performance. It was found that higher gearing on the CSE leads to poorer 
performance. This is in line with the findings of Villalonga and Amit (2006), Martinez et 
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al (2007) and Abor and Biekpe (2007). Sales growth did not show to have a significant 
impact on operating performance.  
 
The results give evidence of a significant positive relationship between board size and 
performance as measured by ROA. The result regarding the relationship between board 
size and current performance (that is ROA) also supports the view, at least for the CSE 
that firms with larger boards may provide for more efficient monitoring of the current 
activities of the firm. This result is in contrast to the result reported by Yermack (1996) 
regarding the relationship of board size with operating performance as measured by 
ROA.  
 
In contrast to the relationship with firm value, there is a negative significant relationship 
between the frequency of board meetings with ROA. The results seem to be in line with 
Vafeas (1999) who reports a negative association between board meetings and ROA of 
recent years. He attributes increasing board activity as a reaction to these negative shocks 
in performance. The negative coefficient with respect to ROA in the research may be 
confirmatory of the same effects taking place in the firms listed in the CSE. The results 
also indicate that the market sees higher meeting frequency as a mechanism that can 
increase future performance (thus the observed positive association with Tobin’s Q) that 
can be used to make the firm more effective. 
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Table 7: Regression results: ROA performance versus Corporate Governance Mechanisms: 
CSE Market (Model 1) 
 
Dependent Variable: ROA 
 TIME EFFECTS 
TIME EFFECTS 
WITH INDUSTRY FIRM EFFECTS 
Variable Coefficient
t-
Statistic Coefficient 
t-
Statistic Coefficient 
t-
Statistic
CONSTANT -0.036 0.744 0.027 0.528 -0.124 -0.805 
MD1 0.049 2.237 
** 
0.047 2.168 
** 
0.021 0.223 
MD2 0.040 1.985 
** 
0.037 1.875 
* 
0.017 0.192 
ID 1 N/A N/A 0.005 0.245 N/A N/A 
ID 2 N/A N/A -0.062 -3.296 
*** 
N/A N/A 
ID 3 N/A N/A 0.011 0.574 N/A N/A 
ID 4 N/A N/A 0.028 2.117 
** 
N/A N/A 
ID 5 N/A N/A -0.056 -2.103 
** 
N/A N/A 
LN SIZE 0.022 4.640 
*** 
0.023 4.736 
*** 
0.010 1.075 
LN AGE 0.018 1.944 
* 
0.005 0.475 0.015 0.702 
LEVERAGE -0063 -3.291 
*** 
-0.054 -2.788 
*** 
-0.087 -2.328 
** 
SALES_G -0.000 -0.038 0.000 -0.363 0.001 0.425 
LN BOARD 0.086 3.172 
*** 
0.055 1.909 
* 
0.016 0.278 
% NON-EXE -0.024 -0.970 0.001 0.049 -0.042 -0.670 
LN MEETINGS -0.054 -3.254 
*** 
-0.050 -2.938 
*** 
0.009 0.357 
LN BOARD SKILL -0.063 -3.446 
*** 
-0.049 -2.398 
** 
0.001 0.016 
DUALITY 0.019 1.757 
* 
0.019 1.756 
* 
0.052 2.409 
** 
AUDIT-COM -0.026 -1.472 -0.023 -1.306 -0.005 -0.230 
FAMILY -0.028 -1.271 -0.033 -1.505 0.012 0.336 
INSIDER% 0.066 1.672 0.059 1.490 0.052 0.764 
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* 
MD1*CGC_P -0.011 -0.378 -0.012 -0.416 -0.042 -0.908 
MD2*CGC_N 0.005 0.157 -0.009 -0.276 0.004 0.140 
MD3*CGC_F 0.086 2.399 
** 
0.067 1.889 
* 
-0.005 -0.108 
       
R-squared 0.205  0.237  0.487  
F Statistic 6.835  6.641  3.757  
Probability (F-statistic) 0.000  0.000  0.000  
Durbin Watson stats   1.160    
       
The method used was panel regression. The first results are: fixed time effects without industry, the second fixed time effects 
with industry and finally, time and firm effects. The sample consists of 101 panels (firms) and 606 firm observations. 
The time period of the sample was the years 2002-2007. 
Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% level (***), 5% level (**) or 10% level (*) 
 
 
The board skills variable shows to have a surprisingly negative effect on performance. 
This may indicate that while education may in theory improve performance, it does not 
capture the richness of capabilities necessary for effective management.  
 
The evidence found in our sample seems to support the view that CEO duality may help 
in improving both current performance with the owner-manager providing a more active 
monitoring of the activities.  
 
There is also significant evidence at the 10% level of a positive relationship between 
insider ownership and performance. This together with the results of CEO duality 
indicates that there seems to be a better alignment of the goals of shareholders and 
managers. In contrast, there is a negative relationship between family ownership and 
performance though the evidence is insignificant.  
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There is significant evidence at the 10% level that CSE firms listed on the AM that will 
comply with CGC will on average have a positive effect on ROA. Earlier, it was shown 
that stricter compliance in the AM had a negative effect on firm value Tobin Q) so, as 
previously mentioned, these firms should do more to promote stricter compliance benefits 
to investors.  
 
The Durbin Watson statistics has been used to detect the presence of autocorrelation in 
the residuals from the regression. This statistic has only been reported for the fixed time 
and industry effects that is to be used in further tests in Models 2 and 3. According to 
NLREG.com (2010) a value less than 0.8 usually indicates that autocorrelation is likely.  
The result given for the time and industry effects model using ROA (1.16) is well in 
excess of this limit meaning autocorrelation is less likely.  
 
Model 2 aims to examine the relationship between corporate governance and 
performance for different markets. Two market groups are focused on: firms that are 
required to either fully or partly comply with the CGC (that is the MM & PM) and those 
in which firms are not required to comply with the CGC (that is the AM). The analysis is 
based on the panel data regression approach with fixed time and industry effects. This 
model has been chosen over the other two variants (that is fixed time effects and fixed 
firm effects) used in Tables 6-7 since it is the more standard model used in the literature 
(and is more parsimonious compared to the firm fixed effect model). Table 8 reports the 
results with Tobin’s Q value used as the dependent variable measuring performance. The 
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CSE sample consists of 606 firm observations, the MM & PM sample consists of 178 
firm observations and the AM consists of 428 firm observations. 
 
The results of the control variables are similar to the results in Model 1 (See Table 6) and 
are the same amongst the type of markets. Table 8 shows that there is significant 
evidence of a positive relationship between firm size and Tobin’s Q value though a 
negative relationship between leverage and Tobin’s Q value. The results concerning 
leverage provide further evidence that the introduction of debt by CSE firms does not 
lead to decreases in cost of capital and increases in firm value. In may indicate that 
investors on the CSE are keener to invest in firms with low financial risk than otherwise. 
 
Concerning the industry dummies there is a significant positive relationship between the 
Tobin’s Q value with Industrial & Real Estate Development and Technology sectors for 
firms listed on the MM & PM.  
 
The results for the AM show that there is a significant negative relationship at the 1% 
level between ROA and Tobin’s Q value that also reported for the overall stock market 
but not the MM & PM. This indicates that the result for the overall market is mainly 
driven by the low operating performance of the firms in the AM market.  
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Table 8: Regression results: Tobin Q performance versus Corporate Governance mechanisms: 
Type of Market (Model 2) 
 
 
Dependent Variable: Tobin Q 
 ALL OF CSE MM & PM AM 
Variable Coefficient
t-
Statistic Coefficient 
t-
Statistic Coefficient 
t-
Statistic
CONSTANT 1.335 5.922 
*** 
1.178 3.789 
*** 
1.391 4.586 
*** 
MD1 0.062 0.635 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
MD2 -0.094 -1.076 -0.135 -1.305 N/A N/A 
ID 1 -0.050 -0.568 -0026 -0.235 -0.092 -0.722 
ID 2 0.088 1.044 -0021 -0.163 0.071 0.678 
ID 3 -0.007 -0.089 -0062 -0.716 -0.042 -0.361 
ID 4 -0.010 -0.177 0.204 3.403 
*** 
-0.122 -1.575 
ID 5 0.106 0.895 0.230 1.774 
* 
0.096 0.627 
LN SIZE 0.065 2.969 
*** 
0.131 3.071 
*** 
0.048 1.697 
* 
LN AGE -0.040 -0.955 -0.169 -2.597 
*** 
-0.038 -0.644 
LEVERAGE -0.367 -4.230 
*** 
-0.114 -1.105 -0.429 -3.607 
*** 
SALES_G -0.000 -0.018 0.022 0.693 -0.001 -0.240 
LN BOARD -0.337 -2.611 
*** 
0.293 1.409 -0.527 -3.291 
*** 
% NON-EXE 0.115 1.060 0.257 1.844 
** 
-0.015 -0.109 
LN MEETINGS 0.173 2.293 
** 
-0.062 -0.922 0.279 2.507 
** 
LN BOARD SKILL -0.004 -0.040 -0.378 -2.591 
*** 
0.116 1.024 
DUALITY 0.104 2.142 
** 
0.132 1.695 
* 
0.150 2.378 
** 
AUDIT-COM 0.079 1.029 -0.006 -0.052 0.224 1.937 
* 
FAMILY -0.139 -1.425 -0.015 -0.166 -0.309 -2.141 
** 
 145
INSIDER% 0.152 0.864 -0.102 -0.548 0.475 1.908 
* 
ROA -0.866 -4.704 
*** 
0.000 0.001 -0.801 -3.708 
*** 
MD1*CGC_P -0.205 -1.625 0.036 0.351 N/A N/A
MD2*CGC_N 0.069 0.498 0.226 1.969 
* 
N/A N/A
MD3*CGC_F -0.172 -1.089 N/A N/A -0.267 -1.375 
       
R-squared 0.200  0.443  0.230  
F Statistic 5.156  4.624  5.020  
Probability (F-statistic) 0.000  0.000  0.000  
      
The method used was panel regression with time an industry effects  
The CSE sample consists of 606 firm observations. The MM & PM sample consists of 178 firm observations. The AM consists 
Of 428 firm observations. 
The time period of the sample was the years 2002-2007. 
Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% level (***), 5% level (**) or 10% level (*) 
 
 
The results of corporate governance board mechanisms show a number of differences 
between the MM & PM compared to the AM. Larger board sizes are negatively 
correlated with firm value for AM firms.  In contrast to this, a positive (albeit 
insignificant relationship) exists for firms on the MM & PM. A further difference 
between the markets is the significant positive relationship for firms in the MM & PM 
between the percentage of non-executives on the board of directors and market 
performance. The results are in line with those of Baysinger and Butler (1985) and Yoo 
(2005).  It seems that investors on the MM & PM see board composition as a mechanism 
that can enhance investor protection. 
 
Surprisingly, investors view the increase in skilled board members affecting value 
negatively. The number of meetings shows to be positively related with performance only 
 146
in the AM while there is an insignificant relationship for the MM & PM. This result 
indicates that some activities of the board may be considered more important in the 
absence of corporate governance mechanisms. It indicates that in the absence of 
requirements to establish a minimum number of meetings, firms that report a high 
frequency signal a good level of governance. Board skills shows to have a negative effect 
on performance for firms operating in the MM & PM. This is a surprising result that 
cannot be explained but possibly the inefficiency (due to lack of information) of the 
measure used to capture management skills.  
 
Further evidence is also provided by the positive relationship between CEO duality (that 
goes against the CGC) and market performance for all markets. Concerning CEO duality 
there is further significant evidence for the stewardship theory since both in MM & PM 
and AM report a positive relationship between CEO duality and Tobin’s Q value.  
 
In addition further evidence is also provided by the significant positive relationship 
between insider ownership and market performance on the AM. This supports the view 
that investors, especially for firms operating in the AM, view managers as good stewards 
of the firm’s resources and that if left alone they will act responsibly and will effectively 
manage the assets they control. In line with the results of Model 1, there is a difference in 
behaviour concerning the relationship between family ownership and market 
performance which shows to driven mainly by the strong negative relationship for firms 
in the AM (while for firms in the MM & PM is negative but statistically insignificant)  
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There is evidence that investors do reward AM firms if they implement corporate 
governance mechanisms. One such case is the significant positive relationship between 
the establishment of audit committees and market performance that is viewed positively 
by investors. The implementation of audit committees in a market with low corporate 
governance levels may signal improvement in governance that can cause a reduction in 
cost of capital and an increase in firm value. This result is in contrast to the insignificant 
relationship shown for MM & PM where the establishment of such committees is 
standard. 
 
There is no significant evidence to support a positive relationship between performance 
and CGC compliance. In fact, there is significant evidence at the 10% level to suggest 
that CSE firms listed on the PM that do not comply with CGC will on average have a 
positive effect on firm value. This goes against the evidence that shows that corporate 
governance mechanisms will have a positive effect on firm value.  
 
Table 9 aims to examine the relationship between corporate governance and ROA 
performance across different markets similarly to Table 8. Like the previous table, the 
analysis is based on the panel data regression approach with fixed time and industry 
effects. The CSE sample consists of 606 firm observations, the MM & PM sample 
consists of 178 firm observations and the AM consists of 428 firm observations. 
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Table 9: Regression results: ROA Performance versus Corporate Governance mechanisms: 
Type of Market (Model 2) 
 
 
Dependent Variable: ROA 
 ALL OF CSE MM & PM AM 
Variable Coefficient
t-
Statistic Coefficient 
t-
Statistic Coefficient 
t-
Statistic
CONSTANT 0.027 0.528 -0.060 -0.867 -0.060 -0.867 
MD1 0.047 2.168 
** 
N/A N/A N/A N/A 
MD2 0.037 1.875 
* 
-0.054 -2.899 
*** 
N/A N/A 
ID 1 0.005 0.245 0.025 1.231 0.033 1.133 
ID 2 -0.062 -3.296 
*** 
0.028 1.184 -0.073 -3.083 
*** 
ID 3 0.011 0.574 0.026 1.616 0.013 0.495 
ID 4 0.028 2.117 
** 
0.017 1.552 0.033 1.882 
* 
ID 5 -0.056 -2.103 
** 
0.025 1.028 -0.086 -2.466 
** 
LN SIZE 0.023 4.736 
*** 
-0.010 -1.233 0.031 5.015 
*** 
LN AGE 0.005 0.475 0.025 2.077 
** 
0.004 0.270 
LEVERAGE -0.054 -2.788 
*** 
-0.098 -5.617 
*** 
-0.026 -0.966 
SALES_G 0.000 -0.363 0.015 2.641 
*** 
0.000 -0.418 
LN BOARD 0.055 1.909 
* 
0.095 2.496 
** 
0.068 1.838 
* 
% NON-EXE 0.001 0.049 -0.023 -0.894 0.034 1.064 
LN MEETINGS -0.050 -2.938 
*** 
0.003 0.250 -0.066 -2.581 
*** 
LN BOARD SKILL -0.049 -2.398 
** 
-0.081 -3.061 
*** 
-0.055 -2.124 
** 
DUALITY 0.019 1.756 
* 
0.036 2.530 
** 
0.012 0.820 
AUDIT-COM -0.023 -1.306 0.038 1.965 
* 
-0.027 -1.015 
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FAMILY -0.033 -1.505 0.003 0.159 -0.031 --0.924
INSIDER% 0.059 1.490 -0.003 -0.092 0.033 0.585 
ROA N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
MD1*CGC_P -0.012 -0.416 0.011 0.561 N/A N/A 
MD2*CGC_N -0.009 -0.276 0.029 1.350 N/A N/A 
MD3*CGC_F 0.067 1.889 
* 
N/A N/A 0.053 1.178 
       
R-squared 0.205  0.502  0.238  
F Statistic 6.835  6.117  5.492  
Probability (F-statistic) 0.000  0.000  0.000  
      
The method used was panel regression with time an industry effects  
The CSE sample consists of 606 firm observations. The MM & PM sample consists of 178 firm observations. The AM consists 
Of 428 firm observations. 
The time period of the sample was the years 2002-2007. 
Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% level (***), 5% level (**) or 10% level (*) 
 
 
In general the coefficients between the MM & PM with the AM are in the same direction. 
Consistently with the results in Table 7, a negative relationship is recorded between 
leverage and ROA performance. However a number of differences have been recorded. 
Concerning the control variables the main difference concerns the relationship between 
size and ROA performance whereby in contrast to the MM & PM, there is a significant 
positive relationship between firm size and ROA performance (which is the driver of the 
observed positive relationship for the overall market). On the other hand age and sales 
growth has an established positive relationship only in the MM & PM (while this was not 
observed when one looks at the overall market).  
 
A number of corporate board related factors have similar relationship with ROA 
performance across markets. Board size and CEO duality shows a consistently positive 
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effect on ROA for both markets. Similarly, board skills show consistently negative 
relationship with ROA across markets.  
 
The main differences recorded concerning board mechanisms relates first to the 
frequency of meetings where the established negative relationship shows to be driven by 
the low operating performance of firms in the AM (See Table 3).  A second difference 
appears in the impact of audit committees on ROA where is shown that a positive 
statistically significant effect exists for only in firms in the MM & PM. The percentage of 
non-executives on the board appears not statistically significant in both markets although 
a positive insignificant effect exists for firms in the AM.  
 
Concerning whether there is a relationship between the type of market and CGC 
compliance there is significant evidence at the 10% level that CSE firms listed on the AM 
that will comply with CGC will on average have a positive effect on accounting profit. 
This result may however be endogenously driven, i.e., firm that have higher profitability 
are the ones more likely to move on to the establishment of (costly) corporate governance 
mechanisms. As previously mentioned these firms should also do more to promote the 
benefits of stricter corporate governance adoption to investors.  
 
When comparing the results between market performance (Tobin’s Q value) and 
operating performance (ROA) that are provided in Tables 6-9 it was generally found that 
the signs of the coefficients for the independent variables were the same. However two 
main differences were observed between Tobin’s Q value and ROA results. The first 
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difference concerns the relationship between board size and performance. The results 
give evidence of a positive relationship between board size and operating performance 
and a negative relationship with market performance. The results support the view that 
smaller boards are more effective in planning and implementing their activities. 
However, the result regarding the relationship between board size and operating 
performance shows the opposite effect reflecting the view that larger boards may provide 
for more efficient monitoring of the current activities of the firm.  
 
The second difference between the results concern the frequency of meetings where 
logarithm of number of board meetings variable shows to have a strong negative 
association with operating performance and a strong positive association with market 
performance. This difference may be explained by the fact that an increase in the 
frequency of meetings may be carried out to negative shocks in performance and this 
would have a positive effect on the subsequent profitability of the firm. This seems to be 
reflected in the positive coefficient of the frequency of meetings variable with Tobin’s Q 
value.  
 
Model 3 aims to examine how family ownership interact with other variables in their 
effect on firm performance for firms in the CSE.  The performance measures used in 
Model 3 are Tobin’s Q value and ROA. The model tests the interaction effects of 
corporate governance variables in model 1 with family firm dummies. The sample 
consists of 606 firm observations for 101 firms. The results of Model 3 are shown in 
Table 10 and are analysed below: 
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The results regarding the other variables are similar with previous results, so the focus is 
on the results concerning the interaction between family and other corporate governance 
variables. There is a negative effect of the family variable with the Tobin’s Q value 
established at a 10% of significance.  Most of the interaction variables turn out to be 
insignificant, however, the results show that FFs that operate in the MM have higher 
Tobin’s Q values. This may be an indication that FFs that operate in the MM signal 
higher investor protection and thus achieve reductions in their cost of capital that leads to 
an increase in firm value. Interestingly, the presence of non-executive directors in the 
boards of FFs shows to also enhance firm values.  
 
This result is in line with what would be expected from an increase in investor protection 
provided by the presence of non-executive directors. 
 
Though FFs have a higher proportion of CEO duality than NFFs (See descriptive 
statistics in Tables 4 and 5) there is weak evidence that show that FFs with CEO duality 
will have a negative impact of firm value. If this is contrasted to the results in Table 8 
that show a significant positive relationship between CEO duality and Tobin’s Q value 
(for the CSE, MM & PM and AM) then it may be inferred that NFFs with CEO duality 
will have a positive impact on firm value. 
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Table 10: Regression results: Family interaction results (Model 3) 
 
 Dependent variables 
 Tobin’s Q value ROA 
Variables Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic 
CONSTANT 1.859 3.973 
*** 
0.404 3.901 
*** 
MD1 -0.651 -2.862 
*** 
-0.063 -1.234 
MD2 -0.404 -2.113 
** 
-0.032 -0.754 
ID1 -0.064 -0.653 0.014 0.630 
ID2 -0.141 -1.523 
 
-0.055 -2.692 
*** 
ID3 -0.013 -0.149 -0.002 -0.106 
ID4 0.014 0.236 0.022 1.626 
ID5 -0.104 -0.860 
 
-0.063 -2.331 
** 
LN_SIZE 0.111 2.250 
** 
0.060 5.554 
*** 
LN_AGE -0.106 -1.206 -0.016 -0.817 
LEV -0.384 -2.167 
** 
0.030 0.761 
SALES_G 0.001 0.104 -0.000 0.020 
LN_BOARD -0.314 -1.020 
 
-0.152 -2.202 
** 
NONEXE_P -0.723 -1.963 
* 
-0.123 -1.499 
 
LN_MEETINGS 0.313 2.205 
** 
-0.120 -3.829 
*** 
LN_BOARD_SKILL 0.010 0.038 0.072 1.270 
DUAL 0.214 1.143 -0.063 -1.494 
AUDIT 0.311 2.187 
** 
0.007 0.220 
FAMILY -0.888 -1.785 
* 
-0.441 -4.006 
*** 
INSIDER_P -0.139 0.276 0.070 0.621 
ROA -0.910 -4.856 
*** 
N/A N/A 
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MD1*CGC_P -0.127 -0.882 0.032 1.001 
MD2*CGC_N 0.424 2.574 
** 
-0.003 -0.072 
MD3*CGC_F -0.261 -1.612 0.086 2.368 
** 
FF*MD1 0.797 3.177 
*** 
0.115 2.056 
** 
FF*MD2 0.150 0.734 
 
0.085 1.857 
* 
FF*LN_SIZE -0.055 -1.013 
 
-0.045 -3.741 
*** 
FF*LN_AGE 0.110 1.089 0.026 1.151 
FF*LEV 0.032 1.156 -0.110 -2.381 
** 
FF*LN_BOARD 0.028 0.082 0.258 3.443 
*** 
FF*NONEXE_P 0.965 2.514 
** 
0.132 1.541 
 
FF*LN_MEETINGS -0.034 -1.262 0.011 1.948 
* 
FF*LN_BOARD_SKILL -0.076 -0.278 -0.143 -2.348 
** 
FF*AUDIT -0.165 -1.097 -0.036 1.066 
FF*DUAL -0.136 -0.699 0.084 1.922 
* 
FF*INSIDER_P 0.292 0.527 0.011 0.093 
     
R-squared 0.232  0.278  
F Statistic 4.275  5.585  
Probability (F-statistic) 0.000  0.000  
Durbin-Watson stat. 0.811  1.264  
     
The method used was panel regression using fixed time and industry effects. The sample consists of 101 
panels (firms) and 606 firm observations. The time period of the sample was the years 2002-2007. Asterisks 
denote statistical significance at the 1% level (***), 5% level (**) or 10% level (*) 
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There is weak evidence of a positive relationship between leverage and firm value for 
FFs. If this is contrasted to the results in Table 8 that show a significant negative 
relationship between leverage and Tobin’s Q value (for both the CSE and MM & PM) 
then it may be inferred that there may be a negative relationship between leverage and 
firm value in NFFs. However this is based on inconclusive evidence.  
 
A number of interaction variables show to be important for the model where ROA is the 
independent variable. First, similarly to the effect on Tobin’s Q value, FFs operating in 
the MM show to have positive impact on operating performance. Larger firm size and 
leverage show to have a negative impact on ROA for FFs. Larger boards, a higher 
frequency of meetings and CEO duality enhances the operating performance of FFs. In 
contrast to intuition, board skills correlate negatively with the FFs operating performance 
that is the same as the results reported in Table 9.  
 
Concerning the frequency of meetings, if this is contrasted to the results in Table 9 that 
show a significant negative relationship between the frequency of meetings and Tobin’s 
Q value (for both the CSE and AM) then it may be inferred that there is a positive 
relationship between the frequency of meetings and operating performance of NFFs. 
 
The Durbin Watson statistic has been used to detect the presence of autocorrelation in the 
residuals from the regression. According to NLREG.com (2010) a value less than 0.8 
usually indicates that autocorrelation is likely. Concerning Model 3, there is less 
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likelihood of autocorrelation in the ROA model that has a higher Durbin Watson statistic 
(value of 1.264) than the Tobin’s Q value model (value of 0.811).   
 
Model 4 is a changes model and aims to establish the relationship between the changes in 
the performance measure with a change in the corporate governance variable. Dummy 
variables have been omitted from this model due to the fact that in the majority (if not all 
cases) they are fixed. Hence the actual variables used are non-dummy variables. The 
performance measures used in the model are the same as for the previously three models: 
namely Tobin’s Q value and ROA. The independent variables used in this model that 
involve percentage changes include: board size, board composition, frequency of 
meetings, board skills and insider ownership. The model also uses the control variables of 
size of the firm, age of the firm, leverage and sales growth. Changes in the ROA are only 
used for the Tobin’s Q model. The data used was for the years 2003-2007 and 505 firm 
observations were used. The results are presented in Table 11 below and are analysed as 
follows: 
 
There is significant evidence of a positive relationship between the changes in the board 
size and changes in firm value. This is in contrast to the results in Tables 5-9 that show 
that board size has a negative impact on firm value. However the change in board size 
could be linked to the appointment of more non-executive directors. It should be noted 
from the evidence in previous models that shows there is a positive relationship between 
the percentage of non-executives and market performance.  
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Table 11: Regression results: Changes in variables model (Model 4) 
 
 Dependent variables 
 
% Change in Tobin’s Q 
value 
% Change in ROA 
Variables Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic 
CONSTANT 0.217 2.136 
*** 
-2.861 -1.196 
ROA % CHANGE 0.001 0.439 N/A N/A 
BOARD % CHANGE 0.614 2.651 
*** 
-0.349 -0.064 
%NON-EXE % CHANGE 0.038 0.288 0.555 0.177 
MEETINGS % CHANGE 0.102 1.518 0.533 0.336 
BOARD SKILL % CHANGE -0.218 -1.124 0.313 0.068 
% INSIDERS % CHANGE -0.005 -0.845 -0.001 -0.010 
LN SIZE  0.009 0.689 0.180 0.583 
LN AGE -0.038 -1.115 0.957 1.193 
LEVERAGE -0.190 -2.886 
*** 
-1.952 -1.259 
ID 1 0.093 1.354 4.428 2.744 
*** 
ID 2 0.039 0.590 0.078 0.050 
ID 3 0.092 1.481 1.759 1.197 
ID 4 0.108 2.308 
** 
0.192 0.175 
ID 5 0.114 1.159 -0.289 -0.125 
MD 1 -0.057 -1.074 -0.806 -0.643 
MD 2 -0.126 -2.288 
** 
-0.090 -0.069 
     
R-squared 0.049  0.010  
F Statistic 2.563  0.558  
Probability (F-statistic) 0.005  0.831  
Durbin-Watson stat. 2.142  2.428  
     
The method used was panel regression using fixed time and industry effects. The sample consists of 101 
panels (firms) and 505 firm observations. The time period of the sample was the years 2003-2007. Asterisks 
denote statistical significance at the 1% level (***), 5% level (**) or 10% level (*)
 
 
Table 10 also shows weak evidence of a positive relationship between changes in non-
executive directors and market performance. This provides further evidence that investors 
 158
view positively the introduction of corporate governance mechanisms by CSE firms (via 
the appointment of non-executive directors) and reward them with possible reductions in 
costs of capital that lead to higher firm values. 
 
Table 11 also shows that the changes model concerning changes in the ROA with a 
change in the corporate governance variables is weak with no significant findings. For 
this reason the results have not been analysed. 
 
A positive feature of Model 4 is given by the Durbin Watson statistic. Concerning Model 
4, there is no likelihood of autocorrelation in either the Tobin’s Q model or the ROA 
model since the statistics are both well in excess of the limit for the likelihood of 
autocorrelation.   
 
5.4 Findings for management interviews  
 
Twenty-five managers in CSE firms would be interviewed concerning corporate 
governance issues. The sample was to be distributed from managers who worked in firms 
that were in the MM, PM and the other markets such as the AM. Of the total sample 18 
managers were from FFs and 7 from NFFs. The overall split between family and non-
family firms that is covered by question 5 of the interview (72% to 28%) was similar to 
the corresponding split from the sample of the empirical data (77% to 23%) as shown 
previously in Table 2. However the fact that a number of participants did not respond 
(primarily from those that did not comply with the CGC) meant that the sample of non-
CGC compliance firms (that is firms in the AM) was lower in percentage terms when 
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compared to the empirical sample. Details of the interview questions are given in 
Appendix 5, pp. 252-253. Table 12 provides descriptive statistics concerning the CSE 
interview sample separated between FFs and NFFs. Table 12 includes data for means, 
medians and provides details where the means between FFs and NFFs are statistically 
significant. Though the median data was provided for information purposes, it was 
decided they would not be used in the analysis for the reason that it could be misleading 
in that most questions analysed had no more than three possible answers. Hence the mean 
data was used in the analysis of the results in Table 12. The results from Table 12 are 
analysed below: 
 
In line with the empirical data, the interview data shows that most FFs and NFFs do not 
comply with the CGC and that the firms that either comply or partially comply are 
similar in number. There are no significant differences between FFs and NFFs 
concerning compliance and partial compliance. 
 
For those companies that partially comply with the CGC, Question 3 asked on which 
points they did not comply. Half of these firms stated that they did not comply due to 
CEO duality and 25% of these firms did not establish a remuneration committee. Other 
factors mentioned as reasons for non-compliance with the CGC include: annual meetings 
not exceeding the minimum number and non-executive directors on the board not 
exceeding the minimum requirement.  
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Question 4 asked the participants to classify their firms according to the market and 
industry. Table 12 shows that half of the FFs in the sample are listed in the AM (MD3) 
whereas NFF are equally split between MM (MD1) and AM (MD3).  
I also followed an approach of including some of the larger size NFFs in the sample 
(these were included in both the MM and PM) to make the interview results more useful 
to users of the research.  
 
Concerning the sample market classification, FFs are concentrated in the retail (ID 3), 
industrial (ID 4) and support services sector (ID6). This is also reflected in the population 
of CSE firms where a significant proportion of firms in these sectors are FFs.  In contrast 
to this the participants of NFFs firms were more evident in the banking & insurance (ID 
1) and finance sectors (ID 2). This is in line with the CSE population since these two 
sectors have a more stringent regulatory system that has reduced the presence of FFs. 
 
When participants in FFs were asked about details of the family ownership, 77.2% stated 
their firms were controlled by the family/families (that is a stake in excess of 50%) 
whereas the remaining FFs consists of firms that has influential family ownership stakes 
that falls short of a controlling stake.  
 
Question 6 asked the interview participants how their firms measured performance. Four 
choices were given: Namely sales growth; ROA; a market performance measure and 
finally, any other variables apart from the first three. Table 12 shows that the majority of 
FFs use the ROA measurement to assess their performance whereas the NFFs in their 
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majority use a market performance measurement. Both results concerning the 
performance measures between FFs and NFFs are statistically significant. 
 
The participants were asked to justify the particular measures chosen. Various reasons 
were given.  Concerning ROA some participants stated that it was chosen since a primary 
objective of the firm was to maximise the return on capital employed and in addition a 
number of participants believed that if the firm maximised ROA it would have a positive 
effect on the firm’s share price. Concerning the market performance some interviewees 
preferred it since it was a good measure of the share price performance of the firm.  
 
However the interview data shows that CSE managers perceive that market performance 
will have a greater impact on corporate governance than ROA measurements. Despite 
this the interview data shows that managers’ perceive that ROA will have an average 
impact on corporate governance. Also evident from the manager interviews is that they 
view profitability as an important measure of performance. This is further evidence 
together with its use in previous research justify its use for the CSE empirical models and 
especially for FFs where it is a widely used performance measure.    
 
According to Table 12, a majority of interviewees (56% in FFs and 57% in NFFs) stated 
that the CGC had an effect on performance. Less significant were those that CGC had an 
effect on ROA. The bulk believed there was a positive relationship. The reasons given by 
interviewees included: the compliance with CGC will give a positive signal to the market 
that will result in a positive effect on the share price; compliance with CGC will lead to 
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the firm to operate more efficiently and, compliance with CGC will have positive effects 
for large firms only.  
 
However a significant minority believed there was no link between CGC and 
performance and this mainly consisted of small firm interviewees. The reasons given 
were numerous such as: that corporate governance was a waste of time and money and 
for this reason they did not comply with the CGC and it was asserted that there was no 
value added by complying with the CGC. Further to this a reason given by interviewees 
for the non-effect was that the CGC compliance was down to market requirements and 
was not done for its performance benefits. 
 
The results of the interviewees concerning the CGC effect may be reconciled to the 
empirical evidence that shows that market performance is not positively affected by the 
use of corporate governance mechanisms that in theory should lead to better investor 
protection and better governance. This can be illustrated by the CGC mechanism of non-
CEO duality whose aim is to protect investors and to lead to better corporate governance 
in firms. In contrast to what is stated in the CGC, the empirical data shows that CSE 
investors seem to prefer firms with CEO duality that over perform with regards to 
accounting and market performance. 
 
Another example from the empirical data showing market performance is not linked 
positively by the use of corporate governance mechanisms is that CSE investors do not 
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reward firms that operate CGC even if they are in a market where there is no compliance 
with CGC. 
 
According to Table 12, the interviewees perceive there is little impact between the 
establishment of audit committees and performance. The main reason given by them for 
the weak link is that whilst interviewees believe that audit committee leads to a more 
effective audit, the benefits from this committee barely cover its operating costs. In 
contrast to this the empirical data provides mixed results with mainly weak evidence 
concerning the relationship between audit committees and performance. However the 
empirical evidence shows that investors on the AM look positively at the establishment 
of audit committees in contrast to the relationship shown on markets where there is some 
form of compliance (See Table 8). Hence investors on the AM would appear to reward 
firms that operate audit committees through a reduction in cost of capital and an increase 
in firm value.  
 
Concerning the link between CEO duality and financial performance, Table 12 shows 
that CEO duality exists in 44% of the FFs interviewees and 29% of the NFFs 
interviewees.  The results found in the empirical data in Table 4 and 5 show a similar 
trend. When the managers were asked whether CEO duality affects performance around 
half of the managers believed that CEO duality affects performance. There was not a 
significant difference in the results when looked at from the point of view of FFs and 
NFFs. 
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The interviewees explained that the positive effects of CEO duality can be explained due 
to numerous reasons such as: the avoidance of conflicts in management with the owners, 
that agency costs are reduced by CEO duality and, that CEO duality results in the 
effective management of the firm. The interview results can be reconciled to the 
empirical data that shows that investors perceive that CEO duality in general is not 
harmful to investor protection. It should be emphasized that this result goes against the 
current perception and the established requirements in the CGC that require CEO non-
duality. 
 
Question 14 in Appendix 5, p. 252 considers the extent of the relationship between non-
executive directors and financial performance. Table 12 shows that all firms in the 
interview sample have non-executive directors.  When managers were asked the 
percentage of non-executive directors on the board, Table 12 shows that around 2 in 3 
directors on the boards of FFs were non-executive though the corresponding figure for 
NFFs was materially higher. This difference that is not statistical significant can be 
explained by the fact that the NFFs operate in industries where the regulatory framework 
is stricter and where there are requirements for the application of corporate governance 
procedures. 
 
When interviewees were asked to state whether they perceived their was an effect 
between non-executive directors and performance, one in three managers in FFs 
perceived there was an effect, the corresponding result for NFFs was more than double at 
71.4% (See Table 12). Various possible reasons were given for the possible link 
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including: their valuable experience helps the firm; good quality non-executives give 
positive benefits to the firm; their advice is valuable and will lead to positive benefits 
and, though they benefit the firm their benefits are immaterial. On the other hand 
interviewees that were negative to the benefits of non-executives asserted that the non-
executives have a monitoring role and not a value creating role and, non-executives offer 
prestige to the firm but no real benefits. 
 
Though interviewees in FFs seems opposed to the benefits of non-executive directors, 
this is conflicted by the empirical evidence in Table 10 that provide significant evidence 
of a positive relationship between the percentage of non-executive directors and market 
performance and significant evidence of the a positive relationship between the 
percentage of non-executive directors and Tobin’s Q value on the MM & PM (See Table 
8). This raises the question whether interviewees in FFs do not understand the benefits of 
non-executive directors and see them as an unnecessary cost. 
 
Questions 15 in Appendix 5, p. 252 look at the extent of the relationship between 
expertise and performance.  More specifically it looks at board expertise.  Table 12 shows 
a material difference in the perception of this relationship between managers in FFs and 
NFFs. It shows that managers in NFF believe that there is an effect between expertise and 
performance whereas managers in FFs are divided concerning the link between expertise 
and performance. 
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Table 12: Descriptive statistics of CSE Manager’s interviews: Family and Non-family 
Firms 
 
Question 
number 
 Family firms  
Non-family 
firms   
Variables Mean Median Variance Mean Median Variance Significance 
1 Comply CGC 0.280 0.000 0.212 0.290 0.000 0.235  
2 Part comply 0.330 0.000 0.235 0.290 0.000 0.238  
4 MD1 0.220 0.000 0.183 0.430 0.000 0.286  
4 MD2 0.280 0.000 0.212 0.140 0.000 0.143  
4 MD3 0.500 0.000 0.265 0.430 0.000 0.286  
4 ID 1 0.110 0.000 0.105 0.430 0.000 0.286 * 
4 ID 2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.430 0.000 0.286 *** 
4 ID 3 0.220 0.500 0.183 0.000 0.000 0.000  
4 ID 4 0.280 0.000 0.212 0.140 0.000 0.143  
4 ID 5 0.110 0.000 0.105 0.000 0.000 0.000  
4 ID 6 0.280 0.000 0.212 0.000 0.000 0.000  
5 Family ownership 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
6 Assess Perform: Sales 0.330 0.000 0.235 0.140 0.000 0.143  
6 Assess Perform: ROA 0.670 1.000 0.235 0.140 0.000 0.143 ** 
6 Assess Perform: Market 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.710 1.000 0.238 *** 
7 CGC effect 0.560 1.000 0.260 0.570 1.000 0.286  
8 
CGC effect: Sales 
growth score 2.610 3.000 0.369 2.570 3.000 0.286  
8 CGC effect: ROA score 2.280 2.500 0.683 2.430 3.000 0.619  
8 
CGC effect: Market 
score 2.110 2.000 0.458 1.710 1.000 0.905  
10 AuditCom 0.170 0.000 0.147 0.000 0.000 0.000 *** 
11 RemCom 0.060 0.000 0.060 0.290 0.000 0.238 *** 
13 Duality 0.440 0.000 0.261 0.290 0.000 0.238  
13 Affect Duality Perf 0.500 0.500 0.265 0.570 1.000 0.286  
14 Non-Exe 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.000  
14 Non-Exe% 0.657 0.710 0.030 0.733 0.800 0.027  
14 Affect Non-exePerf 0.330 0.000 0.235 0.710 1.000 0.238  
15 Affect BoardExpPerf 0.440 0.000 0.261 0.710 1.000 0.238  
16 Affect MangExpPerf 0.500 0.500 0.265 0.710 1.000 0.238 * 
17 Board 7.780 8.000 4.536 8.430 5.000 24.952 ** 
17 BoardPerf 0.720 0.000 0.212 0.710 1.000 0.238  
18 Meetings 6.720 0.000 1.740 10.430 6.000 79.952 *** 
18 Affect MeetingsPerf 0.440 0.000 0.261 0.290 0.000 0.238  
19 Affect FamPerf 0.780 0.000 0.183 0.140 0.000 0.143  
20 Foreign 0.060 0.000 0.060 0.140 0.000 0.143  
20 Affect ForeignPerf 0.220 0.000 0.183 0.430 0.000 0.286  
21 Insider 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.430 0.000 0.286 *** 
21 Affect InsiderPerf 0.940 0.000 0.060 0.430 0.000 0.286 *** 
22 AgePerf 0.330 0.000 0.773 0.570 0.000 0.286  
22 SizePerf 0.440 0.000 0.244 0.430 0.000 0.286  
22 GearingPerf 0.560 1.000 0.261 0.710 1.000 0.238  
22 IndustryPerf 0.780 1.000 0.183 0.860 1.000 0.143  
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2 Do not comply 0.390 0.000 0.252 0.430 0.000 0.286  
The interview sample consists of 25 managers in CSE firms. Of the sample 18 managers were from FF and 7 
managers from NFF. Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% level (***), 5% level (**) or 10% level (*) 
 
 
The explanation for this difference is due to the fact that most interviewees in NFFs are in 
the financial sector where there more complex regulations than other sectors and where 
these managers perceive that management and director expertise are vital if the firms are 
to perform well.   
 
When managers were asked to justify their observations the main reason given by 
managers who believed in the link between expertise and performance is that educated 
managers can better cope with complex issues that will have a positive effect on 
performance.  Mainly managers in NFFs gave this rationale. 
 
On the other hand the main reason given by interviewees in FFs who believed in no link 
between expertise and performance is that they believe uneducated managers can be as 
effective as educated managers. The empirical data would appear to support the 
perception of managers in FFs since its shows a negative relationship between expertise 
and performance. It also shows that if FFs operate expertise to a greater extent then there 
would be no performance benefits. 
 
Question 17 in Appendix 5, p. 252 looked at the link between board size and financial 
performance.  Table 12 shows that the average board size for NFFs are significantly 
greater than for FFs. This can be explained by the fact that the larger firms in the 
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Republic of Cyprus are NFFs that have a board size greater than the average. Both FFs 
and NFFs interviewees strongly support the link between board size and performance. 
When asked to justify their results two main reasons were given for the perceived effect: 
The first is that smaller boards operate more effectively and perform much better. The 
majority of managers who believed in the relationship between board size and 
performance stated this reason. The second reason that was supported by fewer managers 
in the sample was that larger boards are bureaucratic, less efficient and less effective. 
These results are in line with the results shown in Table 8 that provide evidence of a 
statistically significant positive relationship between smaller board size and market 
performance. 
 
But in contrast to this it was found that larger boards are more profitable based on the 
statistical data in Table 9. The result regarding the relationship between board size and 
current performance (that is ROA) also supports the view, at least for the CSE that firms 
with larger boards may provide for more efficient monitoring of the current activities of 
the firm. 
 
It was found that the average frequency for meetings for NFFs is significantly greater 
than the corresponding figure for FFs at the 1% level.  This can be explained by the fact 
that larger NFFs that are listed in the MM meet more frequently than FFs that are mainly 
quoted in the PM and AM. The empirical evidence in Tables 3 & 4 supports this. 
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When managers were asked if meetings have an effect on performance the majority of 
interviewees see no link between the number of meetings and performance. It was also 
found that more managers of FFs believed there was a link between these two factors 
whereas this was not the case with NFFs (See Table 12). The majority of persons who 
stated there was a link between meetings and performance found that there was a 
negative relationship and that having too many meetings may harm the decision making 
process.  
 
The main reason for those that stated that there was no link between meetings and 
performance was that performance was not affected by the number of meetings but by the 
quality of management making these decisions.  The empirical evidence regarding the 
frequency of meetings is in contrast to the interview data and indicate that the market 
believes that having too many meetings may actually enhance the decision making 
process.  This raises the question whether CSE managers need to be explained the use of 
meetings as an effective corporate governance mechanism.  
 
Question 19 looked at the relationship between family ownership and performance. Table 
12 shows the link between family ownership and performance. Interviewees in FFs in 
contrast to interviewees in NFFs mainly perceived the link. When managers were asked 
to justify the relationship the main reason given by them was that with family ownership 
motivates the managers of the business to perform well since if they succeed their wealth 
will increase.  On the other hand those that stated there was no link between family 
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ownership and performance stated that the performance was not affected by the extent of 
family ownership but by the quality of the management team. 
 
In contrast to the interviewees in FFs, the empirical data shows a negative relationship 
between family ownership and performance however it does provide significant evidence 
that the implementation of corporate governance mechanisms by FFs can lead to 
performance benefits. Evidence is provided in the following ways: Firstly, FFs that are 
listed in markets that have some form of compliance with the CGC have performance 
benefits concerning their market performance. Secondly, the market will look positively 
at FFs have a higher percentage of non-executive directors on the board of directors. 
Finally it was found that FFs that operate CEO duality outperform concerning operating 
performance. 
 
When the interviewees were asked about whether there was a link between insider 
ownership and performance, Table 12 shows that the majority in FFs felt there was in 
contrast to interviewees in NFFs. When managers were asked to justify the relationship 
the main reason given by them was that with insider ownership the managers of the 
business are motivated to perform well since if they succeed their wealth will increase.  
On the other hand those that stated there was no link between insider ownership and 
performance stated that the performance was not affected by the extent of family 
ownership but by the quality of the management team. The empirical evidence shows that 
there is a significant positive relationship between insider ownership and performance on 
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the AM suggesting that insider ownership may have positive benefits if backed by a 
quality management team. 
 
Question 22 in Appendix 5, p. 252 looked at the relationship between other factors and 
performance. The sample was asked to comment on their perceptions concerning the 
relationship between performance and four factors: age, size, gearing and industry. Table 
12 shows that the managers perceived that of the four factors the relationship between 
industry and performance was strong though they perceived the opposite of the 
relationships between the factors of age, size and gearing against performance. 
 
When asked to explain their perceptions they general conclusions reached included the 
following: the performance of a company was affected by industry trends and the state of 
the industry would have an influence on how well or how poorly a business performed. 
Concerning gearing the general view was that the gearing effect on performance was 
related to the state of the economy. This could be reconciled to the empirical data 
showing a negative relationship between leverage and performance. 
 
For the factors of age and size the general view was that no relationship existed with 
performance though some managers believed that older firms in general perform better 
than newer firms. There were also a significant number of managers who asserted that 
large firms perform better than smaller firms.  
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5.5 Findings of the questionnaire results 
 
The aim of the student questionnaires is to obtain information concerning the present role 
of corporate governance on course programs and how students’ perceive the future role 
of corporate governance should evolved in course modules. Since the areas of the CSE 
and family businesses are closely linked to corporate governance, questions concerning 
these two areas were also asked about their present and future role in course programs. 
 
Thirty-eight students participated in the questionnaire since two students were absent on 
the dates when the questionnaires were administered. Despite this the sample closely 
reflected the characteristics concerning sex, course and year of study.  The actual 
questionnaire distributed to students can be seen in Appendix 7, pp. 237-238.  
 
The demographic characteristics of the sample are as follows: The sample comprised of 
23 females and 15 males. This is broken down into 22 business administration students 
and 16 accounting and finance students.  In addition this was broken down into 15 
students in the 2nd year, 13 students in the 3rd year and 10 students in the 4th year.  
 
Ideally it would have been preferred if the sample of students from accounting and 
finance were higher however this was not possible due to the lower student numbers 
(when compared to business administration) as a result of it being a newly established 
course. The accounting and finance has been operational from the 2007/2008 academic 
year meaning this is the third academic year of its operation.  
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The questionnaire given to students can be found in Appendix 7, pp. 237-238. I tried to 
make the questionnaires user friendly since if questions were complex then there was the 
risk that the answers would be unreliable. In addition I also felt that if the question were 
too long that this too could bore students who could give unreliable answers. For these 
reason only nine questions/statements were presented to students that could be graded on 
a 1-5 scale. The first six statements were made on knowledge gained by students on 
family business, corporate governance and the CSE. The next three statements were made 
concerning the future development of modules concerning these three areas. Each of 
these statements were answered on a 1-5 scale that ranged with an answer of “1” meaning 
the students strongly disagreed with the statement and an answer of “5” meaning they 
strongly agreed with the statement.  Finally there was a section for students to make any 
general comments.  
 
Table 13 presents the overall mean scores for student questionnaires based on gender. 
There was no significant difference in the results betweens male and female students. 
Though both male and female students perceive corporate governance, the CSE and 
family businesses as important areas to their relevant courses and there is general 
agreement among them that these subjects should be covered more in their courses. The 
importance of corporate governance as perceived by students can be linked with their 
agreement with the statement that corporate governance affects performance (See Table 
13). In line with the sample both male and female students are satisfied with the course 
content concerning corporate governance, family businesses and the CSE. 
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  Table 13: Overall Mean Score for Student Questionnaires based on Gender 
 
  
  
 Overall GENDER  
 Mean score Male Female Significance 
Family business affects performance 3,90 3,73 4,00  
Corporate governance affects performance 3,84 4,00 3,74  
Satisfactory course content on CSE 3,79 3,60 3,91  
Satisfactory course content on governance 3,76 3,60 3,90  
Satisfactory course content on family business 3,84 3,53 4,04  
Course material: useful knowledge 4,37 4,33 4,39  
New module: family business 3,97 3,80 4,09  
New module: corporate governance 3,97 3,67 4,17  
New module: CSE 4,26 4,27 4,26   
The questionnaire sample consists of 23 female students and 15 male students. Asterisks denote statistical significance 
at the 1% level (***),  
5% level (**) or 10% level (*) 
 
 
Table 14 presents the overall mean scores for student questionnaires based on degree 
courses.  There was no significant difference in the results betweens the type of degree 
course. A material difference found between business and accounting students concerned 
CSE content since it was found that business students are relative happier with the course 
content on CSE than accounting students. A possible reason for this difference is that 
accounting students possibly expect more content to be introduced concerning the CSE. 
 
Though both accounting and business students perceive corporate governance, the CSE 
and family businesses as important areas to their relevant courses and there is general 
agreement among them that these subjects should be covered more in their courses. There 
is also agreement between students on each degree course that corporate governance 
affects performance and this could be linked to why they want corporate governance to 
be covered more in the course (See Table 14). 
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 Table 14: Overall Mean Scores for Student Questionnaires based on Degree Course  
  
 Overall 
TYPE OF DEGREE 
COURSE  
 
Mean 
score Business Accounting 
Significance
  
Family business affects performance 3,90 3,82 4,00  
Corporate governance affects performance 3,84 3,68 4,06  
Satisfactory course content on CSE 3,79 4,05 3,44  
Satisfactory course content on governance 3,76 3,86 3,63  
Satisfactory course content on family 
business 3,84 3,86 3,81  
Course material: useful knowledge 4,37 4,32 4,44  
New module: family business 3,97 3,91 4,06  
New module: corporate governance 3,97 3,95 4,00  
New module: CSE 4,26 4,18 4,38   
The questionnaire sample consists of 22 business students and 16 accounting students. Asterisks denote statistical 
significance at the  
1% level (***), 5% level (**) or 10% level (*) 
 
 
 
A material number of business students in their general comments at the end of the 
questionnaire supported the introduction of a new module in corporate governance but 
that it should be an optional module. In contrast to this, some accounting students 
believed that that corporate governance should be offered as a core subject due to its 
increasing importance in the business world. Some also suggested that it should be linked 
to CSE developments.  
 
Table 15 presents the overall mean scores for student questionnaires based on year of 
study.  There was no significant difference in the results betweens the years of study. 
Though students in the 2nd, 3rd and 4th year perceive corporate governance, the CSE and 
family businesses as important areas to their relevant courses and there is general 
agreement among them that these subjects should be covered more in their courses. 
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Table 15 shows that though the agreement is cross-sectional, the fourth year students are 
not so strong in their agreement concerning the introduction of these three new modules.  
This could be explained by the fact that they are satisfied with the existing course 
material especially on corporate governance and the CSE and that they are not as keen on 
the introduction of new modules for family businesses, corporate governance and the 
CSE as other groups. Students in their general comments as to have given a number of 
reasons why second and third year students agree for the need for a module for corporate 
governance.  
 
The first concerns the ambition of some to pursue the ACCA examinations where two 
years ago, corporate governance has been introduced as a module by the ACCA. These 
students argue that if corporate governance is introduced in the degree course it will assist 
them in their future studies. Another reason why students want a corporate governance 
module is due to its increasing importance in the business world. This could be linked to 
the evidence that shows that students’ perceive that corporate governance affects 
performance. This perception is reflected in each of the years of study examined. 
 
It has been found that students in the questionnaire sample perceive corporate 
governance, the CSE and family businesses as important areas to their relevant courses 
and there is strong agreement amongst them that these subjects should be covered more 
in their courses. The importance placed by students on corporate governance is supported 
by the fact that they perceive that it is a factor that affects performance. Since students 
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are important stakeholders in the educational organisation of the researcher, I have taken 
their findings into consideration in formulating proposed changes to the degree programs.  
 
 Table 15: Overall Mean Scores for Student Questionnaires based on Year of Study 
  
  
  
 Overall 
YEAR OF STUDY 
  
   
 Mean Score 2nd Year 3rd Year 4th Year Significance
Family business affects performance 3,90 4,07 3,69 3,90   
Corporate governance affects 
performance 3,84 4,13 3,69 3,60   
Satisfactory course content on CSE 3,79 3,60 3,69 4,20   
Satisfactory course content on 
governance 3,76 3,73 3,54 4,10   
Satisfactory course content on family 
business 3,84 4,07 3,54 3,90   
Course material: useful knowledge 4,37 4,47 4,31 4,30   
New module: family business 3,97 4,07 4,08 3,70   
New module: corporate governance 3,97 4,20 3,85 3,80   
New module: CSE 4,26 4,40 4,46 3,80   
The questionnaire sample consists of 15 students in the 2nd year, 13 students in the 3rd year and 10 students in the 4th year.
Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% level (***), 5% level (**) or 10% level (*)
 
 
5.6 Findings of faculty interviews 
 
It was felt that by interviewing faculty staff useful data could be obtained concerning the 
course programmes and its relationship to corporate governance, family businesses and 
the CSE.  
 
The rationale behind the faculty staff interviews was that since it is an important 
stakeholder concerning course programmes in their departments that their views provide 
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additional evidence concerning possible changes to course programs connected to 
corporate governance.  
 
Five members of the faculty were interviewed out of its eight members. Of the three 
members excluded from the interviews, two were involved in the research and it was felt 
their inclusion in the interviews was unethical whereas the other member is a part-time 
visiting lecturer who has been at the organisation for a short time with little knowledge of 
the organisation. 
 
The interview participants were asked to comment on the role of the CSE, family 
businesses and corporate governance on faculty course programs. 
 
In contrast to student perceptions, faculty staff generally agreed that the role of the CSE 
in faculty degree programs was underweight and that upgrade was needed in the form of 
an increase in the content concerning the CSE in existing modules. The difference in the 
results can be explained by the fact that the faculty interviewed were lecturers in 
management, economics and quantitative methods where coverage of the CSE is not as 
great as those for accounting and finance. The lecturers in accounting and finance were 
involved in the research and were not interviewed and their answers may have been 
different to those of their colleagues since the stock exchange theory is covered to a great 
extent in finance modules.  
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The majority of faculty staff believed that though there was a need for course modules to 
include more content on the CSE, a new module entirely devoted to the CSE was out of 
the question for a graduate course. This was in contrast to the student perceptions that 
agree for a need of a CSE module. The reason for the difference was that faculty staff 
were divided amongst those who believe that stock markets has a role in a post-graduate 
programme or those who believe that aspects about the CSE could be included in existing 
advanced financial management modules (that is AFIN 306: Investment Analysis, 
Portfolio Theory and Management). Hence though both faculty and students view 
education on the CSE as being important, their disagreement was based on the where this 
upgrade would take place.   
 
Concerning family businesses and their current role on the course it is agreed by all 
participants that the faculty course programs have not emphasised enough its importance 
to the Cyprus economy where the bulk of businesses are family firms. Participants also 
agree on the fact that the coverage of family businesses is underweight. This is in contrast 
to students that say that they are happy with the content concerning family businesses. 
The evidence would appear to suggest that the answers of faculty are more reliable since 
modules in management are general in their nature and do not specifically mention 
family businesses. One possible reason that students may be happy with the content on 
family businesses is if the lecturers in management use case study scenarios for family 
businesses that apply general management theories or economic theory. 
 
 180
Both students and faculty staff perceive that it is time for a new module that covers 
family businesses to be developed. They give as a reason the fact that since Cyprus has a 
strong family businesses culture that this should be reflected in course programs. Some 
interviewees believe it should form part of a module that covers small and medium sized 
business practice. However the interviewees believed this module should be offered to 
students as an optional module.  
 
In line with the student’s perceptions it was generally agreed that the role of corporate 
governance should be upgraded on course programs, there is disagreement amongst the 
interviewees of the extent of the upgrade. The majority of participants believe this 
upgrade should be in the form of a new module if the course programs are to be up to 
date with recent developments. A reason given for this is that the course programmes 
should be in line with professional bodies such as the ACCA that has in recent years 
introduced a module on corporate governance. 
 
Another reason given is that a module on corporate governance most be included on 
accounting and business degree programs due to the current business and social concerns 
about corporate and social responsibility.    
 
However a minority of interviewees believed that the upgrade should be for corporate 
governance to be added on to new modules in finance. 
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To conclude there is general agreement by the students and faculty staff that the roles of 
the CSE, family business and corporate governance should be upgraded on the faculty’s 
course programs. For family businesses the participants believe a new module should be 
introduced though many believe it should be small business oriented rather than family 
business oriented. Concerning the corporate governance the general view is that the 
upgrade should be in the form of a new course module due to its increasing importance in 
the business world. 
  
 
5.7 The implication of the research findings on corporate governance education at 
Frederick University 
 
The evidence from the literature review and the research results of the CSE provide 
evidence that the application of corporate governance mechanisms can have a positive 
effect on firm value. In addition it has been shown that one reason that corporate 
governance is important since it can resolve agency conflicts whether it is between the 
owners and the managers or between large shareholders and small shareholders. The 
theory also shows that corporate governance is perceived as protecting the interests of 
investors. 
 
Since there is evidence to show that corporate governance is useful to the business world 
a question that may be asked is what is its role of corporate governance education at 
FUCy. Albaum and Peterson (2006) provided evidence of the important of students to 
corporate governance. They implied that business students could be treated as future 
leaders of corporations since they will become members of all stakeholders groups 
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connected to corporate governance (that is they could become in the future managers, 
shareholders, employees, customers and suppliers amongst others).  
 
Khan and Sethi (2009) also highlighted the importance of student education in corporate 
governance. They provided evidence showing there is a gap between what is taught in 
business schools about corporate governance and the requirements of the complex 
corporate sector. Connected to this is the increasing important role of corporate 
governance in the business world with the corporate failures in recent years of companies 
such as Enron, WorldCom, and Lehman Brothers that have been connected with a lack of 
effective corporate governance mechanisms.  
 
The project deals with the areas of corporate governance, the CSE and family businesses. 
The areas of the CSE and family businesses have been chosen due to its relationship with 
corporate governance practice in Cyprus. It should be mentioned that the syllabuses of 
the course programs are not available to the public however I have access to this material. 
The available public information concerning the course programs is the course outlines 
that may be found in Appendix 9, p. 240 and a summary of each module that may be 
found in pages 98-99 of the FUCy prospectus of 2009-2010.  The role of these three areas 
to the course programs concerning the accounting and finance and business 
administration degrees are outlined below: 
 
Concerning corporate governance education at FUCy this area is covered spasmodically 
in various disciplines such as accounting, auditing and finance.  Concerning the 
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accounting modules it is covered in ABSA 308 where the disclosure requirements of 
corporate governance are covered.  Further to this it is covered in the auditing modules of 
ABSA 408 and ABSA 409 that examine the role of corporate governance and the audit. 
Finally it is covered in the finance modules of AFIN 102 and 305 that briefly cover the 
key aspects of corporate governance in Cyprus. With the exception of ABSA 409 that is 
taught solely on the accounting and finance degree course all mentioned modules are 
taught on both programmes. 
 
It should be mentioned that of the modules that cover corporate governance, AFIN 102 is 
covered in the second year of a degree course, ABSA 308 and ABSA 408 are covered in 
the third year whilst the remaining subjects being taught in the fourth year. There is no 
difference in the timing of these modules for either the accounting and finance or 
business administration degrees.  
 
Linked to this there is little to no coverage in these degree programmes of corporate 
governance theory and the results of corporate governance research.   
 
Further to this it should be mentioned that three of these six modules are optional courses 
on the accounting and finance degree program hence limiting the potential information 
provided to students concerning corporate governance education. For business 
administration students the situation is even worse since only AFIN 102 is a compulsory 
module (See Appendix 9, p. 240).  Hence the evidence shows that there is very little 
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taught on corporate governance education is either of the accounting and finance or 
business administration degree courses. 
 
Another factor that should be looked at concerning the role of corporate governance 
education is the relationship between FUCy and the ACCA professional examinations.  
The degrees courses in accounting and finance and business administration are strongly 
influenced by the ACCA professional examinations since the ACCA has awarded a 
number of exemptions to FUCy for these degree programs. More specifically nine 
exemptions were awarded to the accounting degree program and eight exemptions for the 
business administration (See Appendix 8, p. 239 for details).  Many accounting students 
have declared an intention to pursue the ACCA examinations after completion of their 
accounting and finance degrees. One factor in their intentions are that after acquiring nine 
exemptions this will leave them with only five modules to complete before qualifying as 
an ACCA professional accountant.  
 
If one examines the ACCA syllabus it is evident that corporate governance is covered as 
a subject in itself. More specifically at the professional stage as module P1: Professional 
Accountant. According to Appendix 8, p. 239, FUCy does not have an ACCA exemption 
for this module for either of its accounting and finance or business administration 
degrees.  
 
If one examines the syllabus of P1 that can be accessed from the ACCA students website, 
one can observe that this module covers the areas of corporate governance theory and 
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looks at the various corporate governance mechanisms such as board and CGC 
compliance factors.  
 
Hence it could be argued that the introduction of more corporate governance education to 
the two degree programmes at FUCy will to a greater extent not only help students in 
their business practice but also in pursuing the ACCA professional examinations since 
they will have prior knowledge on an area they will have to pass in their ACCA 
qualification. The evidence from the student questionnaires and faculty interviews 
support the case for more corporate governance education. Accounting students support a 
new corporate governance module that should be offered as a compulsory module in their 
degree program whereas business students though agreeing with accounting students 
concerning further corporate governance education stated that it should be offered as an 
optional module.     
 
The CSE is not covered directly in any module though stock market theory is covered in 
most of the AFIN courses. The most detailed coverage is given in AFIN 305 and 306 that 
are both optional modules. Though students agreed with a module covering the CSE the 
faculty staff disagreed. They recognised that the role of the CSE in faculty degree 
programs was underweight and that upgrade was needed in the form of an increase in the 
content concerning the CSE in existing modules. By implication the faculty staff agreed 
with the notion that aspects of the CSE could be included in a corporate governance 
module. 
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Concerning family business there is no specific coverage in either of the courses.  
However it is embedded in management theory covered in the ABSO modules. However 
both students and faculty staff perceive that it is time for a new module that covers family 
businesses to be developed due to the Cyprus business culture that is heavily geared 
towards family businesses. Some interviewees believe it should form part of a module 
that covers small and medium sized business practice. However faculty staff believes this 
module should be offered to students as an optional module and some believe it should be 
connected to a module on SMEs.  
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
6.1 Chapter summary 
This chapter aims to provide conclusions concerning the relationship between corporate 
governance and performance based on the empirical and CSE manager interviews data. It 
also aims to examine whether there is a relationship between FFs using corporate 
governance mechanisms and market and accounting performance. Further to this it aims 
to provide conclusions concerning the current and future role of corporate governance 
education for degree programmes provided by FUCy.  Based on the conclusions, the 
chapter will provide recommendations based on the research findings. 
 
6.2 Conclusions 
 
6.2.1 Outline of aims and objectives of project 
The project aimed to looks at whether corporate governance mechanisms have an effect 
on performance based on: the type of market, the type of firm and based on the 
perception of CSE managers. Tied with this was the objective to advance the 
international corporate governance research agenda by describing the corporate 
governance environment for the CSE and to examine the following corporate governance 
areas against performance: board characteristics (including CGC compliance variables); 
ownership characteristics and, control variables. A second objective was to examine the 
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effect of FFs versus NFFs on the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms on 
the CSE based on their market and accounting performance. 
The second aim of the project was to examine the current role of corporate governance 
education in FUCy and to make suggestions on its future role in faculty course programs. 
An objective to this aim was to apply the theoretical framework on corporate governance, 
previous literature on corporate governance, research evidence from the CSE and 
questionnaires/interviews to students/faculty staff to the development of course modules 
in degree programmes in accounting and finance and business administration.  
 
The following sections intend to give conclusions in relation to the project’s aims, 
objectives and research questions. 
 
6.2.2 General evaluation of findings 
In previous research the importance of corporate governance has been examined mostly 
within the context of developed stock markets. However, less attention has been paid to 
the area with respect to developing markets and concerning the type of firm. This project 
investigated the effects of corporate governance mechanisms on the market and 
accounting performance of firms listed on the CSE.  
 
In contrast to the evidence in most previous studies (e.g. Fama and Jensen, 1983; Morck 
et al., 1988; Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Villalonga and Amit, 2006) the study provides 
significant evidence that FFs are negatively related to firm value. According to Gomez-
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Mejia et al. (2001) this may be due to management practices that may be to the detriment 
to the firm and to the exploitation of minority shareholders.  
Despite this the results of the study provide significant evidence that the implementation 
of corporate governance mechanisms by FFs can lead to performance benefits. Further 
analysis of this relationship is given in the next section.  
  
The results of this study generally suggest that the adoption of corporate governance 
mechanisms has some important implications for FFs in the CSE. Corporate governance 
can greatly assist the FFs sector via the introduction of better management practices and 
greater opportunities for growth through the utilisation of non-executive directors.  
 
In addition it was found that FFs that operate in markets where there is full compliance 
with the CGC have a positive impact on firm values. Ensuring more effective corporate 
governance practices and adequate information disclosure are likely to increase the 
confidence of investors in the firm and make the FFs less risky to invest in. This will 
result in lower costs of capital and higher firm values as a result. 
 
Another implication of a well functioning corporate governance system is that there will 
be easier access to internal and external finance. For example FFs that improve the 
quantity and quality of their disclosures are more likely to obtain external finance from 
financial institutions and debt holders.  
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However in contrast to this there is significant evidence from the perception of CSE 
managers that the benefits of corporate governance are not fully understood. This may be 
linked with the empirical evidence that show that investors do not reward AM firms with 
lower costs of capital if they have voluntarily complied with the CGC. This evidence 
shows that CSE managers may be lacking in corporate governance education. Further to 
this there is also evidence of a lack of corporate governance education to students on 
accounting and finance and business administration degree programs in Cyprus. This 
evidence is based on data received from a sample of students and faculty interviews at 
FUCy, one of three private universities operating in the Republic of Cyprus.  
The importance of students to corporate governance education can be explained in that its 
role has been upgraded in the business world due to a number of large corporate failures 
and due to the fact that a number of governments such as the USA have in recent years 
introduced legislations to improve corporate governance practice. Further to this a 
number of other countries including Cyprus have introduced corporate governance 
regulations to be applied in their securities markets.  
 
In addition to this a lack of corporate governance education will not be helping the 
business community in its aim of implementing effective management practices. The role 
of corporate governance education at the university level is important since accounting 
and finance and business students can be treated as future leaders of corporations since 
they will become members of all stakeholders groups connected to corporate governance.  
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6.2.2 General conclusions as related to the research questions 
This section aims to provide the conclusions reached from the main research questions.  
The first research question examined the effect on firm value of board corporate 
governance mechanisms for CSE firms. There is significant empirical evidence that board 
corporate governance mechanisms do have a positive effect on firm value. There is 
significant evidence of a positive relationship between the frequency of meetings and 
firm value and between the percentages of non-executive directors on the board of 
directors (board composition) with firm value. This is because the market evaluates the 
higher frequency of meetings and board composition as signals that corporate governance 
has improved in the firm and rewards these firms with possible reductions in their cost of 
capital that subsequently improves their firm value. It is also a signal by the market that 
these firms have higher growth prospects that are reflected in the higher frequency of 
meetings. In addition the investors relate the higher percentage of non-executive directors 
with a more effective monitoring of the activities of the firm and reward these firms with 
a lower cost of capital since they view these measures as protecting the shareholders in 
the firms. This resulting lower cost of capital leads to an increase in their firm value.  
 
In contrast to the evidence provided by board composition and frequency of meetings, 
there is significant evidence that investors do not see the corporate governance 
mechanisms of large boards as a corporate governance mechanism that will improve 
market performance. On the other hand there is a significant positive relationship 
between board size and ROA also supports the view that CSE firms with larger boards 
may provide for more efficient monitoring of the current activities of the firm.  
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The second research question examines the extent of the relationship between CEO-
duality and performance. There is significant evidence of a positive relationship between 
CEO duality and firm value for firms listed on the CSE. This relationship has been found 
in the MM & PM (where firms comply to some extent with CGC) and the AM (where 
there is no requirement of CGC). The results suggest that investors perceive CEO duality 
is not harmful for investor protection. However subgroup analysis based on the type of 
firm indicates that there is inconclusive evidence that CEO duality will have a negative 
impact on firm value for FFs.  
  
The third research question examines the impact of market performance when CSE firms 
are listed in different markets where the extent of CGC compliance differs. Though the 
empirical evidence suggests a positive relationship between the implementation of 
corporate governance mechanisms and firm value, no significant evidence was 
established between the extent of CGC compliance in different markets and firm value. 
This may be linked with the empirical evidence that show that investors do not reward 
AM firms with lower costs of capital if they have voluntarily complied with the CGC. 
This evidence implies that these firms may not be effectively informing investors of their 
policy on CGC for the market to properly value their firms. It may also indicate that there 
may be other factors that have had a negative impact on their firm value.  
 
However there is evidence that investors do reward AM firms if they establish audit 
committees. The implementation of audit committees in a market with low corporate 
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governance levels may signal improvement in governance that can cause a reduction in 
cost of capital and an increase in firm value.  
 
The fourth research question considered the effect on market and operating performance 
of the implementation of corporate governance mechanisms for FFs listed on the CSE. 
The results of the study provide significant evidence that the implementation of corporate 
governance mechanisms by FFs can lead to performance benefits. 
 
This evidence is provided in the following ways: Firstly, FFs that are listed in markets 
that have some form of compliance with the CGC have performance benefits concerning 
their market performance. Secondly, the market will look at positively to FFs that have a 
higher percentage of non-executive directors. It would appear that the market would 
reward FFs that apply the corporate governance mechanisms of board composition and 
some form of compliance with the CGC with a lower cost of capital since they view these 
measures as protecting the smaller shareholders in the firms. This resulting lower cost of 
capital leads to an increase in their firm value. 
 
There is also significant evidence that FFs implementing corporate governance 
mechanisms can have a positive effect on operating performance. First, similarly to the 
effect on Tobin’s Q value, FFs operating in the MM show to have positive impact on 
operating performance. Secondly, larger boards have a positive effect on operating 
performance. Thirdly, the corporate governance mechanism of frequency of meetings is 
positively related to the operating performance of FFs.  
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However in contrast to the above, the board skills variable shows to have a surprisingly 
negative effect on the operating performance of FFs. This may indicate that while 
education may in theory improve performance, it does not capture the richness of 
capabilities necessary for effective management.  
 
The fifth research question examines the relationship between leverage and performance 
for both the CSE as a whole and for FFs. There is significant evidence of a negative 
relationship between leverage and firm value for CSE firms and this relationship would 
appear to be evident in NFFs. In contrast to this there is inconclusive evidence of a 
positive relationship between leverage and market performance. 
 
The results concerning leverage would appear to indicate that the introduction of debt by 
CSE firms is either at sub-optimal levels or that investors are wary of firms that wish to 
increase their financial risk. Further to this it indicates that the introduction of debt does 
not lead to decreases in cost of capital and thus has a negative effect on firm value. It also 
indicates that the costs of financial distress outweigh the benefits of outside monitoring. 
 
The sixth research question examines the current role of corporate governance education 
at FUCy. It was found that no module of corporate governance is covered on either the 
accounting and finance or business administration degree programs. Despite this 
corporate governance is covered partially in some accounting, finance and auditing 
modules however since most of these modules are optional meaning students may get 
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very little in their degree course education. This minimal education is in contrast to the 
increasing importance given to corporate governance practice in the business world. 
 
The seventh research question that examines the relationship between corporate 
governance theories and CSE empirical findings has been indirectly answered from the 
previous research questions. There is evidence that the stewardship theory, agency theory 
and bonding hypothesis can be applied to the CSE in some way.  
 
Firstly, the significant evidence concerning the positive association between CEO duality 
with market performance and between CEO duality with operating performance shows 
that the stewardship theory applies to CSE firms and that if managers are left alone they 
will act responsibly and will effectively manage the assets they control.  
 
It should also be mentioned that there is significant evidence that NFFs that apply CEO 
duality will have a positive impact on firm value. This suggests that the market will be 
more comfortable with the idea of CEO duality in NFFs since the Chairman/CEO is not 
likely to be a controlling shareholder and is less likely to dominate the board and 
expropriating assets at the expense of the shareholders. 
 
Secondly, there is weak evidence that the agency theory may be applicable to FFs that 
apply CEO duality as shown with its negative relationship to market performance. This 
implies that agency problems could be caused by a family shareholder having a greater 
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incentive in monitoring the firm and to expropriating assets at the expense of small 
shareholders. 
 
Thirdly, evidence of the bonding hypothesis can be found in FFs that apply corporate 
governance mechanisms such as board composition and comply with the CGC. Both 
these variables infer that the controlling shareholders will increase their disclosure in 
financial statements and this will result in a reduced expropriation of the firm’s resources. 
As a result this will result in an increase in investor protection. The idea behind bonding 
theory is that an increase in corporate governance mechanisms will result in a decrease in 
the cost of capital of the firm hence increasing in firm value. 
 
The eighth and final question concerning recommendations connected to corporate 
governance education will be included in section 6.3. 
 
6.2.3 Suggestions for future research 
This project has provided empirical evidence concerning the relationship between 
corporate governance and performance on the CSE. It has also examined the relationship 
by breaking it down into the type of market and the type of firm. This is an area where 
there has been very little research on the CSE.  
 
The area of corporate governance and performance has interested me a lot and I intend to 
pursue further research in this area one I have hopefully achieved a doctorate 
qualification. They’re a number of areas that could be researched. One area that was not 
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researched due to the unavailability of reliable information is whether independent 
directors if used by a firm can provide market performance benefits. 
 
Another area of research that can be pursued in future is the relationship between foreign 
ownership and market performance. To do this a method must be found to collect 
information concerning the foreign ownership in firms. In this project difficulties were 
found in measuring this variable due to the fact that foreign investors who own less than 
5% of a firm’s equity are not required to disclose their stake. 
 
A third area that could be pursued in future is the breakdown of family ownership into 
founding family firms and to examine the relationship with performance. Though there 
has been research in this area in other countries, this line of research may provide 
interesting findings that give an even greater insight concerning the relationship between 
FFs and performance. 
 
Finally, an area of research that could give interesting results is to examine audit 
committee effectiveness in the CSE. Though research has been carried out in other 
countries such as that by Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) it could provide insights as to 
whether including accounting experts will result in performance benefits for firms. 
6.3 Recommendations 
 
The project provides the following recommendations. Firstly due to the increasing 
importance of corporate governance to the business world combined with the lack of 
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corporate governance education at degree courses at FUCy, it is recommended that a new 
module be introduced for both the accounting and finance and business administration 
degrees. This proposed name of this module is “Corporate Governance” and further 
details are given in Appendix 11, pp. 257-258. Due to its importance, it is suggested that 
this module should be compulsory for both accounting and finance and business 
administration degree programmes.  
 
This module will cover the areas of corporate governance theory and corporate 
governance mechanisms that could be used. These areas are not currently taught in 
existing degree courses though are covered by professional bodies such as the ACCA and 
by other universities that offer modules in corporate governance. To offer a Cypriot 
dimension to the module, market information concerning the CSE will be included 
including the CGC in Cyprus. Since many students may seek or obtain work in the 
financial sector, the new module will offer them the opportunity to acquire knowledge 
that could be put to practical use.  
 
Another need for the corporate governance module is that it will enable students to 
acquire knowledge should they wish to pursue the ACCA qualification after their degree 
and especially for the exam on module: P1 that covers issues on corporate governance.  
 
Due to the importance of corporate governance to the business world, it is suggested that 
both accounting and finance students and business administration students should be 
offered this module as a compulsory module.  It is advised that this module be included 
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in either the 3rd or 4th years of the degree program since it is beneficial to students once 
they have acquired the required knowledge in accounting modules. This is also in line 
with the ACCA that offer the corporate governance module (P1) at the later stages of its 
professional examinations. 
 
The second recommendation is based on the evidence that shows that CSE managers and 
CSE investors (and by implication the public) may be lacking in corporate governance 
education. It is recommended that corporate governance education be offered to these 
stakeholders. 
 
This could be done via specialist courses that could be operated by universities such as 
FUCy. However for this proposal to be successful, the courses should be funded by the 
government through the Industrial Training Authority and through tax incentives to 
employers (that is the cost of the courses could be allowed as a tax expenses against 
firm’s corporation tax). In addition further funding could be obtained through EU funds. 
Since the Industrial Training Authority in Cyprus finances training programs to the tune 
of 50% the cost to employers will not be so great if one also includes the tax saving. 
  
The courses could follow a similar pattern to the module proposed in the degree courses 
though should be more practical in its orientation than that in the degree courses. The 
courses could be offered in the evenings so as not to disrupt the activities of firms with 
participants in the education program. It is recommended that the course should take 
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around 40 hours in total to complete. It is also recommended that the universities could 
brand the education by offering a certificate to the individual.     
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CHAPTER 7: REFLECTIVE ACCOUNT OF YOUR PERSONAL LEARNING 
AND PROFESSIONAL JOURNEY 
 
7.1 Chapter summary 
This chapter intends to show a reflective account of my personal and professional 
learning. It also highlights the impact of the various stakeholders of the project. 
 
7.2 Reflections on research methodology 
After completing the project it is worthwhile reflecting and taking a critical view of the 
methodology used. By doing this a main benefit that may arise is that reflecting will 
enable me to learn about improvements that could be applied in future research in the 
area.  Since I am a lecturer in a university that requires that lecturer’s pursue research and 
have research publications, reflecting on what has happened in the project will be of 
benefit when submitting articles for publication. 
 
We will first look at the methodology used and discuss its fit to the project undertaken 
and any changes or recommendations we would suggest for similar future studies. The 
project was divided into two main sections: a study concerning the relationship between 
corporate governance and performance for the CSE and the application of the research 
findings to corporate governance education at FUCy. 
 
Concerning the section on corporate governance and performance, the research was 
divided into empirical data and interview data. Concerning the empirical data a panel data 
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regression model was used to analyse the relationship between corporate governance and 
performance. There were four model variations concerning panel data: The first was a 
regression model for the CSE as a whole; the second model sub-divided the first model 
into regression models based on the types of markets; the third model built on the first by 
adding family interaction variables and the fourth was a changes model that looked at 
changes in the dependent variables and changes in the independent model. 
 
This approach was based on previous research models used on other stock exchanges and 
it can be said that models 1, 2 and 3 worked well providing useful conclusions to the 
study.  It should be mentioned that both the dependent and independent variables were 
justified through the literature review and this I believe made the results of the models 
valid. I believe following a panel data methodology that has been successfully used in 
other studies helped models 1-3 to work. What I did differently to other researchers in the 
area was that applied different independent variable combinations to them since I tried to 
relate the data to the CSE environment.  
 
However I believe that my choice of independent variables could have been improved 
and would have lead to a more effective model. Hence I admit that I was asked to do it 
again some additional variables should have been included that would have provided 
even more conclusions about the CSE. One variable that should have been used was that 
of independent non-executive directors. In other studies this variable has been used and I 
did not include it due to difficulties in collecting the data. I believe that this variable 
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would have given useful information on the CSE on whether independent directors affect 
performance.   
 
Another variable that should have also been included was foreign ownership that again 
was excluded due to data collection difficulties. I learnt that maybe I could have got this 
information via interviewing senior officials or through inspected the share register of 
companies though in the project I did not do this due to the cost and time factor. However 
due to the increasing importance of foreign ownership on the CSE I believe that the 
relationship between foreign ownership and performance could be used by me in future 
research and as a basis of a future publication. 
 
I also believe with hindsight that if a variable for audit committee expertise were included 
this would have provided some interesting results and would have added to the research 
literature in this area. I do believe that this is an area of future research that could be 
applied once hopefully I have passed by doctorate.  
 
The changes model, that is model 4, did not work as well as I hoped. The evidence given 
was very weak and did not contribute to the conclusions of the project. Looking back I do 
not think it was down to methodological issues but down to the fact that it is not relevant 
for the CSE environment. If I were asked to do the research again I would not have 
included a changes model. 
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I learnt from the project how to analyse statistical data using real life data and this will 
benefit me in the future when I will carry out similar studies. This is some thing I intend 
to do soon since I am close to writing a research article based to be published in a 
refereed journal based on the results of the empirical data. 
 
The second instrument used analysing the relationship between corporate governance and 
performance was the CSE manager interviews. I carried out the interviews to supplement 
the results from the empirical data. I generally believe that the CSE interview approach 
was right since the responses were used to help me interpret some ambiguous results 
found in the empirical data. It also enabled me to explain some conclusions found from 
the empirical data. Although not intended this way, it enabled me to determine that many 
CSE managers were lacking in corporate governance education and that there is a need 
for this in Cyprus. This was determined from the answers given.  
 
The approach used to analyse the answers, content analysis, was the right approach and 
enabled me to draw conclusions from the interviews that could be compared to the 
empirical data. 
 
However when looking back I believe that there where too many closed questions and 
that I should have included more questions for discussion (open questions) to obtain a 
better insight into the perceptions of managers concerning corporate governance. Hence 
if asked again I should have perhaps included more open questions and the results would 
have led to a better analysis of the interview results. I wrongly, did not include many 
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open questions since I feared that CSE managers would have reacted negatively to this 
(due to time factors).   
 
The second part of my study looked at the implication of the research findings on 
corporate governance education. To this end two instruments were used to collect 
primary data: student questionnaires and faculty interviews. These were done in order to 
collect data from two main stakeholders concerning course programs. Though I believe 
the two approaches were justified, I recognised there were weaknesses in the research 
design. Concerning the questionnaires, there were too many questions that did not add to 
the project’s results and were vague. If asked again to do the project I would have been 
more specific in questions asking them to quantify which modules gave them more 
relevant information on corporate governance. I also believe open questions on what they 
felt about the current and future role of corporate governance education would have 
helped the research findings.  Concerning the faculty interviews though some data was 
provided on corporate governance education, I was hindered by the small size of the 
sample and could not form conclusions supported by statistical findings. If asked to do it 
again I should have increased the sample and maybe included staff from the Nicosia 
campus to participate.     
 
To conclude I believe the approaches concerning panel data regression, the CSE manager 
interviews, student questionnaires and faculty interviews enables me to answer all of the 
research questions set though I do admit that each section could have been modified to 
get even better results.  
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7.3 Reflections on professional knowledge and practice 
 
The study was motivated by my interest in the CSE and my belief that corporate 
governance education was underweight on the degree programme I lecturer in and that I 
need to provide evidence that it needed to be included in degree programs of my faculty. 
I was also motivated by my belief that research on the CSE was next to nothing and that I 
wanted to start to change this picture. 
 
I also wanted to understand the relationship between corporate governance and 
performance on the CSE and develop a model that could be used for a basis for further 
research that could be published as research articles. 
 
I also believe that the project has helped me to propose the introduction of a module in 
corporate governance that will benefit students. I also believe that my project has enabled 
me to gain insights as to how to develop future course modules for degree programmes in 
which I teach. 
 
Another part of the study that had a positive impact on me was the data collected on the 
CSE that I could use in my lecturing via case study scenarios that could be set to students. 
 
It was at this stage of the study that I realised the benefit and appropriateness of the 
D.Prof programme.   The subject I was studying is best tackled from within the CSE and 
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industry.  It relies on experience and knowledge on the CSE through my eight years as 
financial correspondence for the Cyprus Financial Mirror. My position within FUCy as a 
lecturer was ideal to initiate and contribute to this area.    I realised that the professional 
doctorate is the best and most appropriate mechanism to address this issue and the D.Prof 
programme is an ideal match. 
 
Overall I have a sense of great satisfaction in the fact that my area of study is very 
valuable, appreciated and timely to the academic profession in which I am a part of and 
will be of benefit to the organisation I work for in that it proposes changes to the degree 
courses I work in.  I hope that my research will be the spark that will enable other 
researchers to expanding the research literature on the CSE. 
 
 
7.4 Impact of research project on the various stakeholders 
 
There are a number of stakeholders to the research project. These include: Middlesex 
University, the management of FUCy, School of Economic Sciences and Administration 
at FUCy, students at FUCy, academic community, Republic of Cyprus government, CSE 
authorities and managers of CSE listed companies. The research project will have 
different impacts on the various stakeholders. An explanation of the impacts on these 
stakeholders is given below: 
 
Concerning Middlesex University one impact is the research project has assisted in the 
development in the relationship between themselves and FUCy. I was one of the first 
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students of Middlesex University from FUCy on their D.Prof qualification and this could 
open the door to other lecturers in FUCy (who do not possess a doctorate) to follow the 
same route. The relationship can also be enhanced in that successful D.Prof candidates 
from FUCy could be trained by Middlesex University to supervise future D.Prof 
candidates.  
 
The relationship developed due to the IWBL conference co-organised by Middlesex 
University and FUCy amongst others that took place on 24-26 June 2010. It should be 
mentioned that I presented a conference paper on corporate governance education that 
derived from the D.Prof project. The conference enabled me to learn more about work-
based learning and helped me to further improve the content of my project. Further to this 
it should be mentioned that after making the necessary revisions my paper will hopefully 
be published in the refereed research journal “Higher Education, Skills and Work-based 
Learning” published by Emerald.  
 
Concerning the management of FUCy the research project is expected to have a number 
of impacts. Firstly assuming I am successful in obtaining the D.Prof qualification, FUCy 
will have another member of its staff with a doctorate qualification that assist it in 
meeting the regulations of the Ministry of Education is Cyprus that state that at least 77% 
of the academic staff of a private university must have the doctorate qualification. 
Secondly, the research project will be used as a base for an application to the EU for 
research grants that if successful will result in extra income for FUCy (as the host 
organisation of the research).  
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Concerning the School of Economic Sciences and Administration at FUCy a number of 
impacts will results from the project. Firstly assuming I am successful in obtaining the 
D.Prof qualification, the School will have another member of its staff with a doctorate 
qualification that assist it in meeting the regulations of the Ministry of Education in 
Cyprus as mentioned previously. It should be mentioned that at the present time no 
accounting lecturer at FUCy has a doctorate qualification and if the researcher does 
obtain it then it will enormously help FUCy for the review concerning the accreditation 
of the BA degree in Accounting and Finance.  
 
Secondly, the research can be used as base for research grants that will enhance the 
income of faculty staff and at the same time enhance the reputation of the School. 
Thirdly, the research could be used as a base for improving course programs and by 
enabling the School to keep up to date with recent developments (especially in the area of 
corporate governance). To this end what I have learnt from the project has enabled me to 
make a proposal concerning a corporate governance module and it is highly probable that 
my recommendations will be implemented in future changes in the course. Finally the 
research could be used as a base for further research in corporate governance and offer 
the School to be an important centre in Cyprus on corporate governance research. 
 
Concerning the students at FUCy the first impact of the project is it will enable 
improvements to be made on the course due to the expected additional coverage of 
corporate governance, family businesses and the CSE. The second impact is that the 
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research could be used as students as a basis for ideas for research when they are about to 
carry out their project dissertations.  
 
The main impact on the academic community is that it is a contribution to the literature 
on corporate governance in Cyprus. It should be mentioned that the literature on 
corporate governance in Cyprus is small and that there is little research on corporate 
governance and performance in Cyprus. The impact on the academic community will be 
more felt when the research is published in a research journal that may happen soon with 
a publication in the research journal “Higher Education, Skills and Work-based 
Learning” published by Emerald.  
 
Finally, the main impact to the government of the Republic of Cyprus and the CSE 
authorities is that the research results provide evidence as to possible changes in the CGC 
legislation and CSE regulations to enable more firms to comply with the CGC. 
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APPENDIX 2: OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS 
 
VARIABLE DEFINITION MEASUREMENT SOURCES OF 
INFORMATION 
ROA Returns on assets Profit before interest 
and taxes divided by 
total assets 
Calculated from data 
in financial statements 
of firms. Where hard 
copies were not found 
online annual reports 
were available from 
the firm’s web site or 
financial information 
web sites such as 
xak.com.  
ROE Returns on equity Net income over total 
equity 
Calculated from data 
in financial statements 
of firms 
Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q value Book value of assets 
minus the book value 
of equity plus the 
market value of equity 
divided by the book 
value of assets 
Calculated from data 
in financial statements 
of firms and market 
data from CSE. 
SALES G Sales growth Change in sales on a 
year-to-year basis 
Calculated from data 
in financial statements 
of firms 
LN Log Natural logarithm of a 
data variable 
Calculated by 
spreadsheet program 
BOARD Board size The number of 
members of the board 
including executive 
and non-executive 
directors. 
From the corporate 
governance report or 
from financial 
statements of firms 
EXE Executive directors The number of 
executive directors on 
the board of directors. 
From the financial 
statements of firms 
NON-EXE Non-executive 
directors 
The number of non-
executive directors on 
the board of directors. 
From the financial 
statements of firms 
%NON-EXE Percentage of non-
executive directors 
The proportion of 
non-executive 
directors on the board 
of directors. 
Calculated from data 
in financial statements 
of firms 
MEETINGS Meetings frequency 
per year 
The number of board 
meetings per year 
From the corporate 
governance report of 
firms or if not 
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available cse.com.cy 
and xak.com 
BOARD 
SKILL 
Board skill Those board members 
who have obtained 
university degrees or 
professional 
qualifications. 
Stockwatch.com.cy 
MANAG 
SKILL 
Management skill Executive directors 
who have obtained 
professional and/or 
university degrees 
Stockwatch.com.cy 
AUDIT-COM Audit committee Dummy variable 
taking a value of 1 for 
firms with an audit 
committee and a value 
of 0 otherwise. 
From the corporate 
governance report or 
from elsewhere in the 
annual report of firms 
REMUN-
COM 
Remuneration 
committee 
Dummy variable 
taking a value of 1 for 
firms with a 
remuneration 
committee and a value 
of 0 otherwise. 
From the corporate 
governance report or 
from elsewhere in the 
annual report of firms 
DUALITY Role of managing 
director (CEO) 
Dummy variable 
taking a value of 1 for 
firms with a managing 
director who is also 
chairman and a value 
of 0 otherwise. 
From the corporate 
governance report or 
from elsewhere in the 
annual report of firms 
CGC 
COMPLNCE 
Corporate Governance 
Code (CGC) 
Compliance  
Dummy variable 
taking a value of 2 for 
firms that fully 
comply with CGC, a 
value of 1 for those 
that partially comply 
and a value of 0 for 
non-compliance. 
From the corporate 
governance report or 
from elsewhere in the 
annual report of firms 
(directors report). 
CGC_F, 
CGC_P AND 
CGC_N 
CGC Compliance 
dummies (F=Full 
Compliance, P=Partial 
and N=Non-
compliance 
Dummy variable 
taking a value of 1 for 
firms that met relevant 
compliance criteria 
and value of 0 
otherwise. 
From the corporate 
governance report or 
from elsewhere in the 
annual report of firms 
(directors report). 
FAMILY Family firms (control) Dummy variable 
taking a value of 1 for 
family firms and a 
value of 0 otherwise. 
Derived from data in 
stockwatch.com.cy 
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FOREIGN Foreign firms 
(control) 
Dummy variable 
taking a value of 1 for 
foreign firms and a 
value of 0 otherwise. 
Derived from data in 
stockwatch.com.cy 
FAMILY% Family ownership Ownership stake of 
the family or families. 
Derived from data in 
stockwatch.com.cy 
INSIDER% Insider ownership Ownership stake of 
the board of directors. 
Derived from data in 
stockwatch.com.cy 
MARKET 
CAP EUR 
Market capitalisation Measured at 31 
December in Euros. 
Cse.com.cy. 
Calculated for 2002-
2005 from market cap 
CY  
MARKET 
CAP CY 
Market capitalisation Measured at 31 
December in Cypriot 
pounds. 
Cse.com.cy 
Calculated for 2006-
2007 from market cap 
EUR 
TOTAL 
ASSET 
Firm size in terms of 
total assets. 
Measured at 31 
December in Cypriot 
pounds. 
Financial statements 
of firms 
BV-EQUITY Book value of equity Measured at 31 
December in Cypriot 
pounds. 
Financial statements 
of firms Calculated for 
2006-2007 from 
market cap EUR 
BOOK_TO_
MARKET 
Book value to market 
value 
Book value of equity 
to market value in 
Cypriot pounds 
Calculated from data 
in financial statements 
of firms and 
cse.com.cy 
LN SIZE Book value of equity Natural logarithm of 
market capitalisation 
of equity 
Calculated from data 
in financial statements 
of firms 
LN ASSETS Firm size in terms of 
total assets. 
Natural logarithm of 
total assets 
Calculated from data 
in financial statements 
of firms 
AGE Age The number of years 
between the 
observation year and 
the firm’s date of 
incorporation 
Stockwatch.com.cy-
company profile 
GEARING Gearing Total debt to total 
capital 
Calculated from data 
in financial statements 
of firms 
LEVERAGE Leverage Total debt to Total 
debt plus market 
capitalisation of 
equity in Cypriot 
pounds 
Calculated from data 
in financial statements 
of firms and 
cse.com.cy 
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INDUS 
CLASS 
Sector dummies (from 
1-6) 
Dummy variable from 
1-6 depending on 
sector to which the 
firms belong. 
1= Banking and 
Insurance, 2= General 
Financial, 3= Retail, 
4= Industrial and Real 
Estate Development, 
5= Technology and 6= 
Other services. 
Derived from market 
data in cse.com.cy 
ID 1-6 Industry dummies Dummy variable 
taking a value of 1 for 
firms that met relevant 
sector criteria and 
value of 0 otherwise. 
Derived from market 
data in cse.com.cy 
MARKET Market dummies 
(from 1-3) 
Dummy variable from 
1-3 depending on 
market to which the 
firms belong. 
1= MM, 2= PM, 3= 
Alternative, Special 
Categories and Others 
Derived from market 
data in cse.com.cy 
MD 1-3 Market dummies Dummy variable 
taking a value of 1 for 
firms that met relevant 
market criteria and 
value of 0 otherwise. 
Derived from market 
data in cse.com.cy 
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APPENDIX 3: COMPANIES INCLUDED IN EMPIRICAL SAMPLE 
 
COMPANY NAME INDUSTRY SECTOR 
A&P (ANDREOU & PARASKEVAIDES) 
ENTERPRISES PUBLIC COMPANY LTD 
Industrial and real estate 
development 
A. PANAYIDES CONTRACTING PUBLIC LTD 
Industrial and real estate 
development 
A. TSOKKOS HOTELS PUBLIC LTD Other services 
A. ZORBAS & SONS PUBLIC LTD 
Industrial and real estate 
development 
A.L. PROCHOICE GROUP PUBLIC LTD General Financial 
A.S.G. (ANDY SPYROU) GROUP PUBLIC 
LTD Other services 
AGROS DEVELOPMENT COMPANY 
"PROODOS" PUBLIC LTD Other services 
ALKIS H. HADJIKYRIACOS (FROU-FROU 
BISCUITS) PUBLIC LTD 
Industrial and real estate 
development 
ALLIANCE INTERNATIONAL RE PLC Banks and insurance 
AMATHUS PUBLIC LTD Other services 
ANDREAS PETSAS & SONS PUBLIC LTD Other services 
AQUA SOL HOTELS PUBLIC COMPANY 
LTD Other services 
ASPIS HOLDINGS PUBLIC COMPANY LTD Banks and insurance 
ASTARTI DEVELOPMENT PLC Other services 
ATHOS DIAMOND CENTRE PUBLIC 
LIMITED Retail 
ATLANTIC INSURANCE COMPANY PUBLIC 
LTD Banks and insurance 
AVACOM NET PUBLIC COMPANY LTD Technology 
AVACOM PUBLIC COMPANY LTD Technology 
BANK OF CYPRUS PUBLIC COMPANY LTD Banks and insurance 
BLUE ISLAND PLC 
Industrial and real estate 
development 
C.A. PAPAELLINAS TRADING PLC Retail 
C.C.C. TOURIST ENTERPRISES PUBLIC 
COMPANY LTD Other services 
CAC PAPANTONIOU PLC Retail 
CARAMONDANI BROS PLC 
Industrial and real estate 
development 
CCC HOLDINGS & INVESTMENTS PUBLIC 
COMPANY LTD 
Industrial and real estate 
development 
CEILFLOOR PUBLIC COMPANY LTD Retail 
CHARILAOS APOSTOLIDES PUBLIC LTD 
Industrial and real estate 
development 
CHRIS JOANNOU PUBLIC LTD Retail 
CLARIDGE PUBLIC LTD Other services 
CLR PUBLIC CO LTD General Financial 
CONSTANTINOU BROS HOTELS PUBLIC 
COMPANY LTD Other services 
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COSMOS INSURANCE PUBLIC COMPANY 
LTD Banks and insurance 
CYPRUS AIRWAYS PUBLIC LTD Other services 
CYPRUS FOREST INDUSTRIES PUBLIC 
LTD 
Industrial and real estate 
development
CYPRUS TRADING CORPORATION PLC Retail 
CYVENTURE CAPITAL PUBLIC COMPANY 
LTD General Financial 
D & M TELEMARKETING PUBLIC LTD Other services 
D.H. CYPROTELS PLC Other services 
DIMCO PLC Retail 
DISPLAY ART PLC Other services 
DOME INVESTMENTS PUBLIC COMPANY 
LTD Other services 
ELLINAS FINANCE PUBLIC COMPANY LTD General Financial 
EUROPROFIT CAPITAL INVESTORS 
PUBLIC LTD General Financial 
EXELIXI INVESTMENT PUBLIC LTD General Financial 
G.A.P. VASSILOPOULOS PUBLIC LTD Other services 
HELLENIC BANK PUBLIC COMPANY LTD Banks and insurance 
K + G COMPLEX PUBLIC COMPANY LTD 
Industrial and real estate 
development 
K. ATHIENITIS CONTRACTORS 
DEVELOPERS PUBLIC LTD 
Industrial and real estate 
development 
K. KYTHREOTIS HOLDINGS PUBLIC LTD 
Industrial and real estate 
development 
KANIKA HOTELS PUBLIC COMPANY LTD Other services 
KARKOTIS MANUFACTURING & TRADING 
PUBLIC LTD 
Industrial and real estate 
development 
KEO PLC 
Industrial and real estate 
development 
KOSTAS MICHAELIDES CONSTRUCTION 
LTD 
Industrial and real estate 
development 
KRONOS PRESS DISTRIBUTION AGENCY 
PUBLIC COMPANY LTD Other services 
L.P. TRANSBETON PUBLIC LTD 
Industrial and real estate 
development 
LAIKI INVESTMENTS EPEY PLC General Financial 
LEPTOS CALYPSO HOTELS PUBLIC LTD Other services 
LIBERTY LIFE INSURANCE PUBLIC 
COMPANY LTD Banks and insurance 
LIBRA HOLIDAYS GROUP PLC Other services 
LOGICOM PUBLIC LTD Technology 
LORDOS HOTELS (HOLDINGS) PUBLIC 
LTD Other services 
LORDOS UNITED PLASTICS PUBLIC LTD 
Industrial and real estate 
development 
LOUIS PLC Other services 
MALLOUPPAS & PAPACOSTAS PUBLIC CO 
LTD Retail 
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MARFIN POPULAR BANK PUBLIC CO LTD Banks and insurance 
MINERVA INSURANCE COMPANY PUBLIC 
LTD Banks and insurance 
MODESTOU SOUND & VISION PLC Retail 
MULTICHOICE (CYPRUS) PUBLIC 
COMPANY LTD Other services 
MUSKITA ALUMINIUM INDUSTRIES PLC 
Industrial and real estate 
development 
NEMESIS CONSTRUCTIONS PUBLIC 
COMPANY LTD 
Industrial and real estate 
development 
NEW MARATHON TOURS PUBLIC CO LTD Other services 
OPTIONS CASSOULIDES PLC Other services 
ORFANIDES PUBLIC COMPANY LTD Retail 
PANDORA INVESTMENTS PUBLIC LTD 
Industrial and real estate 
development 
PETROLINA (HOLDINGS) PUBLIC LTD Retail 
PHC FRANCHISED RESTAURANTS PUBLIC 
LTD Other services 
PHIL. ANDREOU PUBLIC LTD 
Industrial and real estate 
development 
PHILOKTIMATIKI PUBLIC LTD 
Industrial and real estate 
development 
PIERIDES HOLDINGS PLC Retail 
PIPIS BROS FARMS PUBLIC COMPANY 
LTD 
Industrial and real estate 
development 
PLYNTEX PUBLIC LTD Other services 
R.A.I. CONSULTANTS PUBLIC LTD Other services 
RENOS HATZIOANNOU FARM PUBLIC 
COMPANY LTD 
Industrial and real estate 
development 
ROLANDOS ENTERPRISES PUBLIC LTD 
Industrial and real estate 
development 
ROYAL HIGHGATE PUBLIC COMPANY LTD Other services 
SAFS HOLDINGS PUBLIC LTD General Financial 
SALAMIS TOURS (HOLDINGS) PUBLIC LTD Other services 
SEA STAR CAPITAL PLC Other services 
SFS GROUP PUBLIC COMPANY LTD General Financial 
SPIDERNET SERVICES PUBLIC LIMITED Technology 
STADEMOS HOTELS PLC Other services 
SUPHIRE HOLDINGS PUBLIC LTD General Financial 
TELIA AQUA MARINE PUBLIC LTD 
Industrial and real estate 
development 
THE CYPRUS CEMENT PUBLIC COMPANY 
LTD 
Industrial and real estate 
development 
TOP KINISIS TRAVEL PUBLIC LTD Other services 
TOXOTIS INVESTMENTS PUBLIC LTD General Financial 
UNIFAST FINANCE & INVESTMENTS 
PUBLIC COMPANY LTD General Financial 
USB BANK PLC Banks and insurance 
VASSILICO CEMENT WORKS PUBLIC 
COMPANY LTD 
Industrial and real estate 
development 
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WOOLWORTH (CYPRUS) PROPERTIES 
PLC 
Industrial and real estate 
development 
XENOS TRAVEL PUBLIC LTD Other services 
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APPENDIX 4: COMPANIES INCLUDED IN INTERVIEW SAMPLE OF 
MANAGERS 
 
COMPANY NAME INDUSTRY SECTOR 
A. TSOKKOS HOTELS PUBLIC LTD Other services 
A. ZORBAS & SONS PUBLIC LTD 
Industrial and real estate 
development 
AVACOM NET PUBLIC COMPANY LTD Technology 
AVACOM PUBLIC COMPANY LTD Technology 
BANK OF CYPRUS PUBLIC COMPANY LTD Banks and insurance 
CAC PAPANTONIOU PLC Retail 
CLARIDGE PUBLIC LTD Other services 
HELLENIC BANK PUBLIC COMPANY LTD Banks and insurance 
K + G COMPLEX PUBLIC COMPANY LTD 
Industrial and real estate 
development 
KANIKA HOTELS PUBLIC COMPANY LTD Other services 
KEO PLC 
Industrial and real estate 
development 
LAIKI INVESTMENTS EPEY PLC General Financial 
LIBERTY LIFE INSURANCE PUBLIC 
COMPANY LTD Banks and insurance 
LORDOS HOTELS (HOLDINGS) PUBLIC 
LTD Other services 
LORDOS UNITED PLASTICS PUBLIC LTD 
Industrial and real estate 
development 
MALLOUPPAS & PAPACOSTAS PUBLIC CO 
LTD Retail 
MINERVA INSURANCE COMPANY PUBLIC 
LTD Banks and insurance 
MUSKITA ALUMINIUM INDUSTRIES PLC 
Industrial and real estate 
development 
ORFANIDES PUBLIC COMPANY LTD Retail 
PETROLINA (HOLDINGS) PUBLIC LTD Retail 
PHIL. ANDREOU PUBLIC LTD 
Industrial and real estate 
development 
SAFS HOLDINGS PUBLIC LTD General Financial 
SALAMIS TOURS (HOLDINGS) PUBLIC LTD Other services 
SFS GROUP PUBLIC COMPANY LTD General Financial 
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APPENDIX 5: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
 
 
General information 
 
1. Does your firm comply with the Cyprus Governance Code fully? 
2. If the answer to question 1 is NO, does your firm partly comply with the code? 
3. If the answer to question 2 is YES, which points does it not comply with the 
code? 
4. What is the market and industry sector your firm belongs to? 
5. Is there a family that has a significant stake in your firm? If so give details.  
6. How does your company assess its performance in general? (Sales growth =1, 
ROA = 2, Market performance =3, Other = 4). Explain   
 
 
  The effect of corporate governance practices in general on performance  
 
7. Do you believe that the adoption of the corporate governance code has an effect 
on any kind of measure of performance? Justify your answer.  
8. In a degree 1 to 3 (1 being strongest and 3 being weakest) what do you think is the 
effect of corporate governance mechanisms on performance as measured by Sales 
Growth, ROA, Market performance (growth) and other measures that your 
company may be using?  
9. What other factors do you believe affect performance as measured by Sales 
Growth, ROA, Market performance (growth) and other measures that your 
company may be using? Have any of these factors affected your company’s 
performance in the period 2002-2007. Please explain.   
 
Board Composition 
 
      Committees 
  
10. Do you think audit committees have an effect on performance? Justify your 
answer. 
11. Do you think remuneration committees have an effect on performance? Justify 
your answer. 
12. Do you think the formation of other committees has an effect on performance? If 
so, what kind of committees do you think will be valuable?   
 
The role of directors 
 
13. Does your company director have a dual role? Do you believe these affects 
performance? Please explain.  
14. Does your firm have non-executive directors? What percentage? Do you believe 
they create value for the company? Justify your answer. 
15. Do you think board expertise has an effect on performance? Justify your answer. 
 234
16. Do you think management expertise has an effect on performance? Justify your 
answer. 
 
Other board factors 
 
17. What is the firm’s board size? What factors do you believe affect board size? Do 
you think the board size affects firm performance? If so, how?  
18. How many meetings do you have on average per year? What determines the 
number of meetings taken? What topics do these meetings generally cover? Do 
you believe the numbers of meetings are linked to performance? Justify your 
answer. 
 
Ownership 
 
19. Is there a family that has a significant stake in your firm? Do you think more 
family ownership is linked to higher performance or vice-versa?  If, so how?  
20. Is there foreign ownership that has a significant stake in your firm? Do you think 
more foreign ownership is linked to higher performance or vice-versa?  If, so 
how?  
21. Is there insider ownership that has a significant stake in your firm? Do you think 
more insider ownership is linked to higher performance or vice-versa?  If, so 
how?  
 
Other factors 
 
22. Do you think firm’s age; size, leverage and the industry that the company operates 
have an effect on performance? Explain the sign you expect for each of these 
variables.   
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DEFINITION OF KEY TERMS FOR THE INTERVIEW 
 
Industry classifications and sectors 
ID 1: Banks and Insurance: applies to firms in the banking and insurance sectors. 
ID 2: General Financial: applies to the firms in the financial sector (with the exception of 
firms in ID 1 and investment companies). 
ID 3: Retail: applied to food and general retailers. 
ID 4: Industrial & Real Estate Development: applies to manufacturers, construction firms 
and firms that operate in real estate. 
ID 5: Technology: applies to firms in the computer sector (that is hardware, software and 
computer services). 
ID 6: Other services: applies to firms in the following sectors: media, travel and leisure, 
hotels and support services. 
 
Sales growth - the change in sales on a year-to-year basis. 
Return on assets (ROA) - the profit before interest and taxes divided by total assets.  
 
Board size is the number of members of the board including executive and non-executive 
directors. The non-executive percentage (board composition) is the proportion of non-
executive directors to the board size. 
 
Duality – when the chairman is also a CEO (two roles). 
 
Family -an organisation in which decisions regarding its ownership or management are 
influenced by a relationship to a family. 
 
Foreign ownership -an organisation in which decisions regarding its ownership or 
management are influenced by a relationship to foreign ownership. 
 
Insider ownership – the percentage of shares owned in the firm by the directors. 
 
Age – the age of the firm from the date of its incorporation. 
 
Size – Total assets. 
 
Leverage - total debt to total capital 
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APPENDIX 6: LETTER OF PERMISSION: ACCESS TO FUCy STAFF AND 
STUDENTS 
 237
APPENDIX 7: STUDENT QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
Questionnaire on Course Evaluation 
The following questionnaire aims at providing student feedback on the 
course they have undertaken. Provide your answers based on your 
experience concerning the course during your period as students at 
Frederick University Cyprus according to the guidelines below: 
SEX:…………… 
COURSE:…………. 
CURRENT YEAR OF STUDY:……………..   
SUBJECT:……………….. 
The questions below are answered on a 1‐5 scale where  
1=Strongly Disagree, 2=Disagree, 3=Neutral, 4=Agree, 5=Strongly Agree 
Put the relevant figure in the tick box provided 
Knowledge gained by students 
1. Overall after taking this course you think that being a family business has an effect on 
corporate performance   
2. Overall  after  taking  this  course  you  think  corporate  governance  has  an  impact  on 
corporate performance    
3. Overall I learned a lot of useful information about the Cyprus Stock Exchange  
4. The course covered a lot of useful material on corporate governance  
5. The course took account of the unique characteristics of Cyprus business such as the 
domination of family businesses  
6. The  course  material  provided  useful  knowledge  that  can  be  used  by  students  in 
general in their future careers in business 
Future development of modules 
1. An extra module that looked at family business management would significantly 
improve the quality of the course 
2. An extra module that looked at corporate governance would significantly improve the 
quality of the course 
3. An extra module that looked at more details on the firms operating in the Cyprus 
Stock Exchange would significantly improve the quality of the course 
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GENERAL COMMENTS: 
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APPENDIX 10: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND CORRELATIONS 
 
10.1 Family firms in MM and PM 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
C_CODE 126 1 101 52.14 25.617
Market 126 1 2 1.48 .501
MD1 126 0 1 .52 .501
MD2 126 0 1 .48 .501
MD3 126 0 0 .00 .000
ROE 126 -2.1724 3.1359 .068949 .3889781
ROA 
126 
-
1.8707705741
10E-1
.254531722054
.0417982760
4250 
.0568909016656
30
BOARD  126 4 18 8.33 2.629
LN_BOARD 
126 
1.3862943611
20E0
2.890371757896
E0
2.074464672
91453E0 
.2974584520577
29
EXE 126 1 6 2.91 1.220
LN_EXEC 
126 
.00000000000
0
1.791759469228
E0
.9665165535
0825 
.4809973432041
95
NONEXE 126 0 14 5.41 2.720
LN_NONEXEC 
126 .00000000000
2.63905732962E
0
1.560396670
7802E0 
.5409889913949
7
NONEXE_P 
126 
.00000000000
0
.875000000000
.6238331864
7324 
.1907152778669
78
MEETINGS 126 3 16 7.27 2.408
LN_MEETINGS 
126 
1.0986122886
68E0
2.772588722240
E0
1.936168218
52831E0 
.3029752851462
86
BOARD_SKILL 126 1 15 7.18 2.642
LN_BOARD_SKILL 
126 .00000000000
2.70805020110E
0
1.888478238
0344E0 
.4512727829228
7
MANAG_SKILL 126 0 6 2.37 1.269
LN_MANAG_SKILL 
126 .00000000000
1.79175946923E
0
.7718717489
145 
.4912279246622
5
AUDIT 126 0 1 .77 .423
REM 126 0 1 .67 .470
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DUAL 126 0 1 .47 .501
CGC 126 0 2 1.12 .722
CGC_F 126 0 1 .33 .470
CGC_P 126 0 1 .47 .501
CGC_N 126 0 1 .21 .406
FAMILY 126 1 1 1.00 .000
FOREIGN 126 0 1 .03 .176
FAMILY_P 126 .0859 .7704 .544476 .1638038
INSIDER_P 126 .0902 .7881 .581626 .1478743
MV_EUR 126 3.4 1668.9 76.098 215.6149
MV_CY 
126 1.9899316 977.7000000
4.456213651
E1 
1.2631056471E2
TOTAL_ASSETS 126 8.05 7118.73 253.2452 1013.66006
BV_EQUITY 126 -49.92 346.84 39.1090 60.33512
BOOK_TO_MARKET 
126 
-
7.3891868624
71E0
7.756189064129
E0
1.597641776
89007E0 
1.475596973372
785E0
TOBIN_Q 
126 
.28627735920
3
2.227045147425
E0
.9418845909
3546 
.3708888416873
67
LN_SIZE 
126 
.68810026628
6
6.885202874512
E0
2.716132554
52691E0 
1.227606060545
244E0
LN_ASSETS 
126 
2.0856720914
30E0
8.870484617710
E0
3.884056828
44076E0 
1.318135724707
956E0
AGE 126 5 104 30.16 18.963
LN_AGE 
126 
1.6094379124
34E0
4.644390899141
E0
3.237480840
73898E0 
.5918701963532
72
DEBT 126 .00 6736.15 194.7715 960.07078
LEV 
126 
.00000000000
0
.902616558608
.4393497391
4330 
.2523832737991
47
SALES_G 
126 
-
9.6494245270
54E-1
8.297101449275
E0
.1585559021
2712 
.7718855468468
11
INDUS 126 1 6 4.32 1.424
ID1 126 0 1 .06 .245
ID2 126 0 0 .00 .000
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ID3 126 0 1 .19 .394
ID4 126 0 1 .37 .486
ID5 126 0 1 .05 .214
ID6 126 0 1 .33 .470
T2002 126 0 1 .17 .374
T2003 126 0 1 .17 .381
T2004 126 0 1 .17 .381
T2005 126 0 1 .17 .381
T2006 126 0 1 .16 .367
T2007 126 0 1 .15 .359
Valid N (listwise) 126     
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10.2 Non-family firms in MM and PM 
 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
C_CODE 52 5 99 43.62 31.847 
Market 52 1 2 1.44 .502 
MD1 52 0 1 .56 .502 
MD2 52 0 1 .44 .502 
MD3 52 0 0 .00 .000 
ROE 52 -2.7792 .2665 -.095869 .5750498 
ROA 
52 
-
2.91016675632
E-1
.1542088964
0
.01512255167
87
.0844026686902
7 
BOARD  52 4 18 10.63 3.614 
LN_BOARD 
52 
1.38629436112
0E0
2.890371757
896E0
2.3069500727
4285E0
.3463217977778
45 
EXE 52 0 6 2.71 1.661 
LN_EXEC 
52 .000000000000
1.791759469
228E0
.93946523550
592
.5648585706618
72 
NONEXE 52 1 15 7.92 3.591 
LN_NONEXEC 
52 .00000000000
2.708050201
10E0
1.9449797508
440E0
.5516488672629
4 
NONEXE_P 
52 .166666666667
1.000000000
000
.72838411588
412
.1957562790631
98 
MEETINGS 52 5 37 11.71 9.008 
LN_MEETINGS 
52 
1.60943791243
4E0
3.610917912
644E0
2.2374007591
1791E0
.6298123380831
34 
BOARD_SKILL 52 4 18 10.31 3.622 
LN_BOARD_SKILL 
52 
1.38629436112
0E0
2.890371757
896E0
2.2748848477
2445E0
.3442887573696
93 
MANAG_SKILL 52 0 5 2.63 1.621 
LN_MANAG_SKILL 
52 .000000000000
1.609437912
434E0
.91483189232
395
.5576489655495
40 
AUDIT 52 0 1 .81 .398 
REM 52 0 1 .75 .437 
DUAL 52 0 1 .25 .437 
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CGC 52 0 2 1.27 .770 
CGC_F 52 0 1 .46 .503 
CGC_P 52 0 1 .35 .480 
CGC_N 52 0 1 .19 .398 
FAMILY 52 0 0 .00 .000 
FOREIGN 52 0 1 .42 .499 
FAMILY_P 52 0 0 .00 .000 
INSIDER_P 52 .0000 .7435 .127205 .1748005 
MV_EUR 52 9.80 5707.70 634.7443 1372.30250 
MV_CY 
52 5.73568520
3.34056841
E3
3.7161832902
E2
8.03342652100E
2 
TOTAL_ASSETS 52 22.92 18590.17 2436.1613 4876.71883 
BV_EQUITY 52 -13.2 1983.8 203.636 407.9820 
BOOK_TO_MARKET 
52 
-
7.22679606114
4E-1
6.121326184
359E0
1.3266145411
0743E0
1.219927578559
199E0 
TOBIN_Q 
52 .558703315881
2.109318045
005E0
1.0052816223
7231E0
.2436642130384
94 
LN_SIZE 
52 
1.74670722034
1E0
8.113896254
066E0
4.1223312899
5983E0
1.802851330110
488E0 
LN_ASSETS 
52 
3.13200989184
7E0
9.830388225
375E0
5.5864400336
5741E0
2.102802361254
643E0 
AGE 52 8 108 39.88 31.777 
LN_AGE 
52 
2.07944154168
E0
4.682131227
12E0
3.3941378817
596E0
.7732153746001
0 
DEBT 52 0 17417 2205.95 4503.138 
LEV 52 0 1 .52 .390 
SALES_G 
52 
-
2.01291989664
1E0
2.877551020
408E0
.18014088173
744
.5696701899766
03 
INDUS 52 1 6 2.69 1.986 
ID1 52 0 1 .42 .499 
ID2 52 0 1 .23 .425 
ID3 52 0 0 .00 .000 
ID4 52 0 1 .13 .345 
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ID5 52 0 0 .00 .000 
ID6 52 0 1 .21 .412 
T2002 52 0 1 .17 .382 
T2003 52 0 1 .15 .364 
T2004 52 0 1 .15 .364 
T2005 52 0 1 .15 .364 
T2006 52 0 1 .19 .398 
T2007 52 0 1 .17 .382 
Valid N (listwise) 52     
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10.3 Family firms in AM  
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
C_CODE 337 2 100 50.16 30.039 
Market 337 3 3 3.00 .000 
MD1 337 0 0 .00 .000 
MD2 337 0 0 .00 .000 
MD3 337 1 1 1.00 .000 
ROE 
337 
-
6.15155642023
3E1
2.383664171
819E0
-
3.5750724219
9507E-1
3.708561048935
846E0 
ROA 
337 
-
6.74072476272
6E-1
.1815127997
22
-
5.8218744336
0452E-3
.1240398531085
78 
BOARD  337 3 14 6.57 2.292 
LN_BOARD 
337 
1.09861228867
E0
2.639057329
62E0
1.8271722483
814E0
.3309266118924
6 
EXE 337 0 7 2.70 1.679 
LN_EXEC 
337 .00000000000
1.945910149
06E0
.80765652787
59
.6428978194311
7 
NONEXE 337 0 11 3.85 2.053 
LN_NONEXEC 
337 .00000000000
2.397895272
80E0
1.2267000583
758E0
.5526116135670
4 
NONEXE_P 337 .0 1.0 .584 .2366 
MEETINGS 337 3 10 5.20 1.302 
LN_MEETINGS 
337 
1.09861228866
8E0
2.302585092
994E0
1.6163409150
7842E0
.2576148526787
96 
BOARD_SKILL 337 0 13 5.36 2.349 
LN_BOARD_SKILL 
337 .00000000000
2.564949357
46E0
1.5744990185
071E0
.4940235000581
5 
MANAG_SKILL 337 0 6 2.13 1.591 
LN_MANAG_SKILL 
337 .00000000000
1.791759469
23E0
.64313530575
38
.6030924265038
9 
AUDIT 337 0 1 .09 .285 
REM 337 0 1 .05 .225 
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DUAL 337 0 1 .53 .500 
CGC 337 0 2 .12 .411 
CGC_F 337 0 1 .03 .170 
CGC_P 337 0 1 .07 .247 
CGC_N 337 0 1 .91 .294 
FAMILY 337 1 1 1.00 .000 
FOREIGN 337 0 1 .02 .143 
FAMILY_P 337 .1965 .9916 .548658 .1332984 
INSIDER_P 337 .1982 .9916 .596075 .1331598 
MV_EUR 337 .172 365.010 14.16849 26.533367 
MV_CY 
337 .100433018
2.136308627
E2
8.2924480347
4E0
1.552928987137
E1 
TOTAL_ASSETS 337 .0000 238.8900 28.455444 37.8792410 
BV_EQUITY 337 -57.565 138.870 14.58746 21.045895 
BOOK_TO_MARKET 
337 
-
1.91550965872
E1
1.866884888
61E1
2.2687577219
105E0
3.248353121967
84E0 
TOBIN_Q 
337 .000000000000
4.333672490
903E0
.91030464770
183
.5405838561703
49 
LN_SIZE 
337 
-
2.29826425726
4E0
5.364249585
132E0
1.3908163099
9337E0
1.211395395184
651E0 
LN_ASSETS 
337 
-
2.80016549001
E0
5.476003194
94E0
2.6140945383
821E0
1.257770728307
72E0 
AGE 337 4 64 22.97 13.335 
LN_AGE 
337 
1.38629436112
E0
4.158883083
36E0
2.9806405506
041E0
.5560670420630
4 
DEBT 337 .0000 70.4260 7.819299 12.4095325 
LEV 
337 .000000000000
.9756188395
05
.41561690453
458
.2712513874500
66 
SALES_G 
337 
-
9.73684210526
3E-1
8.343750000
000E1
.57153982073
344
5.499621114790
602E0 
INDUS 337 1 6 4.35 1.549 
ID1 337 0 1 .06 .231 
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ID2 337 0 1 .07 .262 
ID3 337 0 1 .14 .350 
ID4 337 0 1 .30 .459 
ID5 337 0 1 .05 .213 
ID6 337 0 1 .38 .486 
T2002 337 0 1 .17 .373 
T2003 337 0 1 .17 .375 
T2004 337 0 1 .17 .373 
T2005 337 0 1 .17 .375 
T2006 337 0 1 .16 .370 
T2007 337 0 1 .17 .373 
Valid N (listwise) 337     
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10.4 Non-family firms in AM 
  
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
C_CODE 91 4 98 56.74 28.271 
Market 91 3 3 3.00 .000 
MD1 91 0 0 .00 .000 
MD2 91 0 0 .00 .000 
MD3 91 1 1 1.00 .000 
ROE 
91 
-
1.2242740998
84E1
3.059397884459
E0
-
2.24909167
932341E-1
1.528413350166
599E0 
ROA 
91 
-
1.2915340086
83E0
.308911513464
-
3.70643207
388022E-2
.2145962344725
35 
BOARD  91 3 11 5.55 1.721 
LN_BOARD 
91 
1.0986122886
68E0
2.397895272798
E0
1.66547602
791140E0
.3148994159448
70 
EXE 91 0 3 .91 .825 
LN_EXEC 91 0 1 .17 .325 
NONEXE 91 1 10 4.64 1.742 
LN_NONEXEC 
91 .00000000000
2.30258509299E
0
1.45735656
95776E0
.4113064612940
3 
NONEXE_P 91 .3 1.0 .830 .1618 
MEETINGS 91 3 17 6.26 2.615 
LN_MEETINGS 
91 
1.0986122886
7E0
2.83321334406E
0
1.77041716
28575E0
.3426512099302
1 
BOARD_SKILL 91 2 11 5.09 1.811 
LN_BOARD_SKILL 
91 .69314718056
2.39789527280E
0
1.56122168
70576E0
.3720773322712
9 
MANAG_SKILL 91 0 3 .89 .809 
LN_MANAG_SKILL 91 0 1 .16 .317 
AUDIT 91 0 1 .18 .383 
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REM 91 0 1 .10 .300 
DUAL 91 0 1 .11 .314 
CGC 91 0 2 .23 .539 
CGC_F 91 0 1 .05 .229 
CGC_P 91 0 1 .12 .328 
CGC_N 91 0 1 .82 .383 
FAMILY 91 0 0 .00 .000 
FOREIGN 91 0 0 .00 .000 
FAMILY_P 91 0 0 .01 .046 
INSIDER_P 91 .0000 .4386 .065824 .0876395 
MV_EUR 91 .43 166.65 11.6111 22.23765 
MV_CY 
91 .25125813 97.53591210
6.79564625
65E0
1.30151180909E
1 
TOTAL_ASSETS 91 .07 274.06 28.5198 58.40324 
BV_EQUITY 91 -2.28 61.99 7.7007 13.19813 
BOOK_TO_MARKET 
91 
-
2.8255647404
14E0
7.235927104228
E0
1.57386279
381294E0
1.637860399218
705E0 
TOBIN_Q 
91 
.20752872172
4
6.702437135521
E0
1.13413815
849222E0
.8998169423825
23 
LN_SIZE 
91 
-
1.3812744690
87E0
4.580220639418
E0
.985699200
05819
1.348391597295
762E0 
LN_ASSETS 
91 
-
2.6578324849
42E0
5.613354358163
E0
1.99252058
414446E0
1.701332310709
524E0 
AGE 91 3 82 24.22 23.071 
LN_AGE 
91 
1.0986122886
68E0
4.406719247264
E0
2.84689153
597343E0
.7854838789220
15 
DEBT 91 .00 149.83 4.9275 16.50881 
LEV 
91 
.00000000000
0
.945044104087
.283078356
91670
.2588397146023
37 
SALES_G 
91 
-
9.5833333333
33E-1
2.240000000000
E1
.471887019
27214
2.572432503357
032E0 
INDUS 91 1 6 3.70 1.900 
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ID1 91 0 1 .12 .328 
ID2 91 0 1 .31 .464 
ID3 91 0 0 .00 .000 
ID4 91 0 1 .22 .416 
ID5 91 0 1 .02 .147 
ID6 91 0 1 .33 .473 
T2002 91 0 1 .16 .373 
T2003 91 0 1 .15 .363 
T2004 91 0 1 .16 .373 
T2005 91 0 1 .15 .363 
T2006 91 0 1 .18 .383 
T2007 91 0 1 .19 .392 
Valid N (listwise) 91     
 
10.5 Significance testing comparing means for the different markets 
 Pooled sample estimates 
Comparisons 
between markets 
 Main (MM)-1 Parallel (PM)-2 Others (AM)-3 
Equal 
Variance
Unequal 
Variance 
Variable Mean Variance Mean Variance Mean Variance 
1 
vs 
2 
1 
vs 
3 
2 
vs 
3 
1 
vs 
2 
1 
vs 
3 
2 
vs 
3 
ROA 0,0385 0,0039 0,0288 0,0051 -0,0125 0,0220  *** **  *** ***
TOBIN Q 1,0595 0,1097 0,8470 0,0983 0,9579 0,4090 ***   *** ** ** 
ROE 0,0621 0,2107 -0,0264 0,2028 -0,3293 11,3177     ** * 
SALES GROWTH 0,1382 0,2125 0,1954 0,8649 0,5504 25,1964     *  
BOARD  9,7579 12,3769 8,1325 5,4334 6,3551 4,9321 *** *** *** *** *** ***
LN(BOARD) 2,2209 0,1104 2,0525 0,0918 1,7928 0,1115 *** *** *** *** *** ***
EXE 2,8947 1,4143 2,8072 2,3770 2,3201 2,8973  *** **  *** ** 
LN(EXEC) 0,9544 0,2556 0,9635 0,2584 0,6728 0,4151  *** ***  *** ***
NON-EXE 6,8632 10,4811 5,3253 8,8319 4,0187 4,0605 *** *** *** *** *** ***
LN(NON-EXEC) 1,8179 0,2295 1,5066 0,3864 1,2757 0,2849 *** *** *** *** *** ***
%NON-EXE 0,6878 0,0213 0,6161 0,0570 0,6367 0,0597 ** *  ** ***  
MEETINGS 10,3579 49,4237 6,5181 3,5454 5,4252 2,9663 *** *** *** *** *** ***
LN(MEETINGS) 2,1865 0,2541 1,8384 0,0706 1,6491 0,0810 *** *** *** *** *** ***
BOARD SKILL 9,0211 12,3825 7,0361 6,8645 5,2991 5,0438 *** *** *** *** *** ***
LN(BOARD SKILL) 2,1329 0,1289 1,8508 0,2605 1,5717 0,2213 *** *** *** *** *** ***
MANAG SKILL 2,5579 0,9940 2,3133 2,9495 1,8692 2,3903  *** **  *** ** 
LN(MANAG SKILL) 0,8490 0,2051 0,7731 0,3322 0,5400 0,3468  *** ***  *** ***
AUDIT-COM 0,8000 0,1617 0,7590 0,1851 0,1075 0,0962  *** ***  *** ***
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REMUN-COM 0,8000 0,1617 0,5783 0,2468 0,0631 0,0592 *** *** *** *** *** ***
DUALITY 0,2842 0,2056 0,5422 0,2512 0,4439 0,2474 *** ***  *** ***  
CGC 
COMPLIANCE 1,3684 0,6394 0,9277 0,3362 0,1472 0,1961 *** *** *** *** *** ***
CGC_F 0,5684 0,2479 0,1325 0,1164 0,0350 0,0339 *** *** *** *** *** ** 
CGC_P 0,2316 0,1798 0,6627 0,2263 0,0771 0,0713 *** *** *** *** *** ***
CGC_N 0,2000 0,1617 0,2048 0,1649 0,8879 0,0998  *** ***  *** ***
FAMILY 0,6947 0,2143 0,7229 0,2028 0,7874 0,1678  *   *  
FOREIGN 0,1474 0,1270 0,1446 0,1252 0,0164 0,0161  *** ***  *** ***
FAMILY % 0,3412 0,0776 0,4360 0,0801 0,4333 0,0638 ** ***  ** ***  
INSIDER% 0,4049 0,0689 0,4992 0,0613 0,4833 0,0628 ** ***  ** ***  
MARKET-CAP 
EUR 430,5077 1126148,2460 20,4430 438,7899 13,6247 659,3100 *** *** ** *** *** ** 
MARKET-CAP CY 252,0622 385946,5844 11,9648 150,3056 7,9742 225,8438 *** *** ** *** *** ** 
TOTAL ASSETS 1634,2335 14936604,9118 40,2060 1723,7583 28,4691 1847,9860 *** *** ** *** *** ** 
BV-EQUITY 148,4196 97466,8022 17,0713 173,3832 13,1232 393,2081 *** *** * *** *** ** 
BOOK_TO_MARK
ET 1,1024 1,4771 1,9947 2,1544 2,1210 8,9495 *** ***  *** ***  
LOG FIRM SIZE 3,9881 2,4038 2,1412 0,6081 1,3047 1,5655 *** *** *** *** *** ***
LOG ASSETS 5,2663 3,6649 3,3685 0,5529 2,4819 1,9198 *** *** *** *** *** ***
AGE 36,7474 864,7015 28,7108 192,5251 23,2383 252,3693 ** *** *** ** *** ***
LN(AGE) 3,3263 0,5662 3,2339 0,2632 2,9522 0,3764  *** ***  *** ***
DEBT 1455,8247 12828142,7052 11,4130 359,0676 7,2045 180,0250 *** *** ** *** *** * 
LEVERAGE 0,5268 0,0852 0,3894 0,0866 0,3874 0,0750 *** ***  *** ***  
INDUS CLASS 3,5368 3,5066 4,1928 2,4746 4,2103 2,7191 ** ***  ** ***  
ID1 0,2526 0,1908 0,0723 0,0679 0,0701 0,0653 *** ***  *** ***  
ID2 0,0632 0,0598 0,0723 0,0679 0,1238 0,1088  *   **  
ID3 0,1263 0,1115 0,1446 0,1252 0,1121 0,0998       
ID4 0,2526 0,1908 0,3614 0,2336 0,2827 0,2033       
ID5 0,0632 0,0598 0,0000 0,0000 0,0421 0,0404 **  * **  ***
ID6 0,2421 0,1854 0,3494 0,2301 0,3692 0,2334  **   **  
Market 1,0000 0,0000 2,0000 0,0000 3,0000 0,0000   
MD1 1,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000       
MD2 0,0000 0,0000 1,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000       
MD3 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 1,0000 0,0000       
Notes: The table reports means and standard deviation for different variables the main, parallel and AM firms based on 
pooled data for the years 2002-2007 for the Cyprus stock market.  The table also reports comparisons of means 
between the different markets for all variables reported using two alternative approaches: equal variance and unequal 
variance of the years 2002-2007 (for brevity we only report means and variances using the equal variance sample). 
The markets are separated with respect to the level of corporate governance compliance according to the official CSE 
classification. We have 95 firm-year observations in the MM, 83 firm-year observations in the PM and 428 firm-year 
observations in the AM. Statistically significance: “*” : 10% level, “**”: 5% level, “***”: 1% level. 
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10.6 Medians and median comparisons between markets   
 
Median 
  
  
Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney 
  
  
Variable 
Main 
(MM)-1 
Parallel 
(PM)-2 
Others 
(AM)-3 1 vs 2 1 vs 3 2 vs 3 
ROA 0.034 0.029 0.018   *** ** 
TOBIN Q 1.001 0.828 0.790 *** *** *** 
ROE 0.074 0.039 0.016 *** *** *** 
SALES GROWTH 0.091 0.074 0.018   *** *** 
BOARD  9 8 6 *** *** *** 
EXE 3 3 2   *** *** 
NON-EXE 6 4 4 *** *** *** 
%NON-EXE 0.727 0.600 0.667 **     
MEETINGS 7 6 5 *** *** *** 
BOARD SKILL 8 8 5 *** *** *** 
The table reports medians and comparisons of medians between the different markets for all variables reported using 
Wilcoxon/Mann-Witney tests of the years 2002-2007. The markets are separated with respect to the level of corporate 
governance compliance according to the official CSE classification. We have 95 firm-year observations in the MM, 83 
firm-year observations in the PM and 428 firm-year observations in the AM. Statistically significance: “*” : 10% level, 
“**”: 5% level, “***”: 1% level. 
 
10.7 Correlations  
 
REM 
COM MD1 MD2 MD3 ROA 
BOAR
D  
LN_BOAR
D 
NONEXE
_P 
MEETI
NGS 
REM COM 1.00         
MD1 0.55 1.00        
MD2 0.30 -0.17 1.00       
MD3 -0.67 -0.67 -0.62 1.00      
ROA 0.14 0.12 0.08 -0.16 1.00     
BOARD  0.40 0.41 0.14 -0.43 0.12 1.00    
LN_BOARD 0.41 0.38 0.17 -0.43 0.14 0.97 1.00   
NONEXE_P 0.17 0.09 -0.04 -0.03 -0.11 0.10 0.07 1.00  
MEETINGS 0.44 0.47 0.02 -0.39 0.02 0.44 0.36 0.11 1.00
LN_MEETINGS 0.49 0.49 0.08 -0.45 0.00 0.40 0.35 0.11 0.91
BOARD_SKILL 0.44 0.43 0.13 -0.44 0.05 0.92 0.88 0.16 0.49
LN_BOARD_SKILL 0.41 0.37 0.12 -0.39 0.03 0.80 0.83 0.15 0.36
MANAG_SKILL 0.12 0.15 0.07 -0.17 0.05 0.42 0.45 -0.62 0.14
LN_MANAG_SKILL 0.13 0.17 0.10 -0.21 0.07 0.45 0.47 -0.62 0.16
AUDIT 0.87 0.46 0.39 -0.67 0.12 0.37 0.39 0.13 0.41
DUAL -0.09 -0.13 0.09 0.04 0.10 -0.14 -0.13 -0.21 -0.17
CGC_F 0.68 0.56 0.00 -0.44 0.05 0.42 0.40 0.13 0.53
CGC_P 0.43 0.06 0.50 -0.42 0.10 0.06 0.10 0.03 0.02
CGC_N -0.85 -0.45 -0.41 0.67 -0.12 -0.35 -0.38 -0.12 -0.41
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FAMILY -0.11 -0.07 -0.04 0.09 0.08 -0.05 0.00 -0.36 -0.29
INSIDER_P -0.12 -0.12 0.04 0.06 0.14 -0.04 0.02 -0.42 -0.28
MV_EUR 0.25 0.34 -0.05 -0.23 0.02 0.43 0.32 0.06 0.68
BV_EQUITY 0.25 0.37 -0.05 -0.25 0.04 0.44 0.34 0.06 0.57
TOBIN_Q -0.01 0.08 -0.08 0.00 -0.17 -0.14 -0.19 0.10 0.08
LN_SIZE 0.45 0.59 0.08 -0.53 0.28 0.54 0.51 -0.03 0.51
AGE 0.21 0.24 0.05 -0.23 0.15 0.41 0.37 -0.03 0.40
LN_AGE 0.19 0.19 0.11 -0.23 0.22 0.38 0.37 -0.13 0.25
LEV 0.15 0.18 -0.03 -0.12 -0.08 0.30 0.26 -0.07 0.18
SALES_G -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 0.04 0.00 -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01
ID1 0.22 0.22 -0.04 -0.15 0.04 0.28 0.26 0.08 0.46
ID2 -0.06 -0.06 -0.05 0.08 -0.23 -0.25 -0.27 0.25 -0.05
ID3 -0.06 0.01 0.03 -0.03 0.08 0.02 -0.02 -0.08 -0.09
ID4 -0.01 -0.03 0.06 -0.02 0.18 -0.02 0.04 -0.22 -0.09
ID5 -0.02 0.05 -0.08 0.02 -0.13 -0.07 -0.07 0.05 0.05
ID6 -0.04 -0.09 0.00 0.07 -0.05 0.01 0.02 0.03 -0.12
MD1*CGC_P 0.23 0.45 -0.08 -0.30 0.13 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.03
MD2*CGC_N 0.13 -0.07 0.43 -0.26 0.01 0.07 0.08 -0.05 0.01
MD3*CGC_F 0.28 -0.07 -0.06 0.10 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.13 0.06
 
 
LN 
MEETIN
GS 
BOARD
SKILL 
LN_ 
BOARD 
SKILL 
MGT 
SKILS 
LN 
MGT 
SKILLS
AUDI
T DUAL 
CGC
_F 
CGC
_P 
CGC
_N 
LN_MEETINGS 1.00          
BOARD_SKILL 0.46 1.00         
LN_BOARD_SKILL 0.37 0.93 1.00        
MANAG_SKILL 0,14 0,43 0,43 1.00       
LN_MANAG_SKILL 0.15 0.44 0.44 0.96 1.00      
AUDIT 0.47 0.39 0.37 0.08 0.10 1.00     
DUAL -0.14 -0.14 -0.16 0.03 -0.01 -0.06 1.00    
CGC_F 0.53 0.43 0.37 0.12 0.15 0.59 -0.34 1.00   
CGC_P 0.11 0.07 0.09 -0.03 -0.04 0.66 0.23 -0.18 1.00  
CGC_N -0.48 -0.37 -0.35 -0.07 -0.08 -0.98 0.06 -0.58 -0.70 1.00
FAMILY -0.26 -0.17 -0.14 0.19 0.18 -0.12 0.30 -0.12 -0.03 0.11
INSIDER_P -0.28 -0.17 -0.13 0.26 0.25 -0.11 0.39 -0.22 0.08 0.09
MV_EUR 0.48 0.47 0.29 0,26 0,25 0.22 -0.11 0.35 -0.05 -0.21
BV_EQUITY 0.43 0.47 0.31 0,16 0,16 0.23 -0.11 0.35 -0.04 -0.22
TOBIN_Q 0.12 -0.10 -0.10 -0.13 -0.13 0.03 0.05 -0.03 0.06 -0.03
LN_SIZE 0.47 0.56 0.47 0.25 0.27 0.41 -0.06 0.40 0.14 -0.41
AGE 0.32 0.42 0.31 0.22 0.23 0.24 -0.07 0.23 0.06 -0.22
LN_AGE 0.20 0.35 0.27 0.27 0.28 0.23 -0.01 0.17 0.11 -0.22
LEV 0.11 0.25 0.16 0.21 0.20 0.08 -0.02 0.21 -0.08 -0.09
SALES_G 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 -0.04 -0.03 0.03 -0.01
ID1 0.38 0.34 0.27 0.07 0.09 0.21 -0.09 0.25 0.03 -0.20
ID2 -0.02 -0.14 -0.10 -0.26 -0.24 -0.04 0.00 -0.14 0.09 0.03
ID3 -0.09 -0.14 -0.29 -0.04 -0.05 -0.01 0.17 -0.11 0.10 0.00
ID4 -0.07 -0.02 0.05 0.18 0.18 -0.01 0.05 -0.03 0.01 0.01
ID5 0.07 -0.03 0.00 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.09 0.05 -0.10 0.05
ID6 -0.13 0.00 0.04 -0.01 -0.02 -0.07 -0.07 0.02 -0.12 0.08
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MD1*CGC_P 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.13 0.15 0.29 0.19 -0.08 0.41 -0.29
MD2*CGC_N 0.03 0.06 0.07 0.00 0.00 -0.11 -0.01 -0.07 -0.08 0.11
MD3*CGC_F 0.10 0.03 0.06 -0.08 -0.10 0.24 -0.14 0.41 -0.08 -0.24
 
 
FAMILY INSIDER_P BV_EQUITY TOBIN_Q LN_SIZE AGE LN_AGE LEV SALES_G
FAMILY 1.00         
INSIDER_P 0.85 1.00        
MV_EUR -0.20 -0.23        
BV_EQUITY -0.18 -0.19 1.00       
TOBIN_Q -0.13 -0.10 -0.02 1.00      
LN_SIZE -0.10 -0.09 0.54 0.08 1.00     
AGE -0.11 -0.11 0.52 -0.07 0.51 1.00    
LN_AGE 0.00 0.04 0.34 -0.11 0.43 0.92 1.00   
LEV 0.08 0.04 0.23 -0.22 0.01 0.20 0.15 1.00  
SALES_G 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.02 -0.04 -0.06 0.02 1.00
ID1 -0.25 -0.27 0.37 0.03 0.34 0.29 0.15 0.02 -0.02
ID2 -0.31 -0.31 -0.07 0.19 -0.14 -0.21 -0.23 -0.15 0.00
ID3 0.20 0.23 -0.05 -0.05 -0.08 0.05 0.12 0.11 -0.03
ID4 0.12 0.16 -0.07 -0.05 0.05 0.11 0.21 -0.17 0.06
ID5 0.07 0.04 -0.04 0.09 -0.05 -0.16 -0.22 -0.02 -0.02
ID6 0.07 0.04 -0.07 -0.09 -0.10 -0.12 -0.13 0.18 -0.01
MD1*CGC_P 0.02 0.07 0.04 0.07 0.24 0.10 0.12 0.01 -0.01
MD2*CGC_N -0.05 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.00 -0.02
MD3*CGC_F -0.04 -0.11 -0.03 -0.06 -0.06 -0.02 -0.05 0.06 0.00
  
 
 
ID1 ID2 ID3 ID4 ID5 ID6 
MD1* 
CGC_P 
MD2* 
CGC_N 
MD3* 
CGC_F 
ID2 -0.11 1.00        
ID3 -0.12 -0.13 1.00       
ID4 -0.21 -0.22 -0.23 1.00      
ID5 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.13 1.00     
ID6 -0.24 -0.25 -0.27 -0.46 -0.15 1.00    
MD1*CGC_P -0.06 0.05 0.09 -0.01 -0.04 -0.03 1.00   
MD2*CGC_N -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 0.02 -0.03 0.04 -0.03 1.00  
MD3*CGC_F 0.02 -0.06 -0.06 -0.03 -0.03 0.11 -0.03 -0.03 1.00
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APPENDIX 11: PROPOSED NEW MODULE SYLLABUS 
 
 
AFBE 320 
 
 
Corporate Governance Lectures Labs Project ECTS 
3 No No 5 
Aims One aim of the module is to enable students understand the 
theory and mechanics of corporate governance. It also aims 
to enable students to understand Stock Exchange theory and 
practice with emphasis on the Cyprus Stock Exchange. 
 
Learning outcomes: By the end of this course students should: 
• Examine the history of corporate governance and the 
reasons for its implementation in many stock exchanges. 
• Be able to define corporate governance and understand 
its role in effective management and control. 
• Understand the various corporate governance 
mechanisms that affect performance. 
• Be able to understand how the Cyprus Stock Exchange 
operates and its role in the financial system. 
• Examine and understand the main principles in the 
regulations of the Cyprus Stock Exchange including the 
corporate governance code. 
• Examine the role of efficiency market hypothesis theory. 
• Examine the literature concerning the relationship 
between Corporate Governance and firm performance using 
evidence from various stock exchanges. 
Description: 1. History and evolution of the role of corporate 
governance in stock markets including Cyprus. 
2. Corporate Governance Theory. 
3. Relationships between Corporate Governance 
mechanisms and Performance including the factors of: 
directors, ownership and control. 
4. How the Cyprus Stock Exchange operates in 
comparison to other markets 
5. The role of the Cyprus Stock Exchange in the finance 
system. 
6. The theory of the Efficient Market Hypothesis and its 
application to other markets including the Cyprus 
Stock Exchange. 
7. Review of Stock Exchange regulations with emphasis 
on the Corporate Governance Code. 
8. Research concerning the relationship between 
corporate governance and firm performance using 
evidence from various stock exchanges.  
 
Textbook: Kaplan Publishing, ACCA Complete Text P1 PA: Professional 
Accountant, Kaplan Publishing, 2009 
References: Mallin, C, Corporate Governance, Second Edition, Oxford 
University Press, 2007. 
Monks, AG and Minow, N, Corporate Governance, Third 
Edition, Malden MA, Blackwell, 2004. 
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Becket, Michael, How the Stock Market Works, Second 
Edition, Kogan Page, 2004.  
Assessment: • Final Exam: 60% 
• Coursework: 40% 
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